





History of Brazil.

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PREFACE

History of Brazil;

by

Robert Southey.

Part the Second.

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Printed for Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown,
Paternoster-row.

1817.

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PREFACE.

I MUST not send the second volume of this History into the world without acknowledging some of the many favours which I have received during its progress. I am beholden to Sir Charles Stuart, among other acts of kindness, for the use of the Valeroso Lucideno : to Captain Patrick for that of the Latin version and continuation of Charlevoix : to Mr. Thomas Kinder for a volume of Noticias del Paraguay, and the prose Argentina, both in manuscript, and for his own valuable Journal : to Mr. Gooden for the Life of F. Joam d'Almeida, among other books, and a manuscript Apology for the Jesuits in Paraguay and Maranham, of great importance ; to Mr. Heber for many works concerning Spanish America, and among them a volume of papers relating to the affair of Cardenas : and to his Excellency the Conde dos Arcos, Governor of the Captaincy of Bahia, and to the Public Library of that

PREFACE.

city, for their singular liberality in entrusting me, across the Atlantic, with one of the works which I solicited, and for enriching my collection with their duplicate of Anchieta's Grammar, . . . one of the most gratifying circumstances which has occurred to me in the course of my literary life.

I have now to perform another duty of a very different nature. In the year 1815, M. Alphonse de Beauchamp published an 'Histoire du Bresil,' in three volumes octavo. He asserts in his Preface that he had been employed seven years in arranging the materials; and that he could have published the two first volumes much sooner if he had not thought it better to lay the whole work at once before the public. In composing the concluding volume, he says, he thought it necessary to see if any recent information could be obtained; . . . but M. Beauchamp shall speak in his own words. "En coordonnant les materiaux
"de mon dernier volume, je sentis la necessité de le
"mettre au niveau des recherches qui avaient com-
"plété la premiere partie de mon ouvrage, et de for-
"tifier, par des informations recentes et authenti-
"ques, les chapitres destinés a faire connaitre d'une
"maniere positive l'etat actuel du Bresil: rien ne fut
"négligé pour arriver a ce resultat. Dans l'inter-
"valle, parut a Londres une compilation sur l'his-

PREFACE.

“toire de Buenos Ayres et du Bresil jusqu'en 1640.
“ Sans offrir de nouvelles lumieres, l'auteur Anglais
“ (M. Southey) faisait esperer qu'un second volume,
“ annoncé pour 1810, completerait les annales du
“ Bresil, et donnerait des renseignemens tout-a-fait
“ nouveaux sur la geographie et sur la statistique de
“ cette vaste contree. Vain espoir : l'attente de
“ l'Europe litteraire a été encore une fois trompée.
“ Ce second volume, si emphatiquement promis, n'a
“ point paru !”

It is now my turn to notice the work of M. Alphonse de Beauchamp. With the exception of an introductory chapter upon the History of Portugal, and another containing a general description of Brazil, the two first volumes and about a fourth part of the third, are wholly and solely made up from mine. The list of authorities which he has given is copied from my marginal references; the manuscripts which he pretends to quote are those in my possession, and only those which I had used in my first volume. The whole matter of his history is taken from that volume, as far as it would carry him, and from no other source; and in many places it is close translation. Care has been taken to disguise this plagiarism by transposing the matter as much as possible, and omitting all that relates to

PREFACE.

Paraguay, . . for M. Beauchamp is no novice in the art of plagiarism, as M. de Puissaye, and others of his countrymen, may bear witness. But he has not been able, with all his art, to conceal his ignorance of the Portuguese language ; . . for venturing to translate *Escrivam da Fazenda*, he metamorphoses a Secretary of the Treasury into an Historiographer ; and he speaks of a disease in Brazil called *Bexigas*, not knowing that the *Bexigas* are the Small Pox.

The concluding volume of this work is so far advanced that I trust nothing will prevent it from appearing in the course of next winter.

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HISTORY OF BRAZIL.

CHAPTER XIX.

A Truce for ten years between Portugal and the United Provinces. The Dutch take advantage of it to get possession of Serigipe, Loanda in Angola, the Isle of St. Thomas, and Maranham. Antonio Telles da Sylva Governor of Brazil. Expedition of the Dutch against Chili. The Portugueze of Maranham recover the Island, and compel the enemy to abandon S. Luiz. Nassau is recalled. His last advice to the Great Council.

One of the first acts of the Viceroy after the news of the Acclamation reached him, had been to dispatch a vessel to Recife with the intelligence. Instead of bearing a flag of truce, and waiting off the harbour, as usual, to obtain permission for entering, the ship appeared drest out with gala colours, sailed in at once, firing repeated salutes of musquetry, and anchored in front of Nassau's residence, who rewarded the messenger with a jewel of great value. The tidings of this Revolution were received with equal joy by the Pernambucans and the Dutch; the former hoping to receive from a Portugueze King that efficient succour which they knew it was in vain to look for from

CHAP.
XIX.
1641.

The revolution in Portugal announced to Nassau.

Valeroso Lucideno. l. 2. c. 2. p. 108.

April.

CHAP.
XIX.
1641.

Madrid, the latter expecting easily to extend their conquests during the confusion which would ensue. Three days were set apart for public rejoicings; on the first the sports were after the Portugueze manner, horse-races, running at the ring, throwing the cane, and pelting with *alcanzias*, or hollow earthen balls, filled with flowers, ashes, or powder, a sort of carnival hand-grenade, which the name seems to refer to a Moorish origin: on the second the entertainment was Flemish; a magnificent dinner was given by Count Mauritz to the gentry of both nations and sexes, and the order of the day was, that whoever erred in a toast should drink it a second time; on the third the horse-exercises were renewed, and the whole was concluded by a public supper. Before this was over a ship arrived from Holland with dispatches, announcing that a truce for ten years had been agreed upon between the States and the Court of Portugal, . . . and the last bumper was drank in honour of the joyful tidings.

East. Lus.
5. § 18.

*Truce for
ten years
concluded
with Hol-
land.*

But the Brazilians had little cause for rejoicing at the arrangements made between Portugal and Holland. Immediately after the Acclamation of Joam IV., ambassadors from Lisbon were dispatched to Paris, London, and the Hague, to solicit the alliance of the three courts. Tristram de Mendoza was charged with the last and most important of these missions. A colleague had been nominated with equal powers, but as something occurred which prevented this person from accepting the charge, it was thought that the deficiency might be supplied by appointing Antonio de Sousa Tavares secretary to the embassy, and annexing to it two merchants as counsellors, one of whom was a Dutchman, naturalized and married in Lisbon. Circumstanced as the new King was, it was so essential that his cause at foreign courts should be entrusted to men of rank and fidelity, that where these qualifications were found, he was

fain to dispense with the talents which would at other times have been required. But the plan of appointing counsellors to the ambassador had inconveniences which might have been foreseen: it might wound his pride, and it lessened his responsibility. He was instructed to negociate for the restitution of all the Portugueze conquests and colonies which had been captured; for it was argued, that as Portugal had only been involved in the war with Holland as dependant upon Spain, in consequence of an usurpation which she had shaken off, it was not just that Holland, with whom she was now engaged in a common cause against Spain, should retain possessions taken from Portugal under such circumstances. However cogent in equity this reasoning might appear to the Portugueze, they could hardly expect that it should be admitted. Willingly or unwillingly, the forces and treasures of Portugal had been employed against the United States during their arduous struggle with the mighty power of Spain, and the conquests which the Dutch had effected in their foreign possessions had been made fairly in open war. Discussions upon this point were set aside for the present by the expedient of concluding a truce for ten years, and it was stipulated that in the course of eight months Portugal should send plenipotentiaries to treat for a definitive peace; but whatever might be the issue of this fuller negotiation, the truce was to hold good for the whole term specified. A year was allowed for notifying it to the Dutch commanders in India, with a proviso that if the intelligence should arrive sooner, the truce was immediately to commence. Of this article the Portugueze complained, and censured the conduct of their diplomatist who submitted to it; but the letter of the treaty would not have been objectionable, if the Power by whom it was dictated had had no sinister object in view. On these terms their High Mightinesses agreed to supply the Por-

CHAP.
XIX.
1641.

Ericeira.
I. 153-5.

June 12.

CHAP. XIX.
 1641. Treachery of the Dutch.

tugueze with arms and ammunition, of which their country had been stript by Spain, and to send troops and ships to Lisbon, to be employed against the common enemy. Meantime in their advices to Nassau, (who, finding that the Company were jealous of his power, and listened willingly to complaints which envious factions or discontented individuals sent home against him, had requested to be recalled,) they required him to continue in the command, and ordered him to seize the present opportunity of extending their conquests as widely as possible. Especially, they observed, it was of importance to get possession of Bahia, and if he should not think it practicable to win the city either by fraud or force, they recommended him to besiege and blockade it, as in that case means might be found of obtaining it when peace was made. It is a Dutch historian who relates this, and he states it openly, without appearing to perceive the iniquity of the transaction, or offering the apology with which the members of the Dutch Government perhaps glossed over the villainy to their own consciences. They no doubt believed it impossible that Portugal could maintain its independence against Spain, and looked upon the revolution as a mere temporary event, from which it was their business to derive all the advantages they could while it lasted.

Barlaeus.
 p. 202.

Embassy of Vilhena to Recife.

The Brazilians were not prepared for this treachery. The three Governors, who after the deposition of the Viceroy had been invested with the command at Bahia, sent Pedro Correa da Gama, and Vilhena the Jesuit, to Recife, to make arrangements for a friendly intercourse between the two Powers, till things should be ultimately adjusted by their respective Governments in Europe. Vilhena had private business to transact in Pernambuco. His brethren of the Company had charged him to secure the plate which they had buried before their flight, and Mathias and Duarte de Albuquerque had in

like manner commissioned him to recover their hidden treasures, and the property which they had disposed of in trusty hands. For himself, the Jesuit is accused of having carried on a gainful and dishonourable trade. He had brought out with him from Portugal many letters from the King with blank directions, to be distributed according to his discretion among the persons of most influence and character in Brazil; the letters announced the restoration of the legitimate family to these persons as men whose worth was well known, and whose loyalty was relied on by the Government; the possession of such letters therefore became a mark of honour, and would be a pledge of future favour from the Court; they would at least serve as valid testimonials for those who should solicit preferment. Vilhena made them matters of private contract, boasting of his own power at Lisbon, and enriched himself by the sale. The end however was singularly unfortunate for himself; he sailed from Brazil in a caravel and reached Madeira, but trembling for the wealth which he carried with him in a vessel so little capable of defence, he took his passage from thence in a large Levant ship bound for Lisbon. The caravel arrived safely; the Levanter was taken by an Algerine pirate, and Vilhena ended his days in the most wretched of all slaveries.

These Deputies ordered Paulo da Cunha and Henrique Diaz, who were still ravaging the country in defiance of all the Dutch force, to withdraw their troops into the Portugueze Captaincies; and the order being now given in good faith, was obeyed. Nassau had set a price of five hundred florins upon Paulo da Cunha's head, a measure which produced no other effect than that of making Paulo offer two thousand cruzados for Nassau's. Such however was the apparent alteration of affairs in consequence of the Braganzan revolution, that Paulo was now invited with the Commissioners to Nassau's table; the conversation turned upon

CHAP.
XIX.
1641.

Valeroso Lucideno. p. 113.

Paulo da Cunha and Henrique Diaz recalled from Pernambuco. Barleus. p. 201.

CHAP. what had passed while they were enemies, and the Dutch
 XIX. Governor, in the freedom of convivial intercourse, complained
 1641. to his guest of the great price which he had offered for his life.
 Paulo replied that the cause of complaint lay rather on his part
 than on the Count's; it could not be thought that the head of a
 Prince ought to be valued at less than two thousand cruzados
 to a poor soldier, but when a Prince wished to purchase that of
 a brave man, five hundred florins was too little to offer for it.

Ericcyra.
 1. p. 495.

*The Dutch
 surprise Se-
 regipe.*

Barleus.
 201.
Cost. Lus.
 5. § 20.

Ericcyra.
 1. 197.

Cost. Lus.
 5. § 20.

Barleus.
 203.

During their stay at Recife the Commissioners saw sufficient
 reason to distrust the sincerity of Nassau's professions, and on
 their return they warned the Governors, that the Dutch were
 deceiving them. The Governors, as they would fain have be-
 lieved the suspicion groundless, acted as if it were so; but it was
 soon verified. Mauritz, in obedience to his instructions, pre-
 pared to extend his conquests on all sides; and in consequence
 of the recall of the marauding parties, he ventured to increase
 his disposable force by withdrawing the greater part of his garri-
 sons, relying upon the supineness of the three Governors, and
 the credulity with which they confided in his good faith. His
 first attempt was toward the North, upon St. Christovam, the
 capital of Seregipe. The inhabitants, who had returned there
 since the siege of St. Salvador, were surprized by a squadron of
 four sail, which entered the port carrying a flag of truce: . . . an act
 of superfluous treachery, for the place could not have been
 maintained if it had been fairly attacked. The assailants landed
 without opposition; they fortified themselves, and then began
 to search for mines, expecting to find silver. But they had
 little success in this, and indeed little opportunity for it, for this
 act of aggression roused the Governors, and they sent Camaram
 with his native troops to encamp within sight of the town, and
 prevent the Dutch from venturing beyond their works. The
 first and second time that any of them went out to seek provi-

sions, he was instructed to take every thing from them, and warn them that on a third attempt their lives would be the forfeiture. These orders he obeyed so well that the conquerors were imprisoned within the town which they had so dishonourably won, and reduced to depend for subsistence upon what they received by sea.

CHAP.
XIX.
1641.

Cast. Lus.
s. 24.
Ericyura,
l. 495.

Bahia had lost a great part of its force in consequence of the Revolution. There were in its garrison seven hundred Spanish and Neapolitan troops; the Portugueze were too honourable to make men prisoners who had so long been their fellow soldiers; they gave them a good ship capable of holding them all, and victualled for a voyage to Spanish America, but would not allow them to lay in provisions for a longer course, well knowing that if they sailed to Spain they would immediately be employed against Portugal. After these troops had past Cape St. Augustine, they carried away their main mast in a gale, and put into Paraiba to repair, where they endeavoured to procure stores enough to serve them till they should reach Europe. Here however they found themselves in worse hands than in those of the Portugueze. The Dutch seized them, which was easily done as they were without arms, and compelled them to work at the fortifications, while it was deliberated in what manner to dispose of them, some being of opinion that the surest and shortest method was to hang them out of the way. At length it was determined to send the men to some of the Spanish settlements, where for want of officers to keep them together, they would be likely to disperse. The officers were detained in Pernambuco, till after some months of solicitation they were allowed to return home by way of Holland.

*Spanish and
Neapolitan
troops sent
from Bahia.*

Val-raso Lu-
cileno. p.
115.

In ridding themselves of these internal enemies, the Portugueze suffered a grievous diminution of a force which had never been equal to the danger for which it was required; and in this

*Expedition
of the Dutch
against An-
gola.*

CHAP. state of weakness the Government was roused from its dreams
 XIX. of security by tidings of invasion on all sides, and perceived
 1641. when it was too late the important service which Paulo da
 Cunha and Henrique Diaz had rendered by occupying the inva-
 ders' attention. Jol and Hinderson had been dispatched with
 two thousand regular troops and two hundred Indians against
 S. Paulo de Loanda, the capital of Angola, and the most impor-
 tant of the Portugueze possessions in Africa. Information had
 been given to the Governor Pedro Cesar de Menezes, by his na-
 tive spies, that the King of Congo had sent agents to Pernam-
 buco to invite the Dutch to this attempt: whatever credit he
 might attach to the intelligence, he had no means either of pro-
 viding against the danger, or of resisting it: some of his troops
 were in the interior, engaged in war with the negro chiefs; and
 others had lately deserted in a galleon, disgusted with their
 station in a pestilential country, where death was daily sweep-
 ing away their companions. When the approach of the inva-
 ders was known, he could muster only two hundred troops and
 one hundred and fifty armed inhabitants. The Bishop, an old
 man of exemplary virtue and great resolution, brought out
 the clergy and all his household, and carried a harquebuss him-
 self, notwithstanding his advanced age. When the fleet came in
 sight, Pedro Cesar thought they would sail up towards the city,
 and he ordered the officers of the crown to sink two vessels for
 the purpose of blocking the channel. They objected that the
 public finances could not afford to pay the owners of these ves-
 sels for the loss; upon which one of the inhabitants, by name
 Antonio Ribeiro Pinto, exclaimed, that if the proposed measure
 was expedient for the defence of the city, it must be done, and
 if the Treasury could not indemnify the owners, he would. This
 Portugueze opened all his stores, and offered all that he pos-
 sessed to the public service. The Dutch however did not at-

tempt the channel: they blockaded it to prevent any of their booty from escaping by sea; then put out their boats, and landed under cover of two ships, which were skilfully anchored between the two forts of Cassondama, and Penedo, or the Rock, the guns of these forts not being of sufficient calibre to command the pass. Pedro Cesar could not reach this part of the shore in time to oppose their landing, and with his inferior force it would have been hopeless to attack them afterwards. He retreated to the fort of Santa Cruz, declaring, that since it was his ill fortune to lose the city for want of troops to defend it, he would at least die at his post, and show that there had been no want of courage on his part. But then the Bishop and the People interfered, and required him to maintain the country for the service of God and the King, and their remonstrances prevailed upon him to abandon the intention of sacrificing his life to a false point of honour. They hastened into the city, loaded themselves and their slaves with ammunition, as the thing most needful for men in their circumstances, buried the church plate, and secured as many of their most valuable effects as the urgency of the occasion would allow; and so busily were they employed in these arrangements, that when they were about to leave the town, there remained but one avenue which the enemy had not occupied. By this it was two hours after midnight; the settlement was in too rude a state to have good roads, even immediately near the principal city; they were bewildered, and in endeavouring to regain the path must have fallen into the hands of the invader, if they had not found a negress who was employed in making charcoal in the woods; she directed them on their way to the river Bengo, where the Jesuits had a farm, and where there were large plantations of maize. The Angolan war now assumed the same character as that of Brazil; a superior enemy possessed the capital, and the Portugueze kept up their

CHAP.
XIX.
1641.

CHAP. desultory hostilities in the country; but their inferiority was
 XIX. greater here, and they were driven successively from one post
 1641. to another, till finally they retreated to their fort of Massangano,
 abandoning about thirty leagues of territory to the invaders; while the natives willingly exchanged their old yoke for one of which they had never yet felt the weight.

*Historia de
 Angola, MS.*

*Effects of
 the loss of
 Loanda upon
 Brazil.*

*Historia de
 Angola, MS.*

*Sim de Vas.
 Vida de
 Almeida.
 6. 1. § 1.*

*Barlaeus.
 207.*

The capture of Loanda happened on St. Bartholomew's day, a Saint who is famous in Catholic mythology for his exploits against the Devil: as the Saint had not interfered in their defence, the Angolan Portugueze believed that their sins had brought down this chastisement, and that Satan had been let loose against them. The Brazilians were equally astonished and dismayed at this unexpected stroke: their whole supply of negroes came from Angola; and they not only lost the direct profits of this execrable trade, but they looked for the loss of every thing in consequence, the whole business of their sugar works being performed by slaves; so compleatly were they dependent upon the labour of this injured and unhappy race, that their ruin appeared inevitable, now that the supply was in the hands of the Dutch. Nassau was of opinion that the Government of Angola ought to be appended to that of Brazil: it was just, he urged, that he who had planned and directed this important conquest, should govern the territory which he had won; and it was expedient, because of the importance of the Slave Trade to these American possessions, and because from Brazil Angola could most easily be supplied. The Company thought otherwise, and on better grounds. Portugal, they said, had always made Angola a distinct government. Brazil still required provisions from Holland; how then could it provide for these new possessions? its own affairs were sufficient fully to occupy its rulers. The simplest method of proceeding was, that ships should sail direct from Holland to Loanda, carry out stores

and articles of traffic for that country, discharge their cargoes there, take in slaves for Brazil, and finally return to Europe laden with sugar.

Meantime Jol proceeded with thirteen ships against the Island of St. Thomas. In the year 1600 the Dutch had attacked this place, taken the town and the fortresses, and endeavoured to establish themselves there; but the climate made such havoc among them, that in the course of a fortnight, the Admiral, the Vice Admiral, every Captain in the expedition, (one alone excepted,) and above a thousand of the men were swept off, and the few who survived fled from their baneful conquest, lest they also should perish there. Such experience of this deadly climate would have sufficed for any people but the Dutch, in whom the thirst of commercial gain produces as much indifference to pestilence, as predestination occasions in the Turks. St. Thomas's had nearly been secured by the Spaniards when Portugal recovered her independence. The Islanders received the first news of this event from an English ship; but it came in so confused a rumour, that they doubted its truth, and waited anxiously for clearer information. A Spanish vessel shortly arrived, bringing out two hundred soldiers, under an officer who was to assume the Government as soon as he could succeed in introducing his men into the fort: a French ship happened to arrive at the same time at the adjacent Ilha das Cabras, or Goat Island; the Spaniard ordered the inhabitants to treat her as an enemy, upon which the French Captain attacked the Spaniard, and captured her, but set her men on shore. Miguel Pereyra de Mello, the Alcayde Mor, was at that time acting as Governor, his predecessor having lately died. He suspected the intent of the Spaniards, and by examining a Portuguese pilot, whom they had incautiously brought with them, he found that the English news appeared to be well founded.

CHAP.
XIX.
1641.

*Expedition
against the
Island of St.
Thomas.*

*Barleus.
213.
Dapper.
Eilanden
van Afrika
p. 76.
Des Mar-
chais, t. 3.
p. 20.*

CHAP. XIX. Upon this he seized the officer who meant to have superseded him, and put him to the torture, to make him declare what had happened. The resolute Spaniard bore his sufferings in silence, and Pereyra obtained no farther certainty by this abominable act; but having sufficient evidence, he proclaimed Braganza, and supplied the French with provisions, as being now his allies. Two days afterwards an English vessel brought dispatches from the Court of Lisbon; and before the rejoicings on this occasion were well over, came a bark from Angola, with tidings that Loanda was lost, and that the victorious Dutch were about to attack the island.

*Ericcyra. l.
p. 299.*

*The governor
capitulates.*

Pereyra victualled the fort, and ordered the moveable wealth to be carried into the interior. The Dutch landed fourteen companies without opposition, and entrenched themselves in a chapel of St. Anna, about two miles from the city. They ventured then to bring their ships against the fort, and attempted under cover of their guns to storm it; the walls were nearly thirty feet high; they had no scaling ladders, and suffered considerable loss; one of their ships also was set on fire, and blew up, few of the crew escaping. But the Portugueze did not know how to improve their success; the Dutch discovered that the town and the smaller forts were abandoned, and bringing the artillery which thus fell into their hands against the Citadel, they attacked it for fourteen days. During that time only three of the garrison were slain; the bombs, however, frightened Pereyra, and he surrendered a place so strong and so well provided with means of defence and subsistence, that it might have held out till the climate, a sure ally, should have destroyed the assailants. The only conditions which he required were, that he and the King's troops might be sent to Portugal; he had no sooner arrived there than he was thrown into the Castle of Lisbon, and remained in prison during the rest of his life.

*Barleus.
p. 207.
Ericcyra.
p. 300.*

The wealthiest of the Islanders now made terms, and paid 5500 cruzados to preserve their sugar-works from destruction, and for permission to live unmolested, and under their own laws, as subjects of the Dutch. Some of a braver spirit still held out in the interior of the Island; but enough submitted to save the conquerors from that total destruction which must have overtaken them had the whole population been in arms. For disease, as usual, broke out among the strangers, and made such ravages, that scarcely a tenth part of the men were able to perform the ordinary routine of service. Jol himself perished; a seaman of the old Dutch school, rough as the element upon which he lived, disregarding all the arts, ornaments, and almost the decencies of life, and living like his sailors, but beloved by them, for they had full confidence that whatever he undertook would be well planned and resolutely carried into effect. Before he died, in his hatred of the island which had caused the loss of so many brave men, he desired that he might not be buried in so cursed a country, but that they would throw him overboard ten or twelve leagues from land. The Dutch, however, deposited his remains in the Cathedral Church, a remarkable edifice, inasmuch as it is said to stand immediately under the line. Nassau, who believed that it was of importance for the Company to possess this island, and was aware how dreadful an expense of life would be required to support it, advised them to follow the system of the Portugueze, and garrison it wholly with convicts; thus none would die there except fellows who had deserved death, and all who lived would be so much clear gain to the republic: in pursuance of this policy he himself transported thither all the criminals from Pernambuco. He intreated them also to send out medicines, for they chose to believe, that wherever diseases existed, there also would the appointed remedies be found; and acting upon this convenient

CHAP.
XIX.
1641.

*Mortality
among the
Dutch.*

*Valeroso Lu-
cideno. p.
118.*

*Barleus.
209. 212.*

CHAP. theory, they left their men to perish without any of the assist-
 XIX. ance which art might have afforded.

1641.

*Maciel ap-
 pointed go-
 vernor of
 Maranham.*

The Company had sent Nassau particular directions to obtain possession of the Isle and Province of Maranham; the northern division of Portugueze America would then be theirs, and from thence they could conveniently annoy the Spanish Main and the Islands. Maciel was at this time Governor of this state. During Raimundo's usurpation he had been in Spain, soliciting the reward of his services, for such he made his atrocities appear, where there was no one to plead the cause of the Indians against him. The rewards which he obtained were so much beyond those services, however he might have exaggerated them, that corrup- tion as well as falsehood must have been employed in his behalf.

June 14,
 1637.

The Order of Christ was given him; he was made a Fidalgo, Governor of the State of Maranham, and Donatory of a new Captaincy, named from the Cabo do Norte, and extending from that Cape to the Wiapoc or Pinzon, that river being considered as the boundary between the dominions of Portugal and Cas- tille. The demarcation included the islands lying within ten leagues of the coast, and extended inland from eighty to a hun- dred leagues, as far as the Rio dos Tapuyaussús. This Cap- taincy was created for him, and an honorary clause inserted in the patent, that all his successors should retain the name and armorial bearings of Maciel Parente, which if any one neglected to do, his right of inheritance should lapse to the next heir.

*Captaincy of
 Cabo do
 Norte erect-
 ed for him.*

*Berredo,
 § 672—4.*

*Raimundo
 sent to Lis-
 bon and
 there absolv-
 ed*

This man had exerted himself at Madrid in favour of the system of Slavery, as well as for his own interests, which indeed were founded upon that system. Notwithstanding the numer- ous decrees which had been past from time to time in behalf of the natives, he obtained an edict for establishing what was called the Administration of the Free Indians; an arrangement by which these unhappy people were nominally declared free,

while they were actually made slaves; they were attached to the land, and equally with the land the property of its owner; but they could not be sold separately, like other cattle. This edict Maciel brought out with him, to the great joy of the planters and slave-hunters, who regarded it as a triumph over the Jesuits. He was instructed to enquire into the conduct of Raimundo in forcibly assuming the government. The result of the enquiry was, that this officer was pronounced an intruder, all the acts which he had past were declared null, and he was sent prisoner to Portugal. There the sentence was reversed; Raimundo pleaded, that he was appointed to succeed in the succession-papers, and though these had not been opened when he assumed the government, and consequently could not justify the act of usurpation, the plea was admitted. Such a reversal was more probably obtained by favour, or corruption, than by his acknowledged good conduct and meritorious measures. He deserved pardon, but ought not to have been acquitted.

CHAP.
XIX.
1641.

1638.

Berredo.
676—7.

*Misconduct
of Maciel.*

Maciel entrusted the new Captaincy to his nephew Joam Velho do Valle, whom he appointed at the same time Capitam Mor of Curupa. When it was attempted to extend dominion without increasing the force which was to maintain it, and one person was thus invested with two offices, each of which would have given full employment to the activity of the ablest man, the consequences in a time of war and danger might easily be foreseen. Things however seemed to prosper on the side of Maranham, whilst Brazil was struggling against its invaders. Teixeira returned from his adventurous voyage. The Captain of Para, on account of the numerous complaints which were sent from Belem against him, was suspended by Maciel, and his post given to Teixeira during the suspension, to the general joy of the inhabitants. But they knew little of Maciel's charac-

667—670 ?

CHAP.
XIX.
1641.

ter, who could expect justice at his hands. No sooner had Manoel Madeira, the accused captain, appeared before him, than he acquitted him of all the charges so precipitately, as to make it apparent that he had either been suspended without cause, or was now reinstated without investigation. Madeira embarked for Belem in a caravel which had on board sixty soldiers, and twelve families of colonists for the new Captaincy. Either he resented his first treatment, and wished to revenge himself on Maciel; or more probably was afraid of the reception which he might meet at Belem: so he gained the pilot, and fled with the ship to the Spanish Indies. Maciel instantly dispatched a vessel with advices to Europe by the same course, stating the diminution which his force had thus unexpectedly undergone, and how little he was able to resist any attack which the Dutch might make upon him. Greatly, however, as such an attack was to be apprehended, he continued to act as though in perfect security; and the same blind selfishness which had so often made him set at naught the feelings of religion and common humanity, led him now to disregard the plainest worldly prudence. Weakened as S. Luiz had been by the last draught of soldiers, he drew a second detachment from the garrison, and dispatched the men to Belem, with orders to Teixeira to send them on to his new Captaincy, and with them as many troops from Para as there might be there above the number in Francisco Coelho's time. Teixeira reluctantly obeyed instructions against which he did not venture to remonstrate, because he knew the violence of Maciel's temper. He resolved now to go to Portugal himself, and there solicit the reward of services which seemed to be in danger of remaining unrewarded; but while he was preparing for the voyage he died, greatly regretted by the people of Para, and leaving a memorable name in the history of South America.

*Teixeira's
death.*

Berredo.
§ 676-755

The news of the Acclamation now reached S. Luiz, and instructions came to the Governor at the same time, that he was to regard no people as enemies, except the Moors and Spaniards, . . . names which could thus be coupled only to show that the Portugueze regarded both with equal abhorrence. Maciel knew that since these instructions were written the Dutch had seized Serecipe, and this knowledge might well have alarmed him for Maranham. An Englishman, who arrived from St. Michael's, brought him positive information that he would be attacked; he only ridiculed the intelligence. A few days afterwards some Indians assured him that a fleet was making for Peria, and tidings speedily followed that they were at anchor in the Bay of Aressagy, only four leagues from the city. Then indeed he sent to see what they were; and when he was told that they were fourteen ships, and all Dutch, such was his besotted confidence, that instead of making any preparations for defence, he saluted them, as soon as they appeared at the entrance of the Bay, as if they had been friends. They neither returned the salute nor brought to: and he then fired upon them; but his subsequent conduct proved this to be an act of sudden anger, not of determined courage. They returned the fire, ran up the river or channel of Bacanga, which separates the isle from the main land on the east, and dropt anchor before the chapel of N. Senhora do Desterro.

Koin and Lichthart commanded this expedition. They landed half their men without resistance; the inhabitants, betrayed into a fatal confidence by their Governor's imprudence, were utterly unprepared; and seeing no hope of saving the place, every man thought only of saving himself and his family, and fled with them to the woods. About an hundred and fifty men got into the fort with Maciel, who now sent to the Dutch commander, saying, that the King of Portugal was at peace with

CHAP.
XIX.
1641.

*Expedition
of the Dutch
against Ma-
ranham.*

*Berredo.
§ 756—65.*

*Maciel per-
mits them to
land and oc-
cupy part of
the town.*

CHAP. Holland, and therefore the invasion of a Portugueze colony was
 XIX. contrary to all laws. Koin replied, that he had been driven there
 1641. by stress of weather, and had landed his troops in this hostile
 manner because he had been fired upon : nevertheless, if the Go-
 vernor would come out and treat with him in person, something
 might be agreed upon for the benefit of both nations. Maciel
 had obtained the reputation of being a brave man ; he was only
 a cruel one : he went out of his fortress ; Koin told him he
 could not leave Maranham till he received instructions from the
 States, whose conduct would be decided by that of the Court
 of Lisbon ; and he proposed that Maciel should continue in his
 government till these instructions came, and assign a part of
 the city as quarters for the Dutch, where they might be sup-
 plied with all things necessary, paying the usual prices. Maciel
 was perfectly satisfied with proposals which gave him time to
 secure his private interests, issued his orders accordingly, and
 returned into the fort, to hold his office at the pleasure of the
 invaders.

Ferreira.
 § 766—9.

*The Dutch
 seize the
 citadel.*

The Dutch, upon their way towards the city, gave sufficient
 proof, by the insolence of their language, if any proof had been
 needed, that they considered the island as their conquest ; and
 they broke in pieces the images of the Virgin and of St. Anto-
 nio, in the chapel by which they landed. No insult could have
 been felt more deeply by the Portugueze, who had not all been
 panic-stricken, like their commander. Paulo Soares de Avellar
 attempted to make a stand at one of the gates, but his force
 was inadequate. Francisco Coelho de Carvalho besought Ma-
 ciel to prepare for defence in the fort ; the enemy, he said, were
 plundering the city, and had parleyed with him only for the
 sake of gaining admittance. Nothing, however, could rouse
 this man. A gunner, by name Mathias Joam, formed a masked
 battery of more than thirty pieces against the Praça de Armas,

which he would have opened upon the enemy as soon as they should come to take possession of it: but when he informed the Governor of the dispositions which he had made, Maciel hesitated and objected, till he made it too late to save the place. He soon found it too late to save himself. Koin advanced to the fort: the gates were opened to him, and Maciel delivered him the keys, in return for which he speedily received his proper reward. The Portuguese flag was struck, that of the United Provinces hoisted in its place, and the Governor treated as a prisoner. The Dutch then betook themselves to pillage. It was told the Prior of Monte do Carmo, that the priest of the Mother Church had left behind him in his fear some consecrated wafers; and the Prior, regardless of personal danger, hastened to the church and swallowed them, lest the heretics should profane what the people believed to be the actual body of their Redeemer and their God!

It was the interest of the Dutch commanders to repress the spirit of havoc in their men, and by their efforts the settlements on the opposite main were preserved from plunder. There were five sugar-works, or engines, as they are called, at Itapicuru, which compounded for 5000 *arrobas* of their produce. On the Island there were six engines in full employ. The Dutch found also fifty-five large pieces of cannon, ammunition in abundance, and plenty of wine, but few ships, five and forty having lately sailed for the Cape de Verds. The baseness of Maciel seemed to have infected his family. His nephew Pedro, whom after the Acclamation he had appointed Captain of Para, was on his way to Belem with thirty soldiers, 300 Indians, and a convoy of merchandize. He was at Tapuytaperá on the main when the news of the Dutch conquest overtook him, and though out of all danger at the time, and having it completely in his power to reach Belem, where his presence and the reinforcements un-

CHAP.
XIX.164L.*Berreia.* 677
770-5.*The Island is
conquered,
and Maciel
sent away
prisoner.*

CHAP. der him were now so necessary, he turned back to Maranham,
 XIX. and voluntarily surrendered himself, with all the property in his
 1642. charge. The settlement at Tapuytaperá fell in consequence.
 The Islanders were now deprived of all hope, and they who had
 fled from the city returned, and took the oath of obedience to
 the United States. The Dutch shipt off one hundred and fifty
 persons, of whom they were suspicious, giving them a leaky
 vessel, and liberty to go whither they would: they sailed for
 Madeira, but were glad to put into the island of St. Christo-
 phers, then jointly settled by the English and French, where
 they were hospitably received till they could dispose of them-
 selves. Koin and Lichthart repaired a fort which commanded
 the mouth of the Itapicuru; stationed a guard of soldiers in
 each of the sugar-works, as overseers over the owners; and then
 leaving four ships, and a garrison of 600 men to preserve their
 conquest, they sailed on the last day of the year for Recife,
 taking Maciel with them. Nassau, who towards brave men
 had ever shown himself a generous enemy, treated this man with
 the contempt which his late conduct deserved, and sent him
 prisoner to the fortress at Rio Grande, where in a few days he
 died, at the age of seventy-five, having accumulated upon his
 soul as heavy a load of guilt, as any one who ever, to his own
 perdition, hunted down his fellow creatures like beasts of the
 chase, in order to enslave them for beasts of burden.

Barlaeus.
p. 224.
Ericcyra.
p. 303.
Berrelo. §
776 - 780.

Antonio
Telles ap-
pointed Go-
vernor of
Brazil.

It was in vain for the Court of Lisbon to protest against the
 conduct of Nassau, and complain, that while the Dutch in
 Europe were supplying them with stores, and acting conjointly
 against Spain, they were invading the Portugueze possessions
 in Africa and America. Their High Mightinesses replied, that
 these things were done before their Governor in Brazil knew
 that the truce was ratified. They were determined to keep
 what they had won, and the Portugueze, justly indignant at

such treatment, were equally determined to recover, notwithstanding the treaty, conquests which, in defiance of it, had been wrested from them. In this inauspicious manner did the truce begin, one party having committed a flagrant injustice, and the other meditating revenge. Antonio Telles da Sylva was appointed Governor of Brazil, and charged to proceed against the three Governors, for their conduct toward the Marquez de Monte Alvam. Barbalho and Brito were accordingly sent home prisoners: the former was pardoned, his errors being imputed to want of judgment; the latter remained for many years in the common jail at Lisbon: the Bishop escaped with a lighter punishment, being only compelled to refund the whole emoluments which he had received during his administration. The new Governor, following the treacherous policy of which the Dutch had set him the example, continued the same friendly communication with them which had been established since the Revolution, and while he always professed to be at peace, diligently watched for every opportunity of exciting and fomenting insurrections against them.

Relying on these professions, Nassau hoped to enjoy the fruit of his conquests, and to see the ravages of war repaired. But Pernambuco and the southern provinces were visited by other calamities: the season proved unusually wet, the rivers overflowed, and men and cattle were swept away by the floods; especially about the Capivaribi. The young canes were destroyed by the inundation: those which were tall enough to escape this mode of destruction were killed by a species of aquatic worm, which penetrated them, and ate out the pith. This calamity was succeeded by pestilence: the small pox prevailed with such malignity, that more than 1100 negroes were cut off by it in the Captaincy of Paraiba. One evil thus following another, the Portuguese in these conquered provinces

CHAP.
XIX.
1642.

Ericygra.
270.

*Floods and
pestilence in
Pernambuco.*

CHAP. were unable to pay the taxes, and they petitioned the States
 XIX. for relief, representing, that on such occasions their own govern-
 1642. ment was wont to require from those who rented the *Decimas*
 a tenth only of those tenths.

Barleus.
228.

*Nassau's ad-
vice to the
Company.*

Nassau had other difficulties to contend with: the Company having gained what they could during the negotiations, made it their next object to diminish their expenditure, in reliance upon the truce; and they instructed him to dismiss many of his officers, and lessen the pay of the men. Against this act of impolitic parsimony Nassau strongly remonstrated. Many officers, he assured the Directors, in indignation at the mere report of such a measure, had left the service, and sailed for Portugal to serve the new King. But this was no time for reducing the military establishment: the Portugueze were eagerly awaiting an opportunity to recover their losses, and revenge themselves: they were provoked by the capture of Loanda, St. Thomas, and Maranham; and their state of irritated feeling was manifested in their public remonstrances. It was necessary to guard against them; and at the same time to conciliate by all possible means those who had submitted to the Dutch Government; especially it imported to allow them that full religious liberty which had been promised them; nothing had exasperated them so much as the expulsion of the Jesuits, and other religioners, those who were left being only the dregs and disgrace of the church. He had received orders to restrict toleration within the narrowest bounds, and the reformed clergy were calling upon him to enforce these imprudent orders: but he reminded the Company, that it was not for freedom of religion within their own dwelling-houses that the Portugueze had stipulated, but for the full and public enjoyment of their rites and ceremonies, as freely as under their own Government. They were a people, he said, obstinate in their superstition, and who would never

make any country their permanent place of residence where they could not hear the voice of the priest. By establishing schools throughout their conquests, by carefully attending to the young, and labouring to improve the savages, the purer faith was to be promoted. All other methods were perilous, as well as ineffectual. It seems extraordinary that the Jews, who of all men had most reason to hate the Portuguese Government, should have been suspected by Nassau; he said they were always ready for mischief. He again urged the Company to encourage colonization in their Brazilian possessions, for it was not by garrisons and by fear that they could always be defended, but by the attachment of the inhabitants. This would be materially promoted, if an exemption from the tenths during seven years were granted to new settlers upon their marriage, and an additional year of immunity at the end of that term for each of their children; but it would seem an act of ungrateful injustice if this were done without granting some adequate bounty to the owners and overseers of the sugar-works, whose fidelity had been tried, who had borne the worst of the war, many of whom had intermarried with the Dutch, and by whose labours commerce was flourishing; this, therefore the Company should take into consideration.

CHAP.
XIX.
1642.

Barlaeus.
234—9.

*Expedition
of the Dutch
against Chili.*

While Nassau was thus giving the Company wiser counsel than they had wisdom to follow, he was meditating great and extensive plans of conquest. Every thing was ready for an expedition against Buenos Ayres, when his attention was distracted by insurrections in Maranham and in St. Thomas. In the whole of the Spanish colonies there was no place which might so easily have been taken and maintained as Buenos Ayres; but the force intended for this service was now required for the protection of those conquests which had been so dishonourably made, and thus this growing and important city es-

CHAP. XIX.
 1642.
 Barlaeus.
 241-3.

caped. It was feared also that similar attempts would be made in Angola and in Seregipe, and that he might be ready against these expected exigencies, Nassau was compelled to abandon an expedition against the Negroes of the Palmares, who continually infested Pernambuco. A squadron destined against Chili had set sail before this intelligence arrived. The failure of the Dutch fleet against Peru, in the year 1624, had arisen entirely from misconduct, and it was hoped that an attempt made upon a more vulnerable part would efface the shame, and make up for the loss which had been then sustained. Henrik Brouwer, who had been Governor General at Batavia, and was now one of the Directors of the West India Company, offered his services for the occasion; he was a man of distinguished courage, conduct, and integrity, but odious to those under his command, because his discipline was strict, even to severity, and this, perhaps, proceeded from his disposition more than from any error in judgement; for like most of his countrymen in that age, Brouwer was merciless. His instructions were, to search for the Terra Australis on his way, and to offer assistance to the natives of Chili, especially the Araucans, to whom he was to relate, how the Dutch, having once been equally oppressed by their common enemy, the Spaniards, had by a like long and obstinate war recovered and secured their liberty. He was artfully to get from these people the secret of their mines, this being in reality the motive which induced him to plan the expedition, and the Company to undertake it. He was to examine the island of S. Maria, with a view of taking possession of it, in the hope that it might be made another Dunkirk: Baldivia also was to be taken and kept, if he found himself equal to maintain it, with the assistance of the natives. He was to bring back salt-petre, to defray the costs of the expedition; the various dyes which were in use there, one of which was said to exceed cochineal;

and the vicuna, that it might be introduced into the Brazilian provinces. This voyage is remarkable in maritime history, because Brouwer, who intended to pass through the Straits of Le Maire, was driven off by storms, and discovered Staten Land to be an island. As he was the first person who entered the Pacific by this open course, his countrymen wished to have it called after him, the Brouwer Sea, . . . an honour which they could not obtain for him, and to which indeed he had very little claim. He reached Chiloe, stormed some Spanish forts, and with the cruelty which characterized his countrymen in that age, put the men to the sword. But intelligence of his force and designs had previously been received at Lima¹; the Spaniards were prepared to resist his farther progress; and the natives, notwithstanding the cunning with which the new comers endeavoured to cloak their real object, did not conceal their suspicion and abhorrence when they heard them enquire for mines. Brouwer died at Castro; he was succeeded by Elias Herckmann, one of the best of the Dutch, an excellent seaman, and athirst for knowledge of every kind; he had travelled far into the interior of Brazil, on journeys of discovery, and employed his leisure in poetical and historical composition. He reached Baldivia, and began to build a fort there; but it was found that the natives did not supply the troops with food, notwithstanding their promises; . . . in fact, they had little or none to spare from their own wants: the men began first to murmur, then to mutiny and desert, and the Spaniards were collecting forces which would soon have overpowered him. These circum-

CHAP.
XIX.
1642.

Cape Horn
for the first
time past.

Brouwer
dies, Herck-
mann suc-
ceeds to the
command,
and the ex-
pedition
fails.

¹ Barlaeus hints, that this intelligence had been sold to the Spaniards by some of his countrymen: "*Fædo profectò nostratium more, quibus deferre ad exteros domestica nimium proclive.*" P. 275.

stances induced him to abandon the country, and return to Pernambuco. His conduct was not approved by all the members of the government; but before any inquiry could take place, he died, more lamented than his predecessor had been, and leaving a better name to posterity.

Barlaeus.
258—283.

*Tyranny of
the Dutch in
Maranham.*

This was an ill-judged expedition: success had intoxicated the Dutch, and calculators as they were, they seem never to have considered how disproportionate such plans of conquest were to their population, and to their means of maintaining what they might acquire. St. Luiz, like St. Salvador and Olinda, had been easily won; but in Maranham, as in Bahia and Pernambuco, the people whom the incapacity of their rulers had betrayed, soon began to work for their own deliverance. Here, even more than in other parts, the Dutch provoked insurrection by their misconduct. Many of the Portuguese had connected themselves by marriage with the conquerors, thinking that they were delivered over by the mother country; and the people during some months contented themselves with complaining to the Governor of the injuries and insults which they endured: but they found it vain to seek redress from one, who by the admission of his own countrymen was notorious for intemperance, ferocity and cruelty; longer sufferance appeared disgraceful as well as hopeless, and they took the better resolution of revenging themselves with their own right hands. It was time that this resolution should be taken. Four and twenty Portuguese of Maranham had been seized by a creature of the Governor's, from motives of mere personal wickedness, for no suspicion was even pretended against them, and exposed without defence to the savages, by whom they were instantly massacred and devoured.

Barlaeus.
241.

Ditto.
Berredo.
805.

*The inhabitants
determined
to revolt.*

The number of Portuguese who bound themselves to deliver Maranham, or perish in the attempt, did not exceed fifty, besides

some negroes, a race to whom the Dutch have generally behaved more cruelly than any other people. They chose for their leader Antonio Moniz Barreiros, who had been governor of the colony in his early youth, twenty years before this time. The plan which he formed was to attack the five sugar works of Itapicuru on the Main; in these works and in the fort upon the river of that name, there were three hundred Dutch; but the owners were among the confederated patriots, and would be ready, each at his post, to admit and cooperate with their countrymen. It was at first intended that all the five Ingenios should be attacked at the same hour, on the last night of September. The confederates punctually repaired to the appointed place of junction, where they were to receive the final orders of their chief; but when Antonio Moniz saw them thus collected, he thought they were too few to be divided, and immediately changing his plan, determined that they should in one body attack the works of Bento Maciel, which were administered as it is called, by his brother Vital Maciel, both bastards of the infamous governor whose name they bore; that done, they were to proceed to his own works, whither he would previously return, and mark with a light the safest place for their landing.

The first point of attack was carried in less than half an hour; the whole of the Dutch were slain, and the conquerors providing themselves with better arms from the spoils of their enemies, advanced to the second works. Antonio Moniz was ready with his beacon; the Dutch were alarmed, and endeavoured to defend themselves in his dwelling house; it was thatched with palm leaves, to which the Portuguese set fire; the Dutch then broke through the mud wall, endeavouring thus to escape, but they who forced their way out fell by the sword or the musquet; the others, says the Annalist and Governor of Maranhã, died like heretics, being consumed in the flames, the just punish-

CHAP.
XIX.
1642.

Berreto, }
806, 810.

First suc-
cesses of the
insurgents.

CHAP. ment of their barbarous errors. Moniz had received personal
 XIX. ill-treatment from these tenants by force, and exacted such ven-
 1642. geance that every man was destroyed. The third Ingenio was
 on the opposite side of the river, near enough for the garrison
 to take the alarm, and put themselves on their guard; but the
 place was not formed for defence, they were terrified and in-
 ferior in numbers, and were cut off like their companions. The
 fourth was attacked with the like success, and it was only at the
 last that any quarter was given. These works belonged to the
 Sargento Mor, Antonio Teixeira de Mello, second in command
 among the patriots, and by his humane exertions some of the
 Dutch were saved. The head of the detachment to which they
 were entrusted thought this mercy ill-timed, and ordered his men
 to put them to death, but they with proper feeling refused to
 obey him.

Berreto,
 811, 816.

Fort Calva-
 ry taken by
 the Portu-
 guese.

Fort Calvary was still to be won; it was garrisoned by seventy
 men with eight pieces of cannon. Moniz marched toward it
 without delay, and arrived near it just before day-break. His
 scouts fortunately laid hands on a soldier who had past the
 night without the walls, and this man, to save his own life, be-
 came their guide and adviser. He stationed them about fifty
 paces only from the fort, behind a great rock which from that
 day has been called the Rock of Patience, *Penedo da Paciencia*,
 because under its shadow the Portugueze remained several
 hours waiting for an opportunity to attack the enemy. At
 length the morning trumpet sounded, the gates were opened,
 and a small party issued out to reconnoitre and see that all was
 safe. This had been done so often that it was become a mere
 formality; they approached the rock without looking behind
 it, and returned to the fort with so little circumspection,
 that the Portugueze followed them unperceived, and closely
 enough to enter the gates at the same time. Even the centinels

did not discover them till they were within the fort, and began to cut down the astonished Dutchmen. The Commandant attempted to make a stand, but his men were panic stricken at the suddenness of the assault. Some were slain upon the spot; others flying to the sally-port, found that also in possession of the assailants. The greater number were put to the sword; those who were spared owed their lives to the interference of a Priest; he had borne the Crucifix before his comrades as a standard beneath which they were to march to victory, and he stretched out that Crucifix to protect his enemies now, when the victory was won. But this mercy was extended only to the Frenchmen who composed part of the garrison; a Catholic feeling incensed the conquerors against the Dutch, and thus rendered them immitigable towards an enemy, more hated for their heretical opinions than for their cruelty and their perfidiousness.

CHAP.
XIX.
1642.
*Berredo, §
817—20.
Ericsson,
p. 371.*

Some settlers upon the Itapicuru, who had joined their countrymen during the night, were left to garrison Fort Calvary, while Antonio Moniz crossed over to Isle Maranham, hoping to surprize Fort Felipe. But a negro, who escaping from the sugar-works, had swam across, had already carried intelligence of the insurrection to St. Luiz, and forty Dutchmen were sent out from that city to reconnoitre. They fell in with an advanced party of the patriots; the negro's tidings had spread among friends as well as enemies, and though this party consisted at first of not more than thirty men, Portugueze and Indians were now joining them so fast, that the Dutch detachment was outnumbered and cut to pieces. Moniz then took up a strong position about three leagues from the city, and stationed an advanced guard within a league of it, on the river Coty. A canoe was sent down the river, in hopes of making a prisoner, from whom information of the enemy's designs might be obtained.

They advanced against the town.

CHAP. XIX
1642.

Some native fishermen came to meet the canoe, and enquiring eagerly where the Portuguese were, besought the boatmen to return and inform them, that the Dutch had resolved to attack the advanced post on the following day with a great part of their force. Upon this, Moniz advanced, and laid in ambush for the enemy. His force consisted of threescore soldiers and eighty Indians; that which marched against him amounted to an hundred and twenty men. The snare was well laid; the Dutch were surprized by a discharge of musquetry, and of arrows, which were not less destructive, and only five of the whole detachment escaped. More settlers now joined the insurgents, and were armed from the spoils of the field. They called upon their leaders to march without delay against St. Luiz, where the Dutch, they argued, would either be off their guard, in the expectation that their troops had been victorious, or be utterly disheartened, if they should have received tidings of the fate of their comrades. Moniz would have followed this advice, but Antonio Teixeira de Mello, whose experience and authority gave him great weight among the patriots, represented, that the Dutch were still greatly superior in numbers, and being veteran soldiers, would not fail to profit by the favourable ground between their present position and the city. It was better, therefore, to wait till they should receive succours from Para; and in the interim, the success which already had been obtained would bring more of the Islanders to their standard. This advice prevailed for four and twenty hours; the Portuguese then, in that spirit of mutability which want of discipline produces as surely as want of decision, changed their opinion, and Moniz marched at day-break toward St. Luiz. No opposition was made upon the way. He entered the suburbs, and took possession of the Carmo Convent, which stood on a little rising ground, just out of musquet shot from the walls. There he remained till it was

dark, and then during the night possessed himself of a post nearer the fortress, and threw up works there in form of a half-moon. At day-break these works were strong enough to repel the sallies of the enemy, and the Dutch being thus reduced to act upon the defensive, dispatched vessels to Recife, soliciting immediate succour.

CHAP.

XIX.

1642.

*Berredo, §
821—36.**Affairs of
Para.*

Moniz also had applied for succour to his countrymen at Para. That Captaincy was at this time in a singular state of discord. The Capitam Mor, Francisco Cordovil, having received information of the loss of St. Luiz, and on the following day of Pedro Maciel's base surrender, began to prepare for defence, and called upon Joam Velho do Valle, and Cypriano Maciel Aranha, who commanded the new Captaincies of Cabo do Norte and Camuta, to come to his assistance. The former was of a bad race, brother to Pedro Maciel, and nephew to old Bento. In this family selfishness seems to have preponderated over every principle of honour and duty, as well as of humanity. He set out with eighty soldiers and five hundred Indians; there were under his command an hundred and fifty men, paid by the establishment of Para, which now needed and demanded their assistance, and the auxiliary force was in the same proportion greater; but he thought proper to leave nearly half to defend his own plantations of tobacco; and moved towards Belem with so little alacrity, that he consumed two months in a voyage for which only fifteen days were necessary. Having at length arrived, he took up his quarters in the Convent of St. Antonio, (then standing apart from the city, in the place called Campina, but now united with it) and sending notice of his arrival to Cordovil, and to the Senado da Camera, or Council-Chamber, he informed them, that if they did not furnish his men with all things needful, and receive him as Commandant General, an office which he claimed under a provision of Bento Maciel, he

*Joam Velho
called to the
assistance of
Belem.**He demands
the govern-
ment.*

CHAP. would immediately return to his own Captaincy. The Chamber
 XIX. replied, that when they saw the provision they would pay that
 1642. deference to it which it should be found to deserve; that as to
 food, there was at that time a scarcity, and the best plan which
 could be adopted under such circumstances was, that his troops
 should be quartered upon the inhabitants, and fare alike with
 them, a measure, which however inconvenient in other respects,
 had the advantage of making the expense easier. Velho would
 not listen to this proposal, because it would have frustrated his
 intention of carrying his object by force; and lest the men
 might incline to it, he removed them during the night to Una,
 a little way distant from the town. This movement was observ-
 ed from the fortress, and a few guns were ineffectually fired to
 prevent it.

*Barrado, §
 785—9.*

*and returns
 to Cabo do
 Norte when
 it is refused.*

On the ensuing day he repeated his demands with increas-
 ed arrogance. The same answer was returned respecting food;
 and touching the Provision, he was informed, that as it had
 not been registered in their Tribunal, it could not be deem-
 ed valid, in conformity to a regulation made by Francisco
 Coelho, the first Governor of that State, and confirmed
 by Bento Maciel himself. A few days afterwards, while the
 dispute still continued, tidings arrived that the Dutch had
 advanced as far as Gurupy, and were expecting an expedition
 from Recife expressly destined for the conquest of Para. Alarm-
 ed at this, the magistracy again called upon Velho to unite with
 them for the defence of the city, reminding him that he would
 otherwise be responsible for it's loss; and conceding something
 in this exigency, they offered him quarters for his men a league
 from the town, and promised to supply them there. But the
 more imminent the danger of the state appeared to be, the
 more insolent this wretch became in his demands and language;
 and at length leaving Para to its fate, he returned to the Cabo

*Barrado, §
 790—2.*

do Norte, that he might be upon the spot to make a good bargain for his tobacco with the Dutch.

CHAP.
XIX.
1642.

Pedro Maciel arrives.

Cordovil had abstained from taking any part in the dispute between the Chamber and Velho, occupying himself meantime in preparing for defence, wherein he was well seconded by all the people. Seven months had now elapsed since they learnt the fall of S. Luiz, when a Dutch vessel appeared off the bar, and the Captain sent to say that he was come from the island of St. Christopher, only for the sake of serving the King of Portugal. He was told therefore that upon producing his passports he might enter the river; but at the desire of Pedro Maciel, who was on board, he anchored at Mosqueiro, six leagues distant. This man, after his cowardly surrender, had been treated by the Dutch as he deserved, being one of the persons whom they embarked on board a leaky ship, and committed to the mercy of the sea. The Dutch Captain with whom he now made his appearance, seems to have been a kindly-natured man, who as he had his choice of being at war or at peace with the Portugueze, preferred the ways of commerce to those of piracy; and had sailed from St. Christophers with Pedro Maciel, and forty others who had in like manner been expelled from Maranham, thinking by this act of humanity to recommend himself to the magistrates at Para, and the Government at Lisbon, and thus deservedly obtain facilities in his mercantile pursuits.

Berredo, § 793-5.

On the following day Pedro Maciel sent to the Chamber Council the patent by which his uncle Bento had appointed him Capitam Mor of Para, and with it a letter, in which he commanded them to yield obedience. They replied, that when he appeared before their Tribunal, according to the usual forms, they would then come to such a resolution as the case might seem to require. Upon this he landed with a small party of

Demands the government, and summons his brother Velho to aid him.

CHAP. armed men, went to a private house, and from thence notified his
 XIX. presence to the Chamber. By this time they had determined how
 1642. to answer him, which was thus; that upon the invasion and loss
 of Maranham they had taken measures for themselves, and
 acquainted the Court of Portugal therewith; consequently,
 they were not at liberty to receive a new Governor till fresh
 orders arrived from Lisbon, which they expected in the first
 ships. Pedro became furious at this reply; he re-embarked in
 the Dutch vessel, fell down seven or eight leagues below the
 city, to the Bahia do Sul, and landing in the Isle from whence
 the Bay derives its name, took up his quarters there, and de-
 dicated them to St. Pedro de Alcantara. From thence he dis-
 patched letters to his brother Joam Velho, urging him to come
 with all speed, that they might jointly take vengeance upon
 the people of Belem; and this brother, who when proceeding
 to the defence of that city, had spent two months upon the way,
 performed the same voyage in less than a third of the time,
 when he hoped to establish a tyranny there.

Berredo.
 § 796—9.

*Disputes be-
 tween the
 Chamber
 and these
 brethren.*

The Senado da Camera, under these difficult circumstances,
 acted with great prudence, neither yielding to these arrogant
 men, nor irritating them. They sent again to Pedro Maciel,
 requiring him to come and defend Belem, and protesting, that
 his present conduct tended greatly to increase its danger, for the
 Tapuya troops, perceiving how the Portuguese were divided
 among themselves, were ready to desert. Such representations
 were unavailing with a man who regarded nothing but his own
 immediate interest. He replied only by new menaces and insults,
 and as the ship which brought him there was about to sail for
 Lisbon, he forbade the Chamber to write by it, saying, their me-
 morial would be made up of falsehoods; but the Dutch cap-
 tain was disgusted with his proceedings, and privately took
 charge of their dispatches. His menaces were not confined to

the magistracy; he threatened the people also, and declared, that if sufficient measures were not taken for supplying his men, he would by his own authority seize provisions wherever they were to be found. During these disputes, Cordovil remained neutral, contented with maintaining his command, and unwilling to appear as an active enemy against the two brethren, much as he disapproved of their conduct, because he was nearly related to them. He had enough to occupy him in providing for the defence of the Captaincy, with no better force than eighty ill-armed men, and a body of allies, whose desertion was hourly to be expected, . . . perhaps their hostility. Under the difficulties of his situation his health sunk; but before his death, he vested the Government of the Captaincy in the Chamber. This exasperated the two brethren; their relationship to Cordovil had hitherto in some degree restrained them; they now gave way to the natural insolence of their disposition, and it was daily feared that Belém would become the seat of civil war. The brethren were not daring enough for this; their hope was, that the Chamber would be intimidated into submission; bolder measures were not suited to a temper as base as it was insolent. Things were in this state when the messengers of Antonio Moniz arrived at Belém, to request assistance in completing the recovery of Maranhão. The Chamber immediately communicated these advices to the two brethren; reminding them, how necessary it was that succours should be sent, how glorious it would be for them to distinguish themselves on such an occasion, and on the other hand, what an everlasting reproach, if, persisting in their present conduct, they should hold back from the enterprize, and detain in inactivity the only disposable force of the State. Pedro Maciel and his brother were not sorry that so fair an opportunity was offered them for giving up their fruitless pretensions, and they departed accordingly to join the

CHAP.
XIX.
1642.

Berredo.
800-3.

*P. Maciel
and Velho go
to join the
insurgents.*

CHAP.
XIX.
1643.

*The truce
acknowledg-
ed in Para.*

patriots. A few days afterwards, two inhabitants of S. Luiz reached the city, with dispatches from the Dutch Governor, containing a copy of the Ten Years Truce, which he requested the People of Para to acknowledge. The real motives of the Dutchman were obvious; he had long been in possession of the Treaty, and had there been any hope of effecting the conquest of Belem, it would still have remained among his papers; but feeling himself in danger at S. Luiz, it was brought forth for the purpose of preventing the patriots from obtaining aid from Para. The Chamber perfectly understood this; their reinforcements were already sent off, and this being done, peace was as acceptable to them in their state of weakness, as to the Dutchman. They therefore accepted the Treaty, promising that they could not publish it with the customary ceremonies till they received it immediately from their own Court.

*Berredo.
838—43.*

*Proceedings
of the
patriots in
Maranhão.*

Pedro Maciel and his brother meantime proceeded toward Maranhão with their usual dilatoriness, when they were not engaged in some selfish pursuit. It was a coasting voyage, performed in canoes, the course lying through three and thirty bays, connected by sheltered channels which are called rivers: such a navigation is subject to little or no interruption from the weather, and is usually the easy work of five or six and twenty days; . . . these men were between two and three months upon the way. The reinforcement which they brought consisted of one hundred and thirteen Portugueze, and seven hundred good allies, under native leaders. Antonio Moniz was at this time dangerously ill, and the command vested in Antonio Teixeira de Mello, as Sargento Mor. He had brought over two pieces of cannon from Fort Calvary, which had proved of great use, and which the heretical Dutch had attempted to silence, by exposing an image of St. John the Baptist in that place against which the fire was directed. Being thus strengthened, he resolved to assault Fort

S. Felipe, notwithstanding the strength of its garrison. Some obstacles were opposed by that contradiction which the total want of discipline so frequently occasioned in a Portuguese camp; and before he could make the attempt, the Dutch received a large reinforcement, under Anderson, from Recife. On the morrow after its arrival, the Dutch commander attempted to surprize the Portuguese at noonday, when their watch was less carefully kept; but they started up at the first alarm, and repelled him with considerable loss. He was equally unsuccessful in an attack upon their works at the Carmo, where he lost nearly an hundred men, and the greater part of his Indian allies. Moniz died on the evening after this victory, and Teixeira succeeded to the chief command. Five quintals of powder had been his whole stock, and this was almost wholly spent; thus without ammunition, it was not possible to maintain his position so near an enemy who was always certain of receiving supplies by sea; he resolved, therefore, to retire to the main land, and take post at Tapuytaperá, a place separated from S. Luiz by a bay about four leagues broad, and naturally strong. The retreat was begun by night: but even in the act of retreating, his enterprising spirit devised new means of annoying the enemy; it was likely they would pursue him as soon as his movement should be discovered, and attempt to harass his march; no sooner, therefore, had he crossed the Coty, than he laid an ambush in the same place which had formerly proved fatal to the Dutch, and the stratagem a second time succeeded. The Dutch Commandant of Seará, who had been summoned to the defence of Maranhã, fell into the snare, and was cut off, with about thirty Dutchmen, and more than an hundred Indians. Their spoils furnished a small supply of ammunition, and the Portuguese leader having made this welcome booty, delayed the execution of his plan, and instead of crossing to the

CHAP.
XIX.
1643.

*Death of
their leader
Moniz.
Barreiros
succeeds.*

Jan. 25.

*His success,
and cruelty
of the Dutch
in conse-
quence.*

CHAP. main land, posted himself at Moruapy, a strong situation in
 XIX. that part of the Island which is opposite to Itapicuru. The
 1643. insurgents still retained the posts which they had won there,
 and were thus at all times sure of their retreat, either by land or
 water. The Dutch Governor, enraged at the last loss which he
 had sustained, gave way to the most ferocious spirit of ven-
 geance. Five and twenty Portugueze of S. Luiz he delivered
 to the savages from Seara, to be devoured by them; and he
 sent fifty to Barbadoes, to be sold as slaves to the English; the
 English Governor ordered them to be brought on shore, as if he
 meant to bargain for them, and then set them at liberty, after
 indignantly reproving the agent who had insulted him by offer-
 ing white men and Christians for sale. The other settlers were
 plundered, their women were stript naked, and in this state they
 were driven out of the town. Such was the treatment which
 those families experienced, who for the sake of remaining in
 peace, preferred submission to the duty of joining their brethren
 in arms.

Berredo.
848—59.
Ericcyra.
p. 444.

Teixeira re-
treats to the
main land.

May 2.

P. Maciel
and Velho
forsake him.

John G. and J.
of the Dutch
in 1643.

At Moruapy Antonio Teixeira remained more than three months, in the hope of receiving succours; till being weary of perpetual disappointment, and unable to maintain himself longer without supplies, he destroyed whatever property could not be carried away, crossed over to the main land, and abandoning Fort Calvary, reached Tapuytaperá, according to his former intention. He had not been many days in this position, before Pedro Maciel and his brother took to their canoes, which had been left here during the late operations, embarked with the greater part of their own people and some of the Maranham colonists, whom they had induced to follow them, and deserting the patriots, set off for Para. This desertion so much alarmed those who had not been invited to accompany them, or for whom there had not been canoes to embark in, that another party

set off with their families to reach Para by land. The commander seeing himself thus forsaken, and without any ammunition whatever, knew not what better to do than to repair to Belem; sooner or later he doubted not that forces would be sent from Portugal, and Belem seemed to be the place where he could most conveniently await their arrival. But how were they to reach Belem? by water they could not go for want of canoes, and though there were persons who eagerly advised the land march, a journey of nearly eight hundred miles through the wild woodlands of South America was too formidable to be lightly undertaken. While they were yet deliberating what course to pursue, five quintals of powder, with matches and ball in proportion, arrived from Belem. There was but one course which canoes could hold upon this passage; and that the Dutch, masters as they were of the sea, should have suffered these supplies to reach him was represented by Teixeira to his men as something, which added to the safe voyage of those very stores in a defenceless bark from Bahia to Belem, ought to be regarded, if not as absolutely miraculous, certainly as an evident proof of the protection of Heaven. He had with him sixty Portugueze and two hundred Indians. Pedro Maciel and his brother, with their fugitives, when they met the supplies, could not be persuaded to turn back and rejoin their former comrades; this handful of men, however, seeing themselves once more provided with ammunition, resolved to maintain their ground, and continue the war, notwithstanding the important post of Fort Calvary was now again occupied by the enemy. Shortly afterwards a Dutch squadron appeared off the coast, and the commander, hoping that Teixeira might as easily be duped by his cupidity or cowardice as Bento Maciel had been, proposed to him in Nassau's name, that he should take up his residence in S. Luiz as Governor of the Portugueze,

CHAP.
XIX.
1643.

He receives supplies.

May 28.

The Dutch reinforced.

CHAP. holding an authority independant of the Dutch Commandant.
 XIX. Teixeira returned a written answer, saying, that he meant in-
 1643. deed ere long to take up his quarters in S. Luiz, but intended
 first to turn the Dutchmen out. When this reply was commu-
 nicated to Jan Cornelis, the Dutch Governor, it exasperated
 him so, that he issued orders to give no quarter to the Portu-
 gueze. Cruelty of this kind can only be stopt by retaliating
 justice ; Teixeira therefore proclaimed in like manner a war of
 extermination against the Dutch ; but he politicly exempted
 the French who were in their service, for he hoped by this
 means to render them suspected, and perhaps to win them
 over, especially as they were Catholics.

Berredo,
 860—9.
 879—80.
Ericcyra.
 p. 445.

*The Portu-
 gueze hear a
 firing, and
 for the sake
 of making a
 prize neglect
 to ascertain
 its cause.*

The reinforcement which the enemy had just received, made
 them superior in numbers, to any force which could be brought
 against them in the field ; but they knew that the whole coun-
 try was hostile, and were too much disheartened by that know-
 ledge, to pursue offensive operations, either with spirit or effect.
 Teixeira, well informed of their inactivity by his numerous spies,
 threw small parties of his best men into the island, and ap-
 proaching nearer to it, took up a position on the side of the
 channel which insulates it. Soon after he had removed to this
 post, a loud firing was heard from the bar of S. Luiz, and he
 sent two canoes with eight soldiers and fifty Indians, under
 June 13. Joam da Paz, to ascertain the cause. They fell in on the way
 with a Dutch launch carrying seven and twenty men and two
 pieces of cannon. So tempting a prize seduced them to neglect
 the object on which they had been sent ; they boarded and took
 the launch, and returned triumphant with their booty. Teixeira
 reproved their commander for disobeying his orders, but in par-
 taking the joy for this new success, he partook also of the neg-
 ligence which he censured, and made no farther attempt to learn
 the cause of the firing which had been heard : and finding the

Berredo,
 881—3.

Dutch were so fearful of his ambuscades that they seldom ventured beyond the city, he entrusted Manoel de Carvalho with forty Portugueze and one hundred Indians, to take up his quarters in the island, and act as circumstances might induce him.

CHAP.
XIX.
1643.

Carvalho having ravaged the country, found himself so completely master of it, that he sate down to raise and prepare mandioc in the plantations which the Portugueze had abandoned a few months back. This was a work of some time, as well as of many processes, and his people became so accustomed to security, that they carried it on as if they were in a land of peace. At length the watch which they kept became little more than nominal; of this the Dutch obtained intelligence, and also that Carvalho had divided his little force for the sake of gathering in the harvest more speedily; upon this they sent out threescore European soldiers and an hundred Indians, to surprize the Portugueze. Two Indian centinels hearing the sound of their approach at a considerable distance, advanced to discover the cause. Coming near a rivulet they saw the Dutch, who were weary with their march, lying down to drink and refresh themselves; and they drew near with so little caution, that the enemy judging them by their confidence to be part of some considerable advanced force, betrayed a confusion which might have given them ample time to secure themselves and convey the alarm. In some strange humour of bravery, they thought proper to let fly their arrows at the Dutch, who then perceiving that these men were unsupported, rushed upon them, cut one to pieces, and secured the other. The prisoner gave all the information that could be wished; they hastened their march, and having come upon the Portugueze, set up the warwhoop in concert with their savage allies. The Portugueze being dispersed at various employments, and totally unprepared, lost all presence of mind and

*The Patriots
reenter Bla-
ranham.*

*They are
surprized by
the Dutch,
but prove
victorious.*

CHAP. took to flight, some leaving their arms upon the ground, others
 XIX. taking them up, rather that they might not lose them than
 1643. with any intention of applying them to immediate use. Twelve
 men, however, who were so near the enemy that they could not
 fly, were made resolute by the very extremity of their danger.
 They fought in a body supporting each other, and yielding the
 ground only step by step to superior numbers, till they came to
 a turn in the pathway, where taking advantage of the trees, they
 stood firm, and defied all the efforts of the enemy. The Dutch
 attempted to attack them on both sides; they exposed them-
 selves by this manœuvre, and were charged so vigorously when
 thus divided, that they were broken and routed, the other Por-
 tugueze and Indians who had borne no part in the battle, re-
 turning to compleat the victory. The patriots thus unexpect-
 edly victorious, sate down on the ground, and were dividing the
 spoil, when they perceived another body of armed men approach-
 ing among the trees, and made ready for a second action. It
 proved to be Carvalho coming to their assistance from a similar
 victory of his own; he had received six wounds, but they were
 neither sufficient to disable him from fight, nor from following
 up the pursuit to the very gates of S. Luiz. Only ten French-
 men of all who sallied out, effected their escape into the town,
 and the Dutch Governor ordered them to be hanged, as traitors
 who would not fight against the Portugueze, a charge which
 upon all occasions he made against his mercenaries. Carvalho
 now having gathered in the harvest, returned to head quarters;
 and Teixeira continuing a system of warfare which was so well
 adapted to give confidence to his own men, and to dishearten
 the enemy, sent other detachments into the island to prevent
 the Dutch from enjoying the resources with which he had now
 amply provided himself. A redoubt which had been erected
 between the city and the river, to impede their movements,

was scaled by them during the night. Elated with this success, they attacked one of the sugar-works which had been reoccupied by the Dutch, and burnt it to the ground. Fort Calvary they found abandoned to their hands; Teixeira garrisoned it, and then once more crossed over to carry on the war in Maranham.

CHAP.
XIX.
1643.

This brave commander had been left almost wholly to his own resources; the troops from Para had deserted him, led away by their infamous Captains, and their desertion had drawn off from him some even of his own people. One supply of stores from Bahia was all that he had received; it was indeed all that Antonio Telles da Silva, the Governor of Brazil, could send him; and from Portugal, whither he had sent information of his proceedings, little was to be hoped, engrossed as the King was, by the cares and dangers of defending his newly-recovered throne. Some effort however had been made. Pedro de Albuquerque, who had so heroically distinguished himself in the defence of Rio Feroso, was appointed Governor General of Maranham, and sent out with something more than one hundred men, and abundant stores. After a six weeks prosperous voyage, he came within sight of the island, but having no pilot on board who knew the harbour, and not chusing to enter the Bay of S. Luiz, till he obtained some information respecting the state of affairs, he fired his guns off the bar. This was the firing which Teixeira had heard, and the cause of which Joam da Paz, disobeying his orders, had neglected to ascertain. The consequences of that disobedience were deeply calamitous. Instead of landing his men and stores immediately, as he would have done had he known Teixeira's situation, Albuquerque went on for Para. The navigation of the bar of Belem was not well understood, and the ship struck upon a sandbank. The sea was running high, and the destruction of all on board was expected, when Pedro da Costa Favella, who chanced to be fishing

Pedro de Albuquerque comes out as governor of Maranham.

*Vol. 1.
p. 487.*

June 13.

His ship-wreck.

CHAP
XIX.
1643.

near, with two small canoes, came to their assistance : the boats were hoisted out according to his directions, and in them and in the canoes, three and thirty persons were conveyed to land. But the tide was now flowing, which increased the violence of the sea. One of the canoes, in spite of all efforts to regain the ship, was driven back to shore, the other was staved against the ship-side. The boats however came safely alongside, and took in a second load, including the Governor and his family. The pilot assured those who were left, that the vessel would not break up in less than four and twenty hours, during which interval there would be sufficient time to save them all. Albuquerque had scarcely reached the nearest shore, when he saw her go to pieces, and concluding that all must immediately have perished, inexcusably he made no effort to see if any had escaped. They who were upon the wreck, perceiving that the ship could not possibly hold together, formed a sort of raft with their water-casks, upon which seventy persons embarked ; the raft was hastily made and ill-fastened, so that all were lost. Luiz Figueira, the Jesuit, who was returning to Maranham with fourteen of his spiritual brethren, perished at this time. He endeavoured to swim, with a child of four years old upon his back, and the effort was beyond his strength. Eight of the Jesuits were lost with him. Eleven persons still remained upon the wreck ; they made another and better float, and committed themselves to the mercy of the sea, which tost them whither it would. Two of this wretched party, both Jesuits, were washed off on the second day. On the third morning, the others landed upon the Ilha dos Joanes, where the Aruans, a tribe of its savage inhabitants, put six to death : a colonist who happened to be engaged in salting fish near the spot, came in time to save the remaining three.

Berredo.
900-8.

and death.

Pedro de Albuquerque, and those who had escaped with him,

made for the Ilha do Sol, where Pedro Maciel and his brother Velho had resumed their former station, and their former projects. He remained there till his people had recovered from the exhaustion produced by their late sufferings, then he proceeded to Belem, and there assumed the government. The Chamber willingly resigned their authority; but so little did Pedro Maciel profit by this change, that the Governor, in consequence of his conduct, and the complaints of the whole Captaincy, refused to admit him as Capitam Mor of Para, though the office had now been conferred upon him by royal patent. It was now seen in what merited abhorrence these brethren were held; and the Procurador was charged to request of the Governor, in the name of the whole people, that they should be declared incapable of ever holding any office in the Captaincy, and that the King should be intreated to confirm this sentence, and extend it to the whole race of the Maciels. Pedro de Albuquerque had no time to take any measures for assisting Teixeira in the recovery of Maranham; he was in declining health when he arrived at Belem, and died early in the ensuing year, leaving his kinsman Feliciano Correa, joint Governor with the Sargento Mor of the State, Francisco Coelho de Carvalho.

CHAP.
XIX.
1644.

Berrede,
909—15.

Teixeira, however, was so far advanced in his undertaking, that the disappointment occasioned first by the loss of his expected succours from Portugal, and afterwards by the Governor's death, seems little to have impeded his progress. He was now undisputed master of the country, and the Dutch dared not venture beyond the town. Fortunately for them, a ship from the Isle of Fayal, laden with wines for Bahia, was driven by stress of weather into the Bay of Araçagy, near S. Luiz. This vessel they boarded and captured; they had three other ships in the harbour, but all so ill provided, that they

The Dutch
evacuate
Maranhã.

CHAP. XIX.
 1644. dared not put to sea in them without having some better vessel in company: this prize came seasonably to their relief, and accordingly they embarked and evacuated Maranham, being still nearly five hundred in number, besides fourscore Indians. It was in vain to attempt to reach Recife, they therefore made for the Island of St. Christophers. The town was almost reduced to ruins when they abandoned it. Teixeira had soon to communicate the news of farther re-conquests to his court. When the Dutch first invaded Maranham they brought with them a large body of Tapuyas from Seara. The greater number of these had perished, and the only reward which the eighty survivors received for their services, was now to be turned adrift in their own province, upon the desert banks of the Camocy. Indignant at this treatment, they inflamed the discontent of their countrymen, who were groaning under the intolerable² yoke of their new allies, and falling upon a redoubt which the Dutch had established upon that river, they surprized it, and put the whole garrison to death. They then proceeded ten leagues farther, to a second redoubt, and carried it with the like success. This second victory encouraged them to attempt the Fort of Seara itself, which was a hundred leagues distant; they marched with the indefatigable ardour of savages when bent upon revenge, approached it during the night, and laid in ambush. At morning the soldiers went out as usual to their respective pursuits, inapprehensive of danger. The Tapuyas let them pass, then starting from their concealment, rushed in at the gate, and put all whom they found within the fort to death; those who were

and are cut
 off in Seara
 by the In-
 dians.

² Barlaeus himself admits this: "*Nec tamen hujus nefariae seditionis autores habebantur Maranhaoenses, licet proximi et contermini, verum culpa nostratium in subditos ferociae et duriori imperio imputabatur.*" P. 290.

without the walls they afterwards hunted down at leisure. A party employed at the salt licks upon the river Upanemma shared the same fate, and a detachment which came with a Dutch officer to inspect the state of the garrison, being ignorant of its fate, was circumvented and cut off. The Tapuyas immediately advised Teixeira of their conquest, and he lost no time in securing possession of the recovered fortress.

CHAP.
XIX.
1644.

Berrada.
919—23.
Ericcyra.
p. 447.
Barleus.
290.

Ill tidings crowded upon Nassau, the consequences of that dishonourable policy in which he had been engaged. Maranhham and Seara were lost to the Company, and the people of S. Thomas were in arms; they had made themselves masters of the country, and the Dutch were confined to the citadel. In this state of things he began to fear insurrections every where, and Inspectors were sent through the ceded provinces, to disarm all suspected persons. He had now solicited his recall, and having obtained it, appointed Henrik Haus to the military command; the civil government he entrusted to the Great Council, and left them his advice how to administer it. First, he warned them that they should attend to the wants of the soldiers, and never delay listening to their complaints, an error which would be especially dangerous in Brazil, where desertion was so easy. The pay of the officers he recommended them punctually to discharge, for nothing, he said, broke the ties of allegiance, and imposed upon men the necessity of doing wrong, so soon as poverty. With regard to the offences of the troops, he rather advised severe than lenient measures; they were living in a barbarous land, where they continually saw the worst examples: strong means therefore were needed to restrain them from evil. The leaders could not be treated with too much attention, provided the Great Council kept up the respect due to its own authority; they ought at all times to have access to the Government, but the Governors would do well not to asso-

Nassau obtains his recall.

His last advice to the Great Council.

CHAP. ciate too much with them, lest familiarity should breed con-
 XIX. tempt. But above all things it behoved them to be careful that
 1644. the soldiers should not become burthensome to the colonists, an
 ill which was but too common in these provinces, where provi-
 sions had always been scarce, and which made the people dis-
 contented, and the soldiers insolent. In fact the agriculturalists
 and the proprietors of the sugar-works dreaded peace for this
 reason more than war.

He advised them that they should by all fair means endeavour
 to win over those Portugueze whom they supposed to be most
 attached to their own country, and especially the priests; if the
 priests were purchased, the secrets of the people would be
 always within their reach. Reports against them, he said,
 were never tlightly o be believed; for such reports usually began
 among those, who having nothing to lose, were envious of the
 rich and prosperous. Deserters too were always to be heard
 with suspicion; nor could he much commend the practice of
 torture, which was as likely to extort falsehood as truth. Nas-
 sau seemed to foresee the perilous times which were at hand.
 The forts, he said, ought to be frequently inspected, that they
 might be always in a state of defence: and as there could be no
 moats in a dry and sandy soil, it was particularly necessary to
 see that the palisades were in perfect repair, lest, as time was
 continually injuring such ramparts, a breach or a weak part
 might invite the enemy. It was of great importance to preserve
 Friburg and its woods, which in case of war would facilitate the
 means of supplying Recife with water. The bridge at Boavista
 should be strengthened with a redoubt for its defence; both
 bridges would be of essential utility if Recife should be besieged,
 for before this communication across the rivers had been formed,
 they might well remember how much they had suffered from
 scarcity, even almost to the loss of the city. He advised them

by no means rashly to provoke the Governor of Bahia. Their provinces were exposed to his vengeance, he could send in troops to lay them waste, or with a word let the savages loose. Neither could the Portugueze who were now under their dominion endure to see him treated with disrespect: they were a docile people when well treated, but stubborn whenever they felt themselves wronged; and a sense of worthy pride affected them more than the desire of riches. There were persons who insulted them in the performance of their religious ceremonies, and such offenders ought to be chastised, as men whose folly endangered the commonweal. The Portugueze who might be clearly convicted of treasonable practices were to be severely punished; but the most urgent sense of self-preservation required that they should not be irritated by injuries and insults; for if they were, . . . the very existence of the Dutch Government in Brazil was at stake. Maranham and Seara had shown proofs of the instability of dominion founded wholly upon force.

Nassau had granted licenses for carrying arms not only to Dutch, French, and English settlers, who had debts to collect in the country, but also to those Portugueze who lived in scattered habitations, where they had to defend themselves against wild beasts as well as robbers: he warned the Council not to grant such licenses indiscriminately. And he advised them rigorously to punish murder and duelling; and strictly to enforce payment of the debts due to the Company, which the traders were always unwilling to pay as long as they could avoid it. Having thus given his last advice to the new government, Count Mauritz of Nassau sailed for Europe, after a residence of eight years in Brazil. He took with him some savages of different tribes: and five Portugueze-Brazilians were deputed to accompany him, that they might see the Dutch in their own land, and convince their countrymen by their testimony that

CHAP.
XIX.

1644.

*He sails for
Europe.*

CHAP. they were not a mere race of pirates and fishermen, as the great
 XIX. body of the people believed. Not less than fourteen hundred
 1644. persons of all ranks and professions, civil, military, and eccle-
 siastical, departed in the same fleet; . . . with so blind a confi-
 dence did the United Provinces rely upon the truce, though
 they had set so glaring an example of treating it with contempt.

Barleus.
 p. 292.

CHAPTER XX.

Embarrassment of the Company. State of Pernambuco. Oppression of the Dutch. Joam Fernandes Vieira plans the deliverance of his country. He communicates with the Governor General, is suspected, absconds, and appears in arms. Battle of Monte das Tabocas.

A union was projected at this time in Holland between the East and West India Companies. Nassau favoured the scheme; if it were accomplished, he said, the Philippines, Peru, Potosi, and the Plata would fall into their hands; and the Spaniards would be unable to defend even the Havannah, Cartagena, and Mexico against them. The project failed, fortunately for the Portugueze and for Brazil, which, had it taken effect, would have been made the theatre of a longer and more wasting war, even if its former and worthier possessors could ultimately have succeeded in recovering it. It was indeed hardly to be expected that two Companies should unite whose circumstances were so widely different. In the East every thing was prosperous, there seemed no limits to the career of conquest which had been begun, and the profits resulting from conquest in that quarter were calculable and certain. But in Brazil, however splendid had been their success, the books of the Company, by

CHAP.
XX.
1644.

Union proposed between the East and West India Companies. Barlaeus, p. 325.

State of the Company in Brazil.

CHAP. XX. 1644. which the advantages of that success were to be summed up, presented a dismal account. They had never been so completely masters of Pernambuco as to be able to supply Recife with provisions from the country; and when the truce might have enabled them securely to establish their dominion there in peace, they ruined themselves by the nefarious policy which led them to take advantage of the weakness of their new ally. Holland, while acting this dishonourable part, seems never to have considered the possibility of retaliation, but to have supposed that any insult and any injury might safely be inflicted upon suffering Portugal.

Embarrassment of the West India Company.

This policy brought upon them its proper punishment. The expeditions to Serecipe, Maranham, Angola, and Chili, exhausted both the treasures and the magazines at Recife; and the Company, ever calculating how to save immediate expence, ceased to send out supplies, in the belief that they had no longer an enemy to fear. The Council in whom the administration was vested after Nassau's departure, finding themselves thus distressed, were obliged to call upon their debtors for prompt payment, that they themselves might be enabled to pay the civil and military establishments. At the same time the merchants in Holland called upon their agents and correspondents for remittances. Hitherto every thing had been carried on upon a system of credit: the payments which were now required occasioned an immediate scarcity of money; none was to be borrowed upon lower terms than a monthly interest of three or four per cent., and of course they who resorted to such means of relief were soon utterly undone. The Government was not less embarrassed than the subject. They had sold the confiscated estates upon credit, and in like manner had disposed of a great number of negroes, (whom they had imported since the conquest of Angola,) at the price of three hundred

*patacas*¹ per head. The small pox swept off a large proportion of these poor wretches, and this loss, added to the mischief done by the floods, and the subsequent ravages of the worm, ruined many of the planters. The Council of Nineteen, in whom the management of the Company's affairs was vested at home, were ignorant of the true state of the conquered provinces, and sent out peremptory orders that their negroes should be sold only for ready money, or for sugar, which was considered as equivalent. But it was impossible suddenly to alter the system of trade; no person at this time could purchase upon these terms; and though the price at which slaves were offered was repeatedly lowered, still they remained upon the Company's hands, who had to support the expence of feeding them, and the loss sustained by frequent deaths, till the Home Council revoked instructions which were found to be equally absurd and ruinous.

CHAP.
XX.
1644.

Nieuhoff,
p. 30—1.

The case was sufficiently hopeless, when the Company, in despair of remedying an evil, were thus compelled to yield to it. But the pressure for money was now so universally felt, that the consequences became seriously alarming to the State. Where the same person was indebted to the Government, and to private creditors, disputes arose who should have the preference in payment; and men, to obtain their just demands, scrupled not at employing means which were manifestly unjust. In this spirit one creditor endeavoured to be beforehand with another, by tempting the debtor to make over his property, on consideration of a considerable abatement; others, pursuing

General
distress in
Pernambuco.

¹ The translation of Nieuhoff says three hundred pieces of eight, which is impossible. Unfortunately I have no means of correcting this passage by the original. Fr. Manoel Calado gives me the right denomination, . . . but the *putaca* may either be worth seven hundred and fifty reis, or three hundred and twenty.

CHAP. measures strictly legal, but not less to be reprobated, threw
 XX. helpless debtors without mercy into prison. Government itself
 1644. was compelled to act rigorously. Unable to procure payment
 by milder ways, it called upon its debtors at the sugar-harvest,
 and began to seize the produce; upon which all the vexations,
 evils and miseries of legal process followed. The members of
 the Council went sometimes in person into the country to super-
 intend these executions; they thought that to show themselves
 thus earnest in looking after the Company's interest, would pro-
 duce a good effect upon the public; but the consequence was far
 otherwise. The merchants, factors, and other creditors of the
 planters, complained that Government, by seizing the sugar
 in the works, deprived them of their fair demands. Their dis-
 content became loud and menacing, and they sent home com-
 plaints and accusations against the Council; while to secure
 themselves as far as possible, they pursued a like system of
 rigour, and began to seize negroes, oxen, coppers, and the whole
 stock of the farmers. The same plan was pursued by the
 money-lenders. Some of the farmers, enraged at reflecting
 upon the usurious interest upon which they had borrowed mo-
 ney, for the sake of putting off the evil day, became desperate
 when that day could be procrastinated no longer, and defended
 their property by force; so that things seemed tending to a
 general insurrection. Even where no resistance was made, the
 creditors were hardly less embarrassed; for when the lands were
 put up to sale in execution, they were obliged to become the
 purchasers themselves; and then, unless they knew how to
 manage them, and could reside upon the spot (which for the
 merchants and factors was impossible,) the acquisition was a
 dead weight upon their hands.

*Debts frau-
 dulently
 contracted
 by the Por-
 tuguese.*

In this state of general insolvency, it was proposed that the
 Company should contract with the owners of the sugar-works,

receiving the whole products for a certain number of years, and satisfying those who had demands upon the estate; a thing the less difficult, because these creditors were on their parts debtors to the Government. The Home-Council approved the plan; it was found so beneficial, that contracts to the amount of more than two millions of gilders were entered into accordingly, and the same system was adopted by the merchants. This remedy, however, reached only to part of the evil. The trade of these provinces had long been liable to such perilous contingencies, that men engaged in it rather as gamblers than as merchants. Many of the Dutch, and other foreigners, were adventurers of desperate fortunes, alike devoid of patriotism and of honesty. The Portugueze also who continued in Pernambuco were very generally in distressed circumstances. The war had been the first cause of this, their estates having been repeatedly laid waste. The distress which had been thus occasioned, and the hatred which they bore to their new masters, as the causes of that distress, as oppressors, and above all, as heretics, had produced an effect not less injurious to their own moral principles than to the interests of the Dutch. For relying upon the efforts of Spain in their behalf, and fully expecting that the great armament under the Conde da Torre, which had been so lamentably misconducted, would effect their deliverance, they systematically bought up sugar-works, estates, negroes, and goods of every kind, upon credit. The Company committed a grievous political error in selling the confiscated lands promiscuously to all purchasers, instead of inviting over colonists, as Nassau so often and so urgently recommended. They sold them also at such rates, that the wiser part of their own countrymen could not purchase; while the Portugueze took them at any price, having neither the means nor the intention of payment. The expedition on which their hopes were founded,

CHAP.
XX.
1644.

Vol. I. p.
570.

CHAP. failed ; the day of payment came ; .. to borrow was their only
 XX. resource ; .. a compound interest of four per cent. per month soon
 1644. doubled and trebled the debt ; new shifts were then resorted to,
 and every artifice of chicanery was employed, for the purpose
 of gaining time, till the reconquest should rid them of their
 creditors. When, in spite of every delay which legal trickery
 could interpose, the day of reckoning came, some had interest
 enough to obtain a protection from the Government, and thus
 defied their creditors ; others absconded, which in such a coun-
 try was not difficult. Some, whose profligacy was of a baser
 stamp, went contentedly to prison, speculating upon the un-
 willingness of a Dutch creditor long to endure the cost of keep-
 ing them there ; and in fact these costs were so heavy, that the
 creditor himself often solicited the release of his prisoner, glad
 to make any composition rather than aggravate his first loss by
 a continual accumulation of expence.

Barlaeus.
p. 319.
Nieuhoff,
p. 30—4.
Do 137.

*The Portu-
 guese vexed
 and oppress-
 ed by the
 conquerors.*

Many of the Portugueze in Pernambuco being thus circum-
 stanced, they had a base motive for exciting insurrection, added
 to those natural and proper feelings, by perverting which they
 excused and justified to themselves the fraudulent system upon
 which they proceeded. They had also grievous cause of com-
 plaint in the insolence of the conquerors, the hardness and
 brutality of their manners, and their almost unbridled licentious-
 ness. One instance will show to what vexations and dangers
 they were subject. An edict was passed which invited all
 slaves, by a promise of liberty for their reward, to give informa-
 tion if their masters had concealed arms. Every slave who
 might have rightful cause for hating his master, had now an easy
 and tempting means of taking vengeance, and upon such tes-
 timony some Portugueze were tortured, and others put to death ;
 while others only escaped the same fate by the loss of all which
 they possessed. Nothing was more common than for the slave to

threaten his owner with an information. Some Dutchmen founded upon this state of things a nefarious practice; they tampered with the slaves to bring accusations, and hid weapons, which were to be found and produced in evidence. A faithful negro at length revealed to some good master that such a snare had been laid for him, and the master went to Fray Manoel do Salvador for assistance, trembling, as the Friar says, like a green twig in the wind. The Friar was in great favour with Nassau, and thus it happened that two of these villains were taken in their own toils; for upon the slave's testimony the arms were found where they had hidden them, their guilt was proved, they were put to the torture till they confessed it, and were then deservedly punished with death.

CHAP.
XX.
1644.

Valeroso Lucideno. p. 71.

That Holland was at this time a happier country than Portugal cannot be doubted; the people were more industrious and more enlightened; they lived under a free government and a tolerant religion, and enjoyed the regular administration of good laws. But it rarely happens that any nation can extend its own advantages to its foreign conquests. Nassau could transplant forest and fruit trees in their full size and bearing; but not the beneficial institutions of his own country: for these things have their root in the history and habits and feelings of those with whom they have grown up, and to whose growth they have fitted themselves. If the Dutch had projected the conquest of Brazil, for the purpose of bettering the condition of the inhabitants, and framed the administration of the conquered provinces to that end, the end even then could not have been attained; the language, the religion, the manners, the national character, and the national pride of the Portugueze, presented so many obstacles, strong in themselves, and in their union insuperable. But the conquest had been a mere commercial speculation; the profit of the Company was the one object to

CHAP. be kept in view, . . . the pole-star of their whole policy. They
 XX. had made the Pernambucans their subjects ; but they consider-
 1644. ed them as foreigners and rivals in trade : lest, therefore, they
 should compete with the Company in the European market,
 heavy imposts were laid upon the exportation of their produce,
 and every kind of vexatious impediment interposed, so that
 they were compelled to sell upon the spot, and at such prices
 as the conquerors condescended to give. So far did this spirit
 of monopoly extend, that they were not permitted to slaughter
 beasts for sale, nor even for home consumption ; they were com-
 pelled to sell the animal to the Dutch butchers, and purchase
 the meat at a price fixed by the Council.

*Valeroso Lu-
 cideno, p.
 154.*

Even had there been a better spirit in the Government, the
 conduct of its officers would have defeated it. It is but too
 well known in more humane ages, and among a more humane
 people, what shocking instances of rapacity, cruelty, and op-
 pression occur in the management of distant colonies, and espe-
 cially of conquests. Men require, as individuals, for their own
 moral government, a constant sense of the presence of all-seeing
 and retributive justice ; as members of a community they equally
 require a constant sense of the existence of law, the supreme
 and permanent standard by which their actions must be tried.
 But it is rarely that either Law or Religion accompany an
 army ; the forms of both are suspended, and the influence does
 not long survive. The conquerors established two Courts of
 Justice at Recife ; in the lower one there were eight annual
 judges, four Dutch and four Portugueze, and the inferior offi-
 cers were in like manner equally chosen from the two nations ;
 but in the higher, which was the court of appeal, there were
 five Dutch judges to four Portugueze, and all the other officers
 were Dutch. The Portugueze complained, that the apparent
 fairness of appointing judges equally from both nations, in the

lower court, was a mere deception ; for the Portugueze lived in the country, and never all assembled ; whereas the Dutch, as they resided upon the spot, were always present, and decided every thing at their pleasure : and if an appeal were made to the Political Council, the Dutch judges scarcely deigned to notice the Portugueze members of the board, but conferred in their own language, and confirmed whatever their countrymen had decreed. The Portugueze members indeed were treated with such marked indignity that they seldom appeared in the Court, and all causes were decided by corruption and favour. They complained also that the written parts of legal processes were required to be in Dutch, a regulation which, however politic it might be in its remote consequences, occasioned much immediate inconvenience, and was the more galling, because it was at once a badge of subjection and a heavy impost.

The Government wanted flour for their troops at St. Jorge da Mina, Angola, and S. Thomas ; they fixed a maximum in Pernambuco, and bought it up. A scarcity of course followed ; and they then issued an order that every inhabitant should plant a certain quantity of mandioc at the two regular seasons, September and January, in proportion to the number of his slaves. The Pernambucans remonstrated that this was not their system ; all lands were not fit for mandioc ; there were some farmers who cultivated nothing else, and they supplied the sugar-planters and the owners of the sugar-works, who had enough to do with their own concerns. These representations were in vain, and they were to obey the edict, or abide such penalties as the Inspectors should appoint. They were also required to keep the ways about their houses and estates in good order, that the Inspectors might not be impeded by the state of the roads ; and every housekeeper was ordered to have a half-bushel measure in good condition. There was no appeal

CHAP.
XX.
1644.

*Valeroso
Lucideno.
p. 149.*

CHAP. from the Inspectors, and consequently they practised the most
 XX. insolent exactions. The cheapest method was to present at
 1644. first a handsome peace-offering, otherwise pretexts were never
 wanting for some arbitrary mulct. Men were fined for planting
 more ground with mandioc than the law had specified: others,
 who lived by daily labour, and neither bought nor sold flour,
 but received it in exchange for their work, were made to pay
 enormous penalties for not being provided with a measure.
 Even under Nassau these exactions were carried on; for it was
 not possible that he could see every thing with his own eyes,
 and there were persons enough interested in the continuance of
 such abuses to prevent complaints from reaching him, or to im-
 pede the redress which he directed.

*Valeroso
 Lucideno,
 p. 152—3.*

*Popularity
 of Nassau
 injurious to
 his succes-
 sors.*

*Valeroso
 Lucideno,
 p. 120.*

While Nassau was Governor, he endeavoured by all means in his power to repress the excesses of the Dutch, and conciliate the conquered people. So truly indeed did the Portugueze regard him as their protector, that Fray Manoel calls him their St. Antonio. They respected also his high birth, his personal qualities, and his princely magnificence, forming so strong a contrast to that mean money-getting spirit which in their opinion characterized the nation he represented. However much they might hate the house of Orange for its successful stand in support of rebellion and heresy, its acknowledged nobility was not without considerable influence; and when a prince of that house surrendered his authority to Bullestraet and Vander Burgh, and the other members of the Council, these men were as much the object of their secret contempt as of their hatred. Their very names seemed to the Portugueze to betray the baseness of their origin; and the same exactions which under Nassau were felt as the effects of a conqueror's rapacity, were more odious under these men, because now considered as proceeding from the avarice of a set of traders. The conduct of the new Governors was not likely

*Cast. Lus.
 5. § 28.*

to overcome such prejudices. They possessed not that personal authority among the soldiers, by which, as much as by his power, Mauritz had kept them in awe; and they had neither his generosity nor his talents.

CHAP.
XX.
1645.

One of their first measures was to send deputies to Bahia, under the plea of complimenting Antonio Telles on his arrival: they were to represent to him, that many Portugueze who had submitted to the Dutch Government, and contracted large debts in the conquered provinces, fled into Bahia to elude payment, . . . a practice which he was entreated to check, either by throwing such fugitives into prison, or giving information to the Great Council, which might enable the creditors to take measures for recovering their property. They were also to request, that instead of receiving Dutch deserters, and shipping them for Portugal, he would in future apprehend and send them back to Recife. These were the ostensible purposes of the embassy: its real object was to learn the force of the Portugueze in Bahia and the southern Captaincies, what ships they expected from Portugal, the state of the ir slave-trade, and of their intercourse with Buenos Ayres, and especially to discover who were the persons at St. Salvador by whom the Pernambucans were encouraged in their disposition to revolt; for that such a disposition existed and received encouragement was well believed. The Deputies obtained little satisfaction in their public business. The Governor frankly told them it was not in his power to comply with what they required; he promised, however, that he would communicate to the Dutch Government the names of such fugitives as might take shelter in Bahia, and he replied to their professions of peace and friendship with protestations equally flattering and equally insincere. The agents were more successful in their private enquiries, except upon that topic which was the most important. They ascertained that the

*Dutch de-
putation to
Bahia.*

CHAP. number of troops in St. Salvador and the circumjacent forts was
XX. about 2500 ; that about 150 more were quartered in the Cap-
1645. taincies of the Ilheos, Porto Seguro, and Espirito Santo ; and
that the two companies of Indians and Negroes, amounting to
about 150 each, under Camaram and Henrique Diaz, were
divided in the northern garrisons along the Dutch frontier, for
they were a set of desperadoes, whom it was not prudent to
station near the capital. The naval force was nothing ; there
were only a few small vessels, altogether unfit for war. A new
system had been adopted of sending out ships of war from Por-
tugal to collect all the Brazilian merchantmen at Bahia, and con-
voy them home ; and the Brazilians had been ordered, instead
of employing caravels and light vessels in future, to build stout
ships, capable of better defence against an enemy. Hence the
Deputies argued, that the loss of time in waiting for convoy,
and the other additional expences, would increase the price of
Portugueze imports into Europe so much that Holland would
easily undersell them. The negro slave-trade they thought
could not be considerable, because they never heard it men-
tioned ; but Bahia could be in no want of negroes, since the
price of a good one was about three hundred guilders. There
was no intercourse with Buenos Ayres, for though the Portu-
gueze of Bahia would willingly have continued it after the Re-
volution, they who went there had been treated as enemies, and
the communication was thus broken off. It was the general
opinion that this would be the ruin of Buenos Ayres, for the
prosperity of that city depended upon its trade with Brazil ;
and it was not likely that the silver of Peru would now be
shipped at a port from whence it must be exposed to the risk
of passing along an enemy's coast. They could learn nothing
concerning any correspondence with the disaffected Portugueze
in the Company's dominions, but one circumstance had been

discovered at the very time of their departure, which might well make them jealous of the Governor's designs. When they were entering the bay they had observed two armed vessels sailing out, which it was said were bound for Portugal; they could not learn for what port, and this, joined to some other suspicious appearances, made them surmise that they were destined for some other service: at length secret information was obtained, that these ships were bound, not for Portugal, but for Angola, with reinforcements for the people of Massangano, who had sent to solicit aid against the negroes; the troops, it was added, were instructed to reach that place secretly, and not to commit hostilities against the Dutch: but just when the Deputies were returning, they discovered, that immediately upon their arrival all the Dutchmen and Germans in St. Salvador had been carried on board Portugueze vessels, and confined there, to prevent them from holding any communication with their agents.

CHAP.
XX.
1645.

*Nieuhoff, p.
37-40.*

It is not unlikely that the Council might have obtained better intelligence if they had been faithfully served; but they were betrayed by one of the Deputies. This man, whose name was Dirk² van Hoogstraten, and who was commander of the fort at Nazareth, offered his services to the Governor. He was a Catholic, he said, and abhorred the heretics with whom necessity had hitherto connected him; but if the King of Portugal intended to attempt the deliverance of Pernambuco, it was equally in his power and in his inclination to facilitate the success of the enterprize. Antonio Telles was too good a statesman at once to credit professions which might so probably be feigned, for the purpose of obtaining intelligence, when all

*Hoogstraten
offers his
services to
the Portu-
guese.*

² The Portugueze call him Theodozio Estrater: but Dirk is the Dutch abbreviation of Theodorick, and not, I believe, of Theodosius.

CHAP. other means had failed. He thanked Hoogstraten for his offers,
 XX. assured him that the King his master had no other wish at that
 1645. time than punctually to observe the truce, and continue on
 friendly terms with the States; but added, that should any
 circumstances occur to disturb this good understanding, he
 would not fail to inform him of it, and avail himself of his ser-
 vices.

*Castrioto
Lusitano.*
5, § 53.

*Measures
against the
priests and
religioners.*

The report of these Deputies tended only to make the Dutch Government more suspicious of the Pernambucans. They had always distrusted them, and this reasonable distrust led to measures of rigour which produced fresh discontent in the oppressed, and more active hatred. It was known that they had sent letters to Joam IV, expressing their regret that they could not exhibit their loyalty like the other provinces, and complaining that no provision had been made in the truce for securing to them freedom of religion. Even Nassau pronounced that such an appeal for protection was worthy of punishment; they themselves thought it allowable to solicit the mediation of their natural government for the removal of restrictions which affected not merely their feelings, but the very principles of their religious belief. All funds which had heretofore been appropriated to religious purposes, the new Government declared should now belong to itself, to be applied to the support of schools, churches, and hospitals. Priests were to be imprisoned if they entered the conquered provinces without a safe conduct; and they who chose to reside there were required to take the oath of fidelity, and not to receive ordination from the Bishop of Bahia. The Portuguese were forbidden to acknowledge the authority of any priest or prelate not resident among them, or to receive his suffragan, or send money for his use. They were irritated also by a measure of severity which had been fully provoked. A little before the news of the Acclamation arrived, it was dis-

Barlaeus.
299.

Barlaeus.
p. 300.

covered that some of the religioners who were employed as confessors by the Dutch Catholics, and by the French in the Dutch service, had refused to give these persons absolution while serving in an unjust war against the Christians, as they called the Portugueze, to distinguish them from the heretics of the Reformation! To tolerate this was impossible. In consequence, the members of every monastic order were commanded within the space of a month to quit the Dutch possessions on the continent, and repair to the island of Itamaraca, that they might be conveyed from thence to the Spanish main. The needful measure was carried into effect with brutal cruelty, as such deportations usually have been. The Dutch stript them of their habits, and turned them ashore in their shirts and drawers, in such remote situations that most of them perished.

*Valeroso
Lucideno,
p. 51.*

Among the Pernambucans who had submitted to the Dutch was that Joam Fernandes Vieira, who, after the loss of Olinda, had distinguished himself so bravely in the defence of Fort St. Jorge. He was born at Funchal, in the Island of Madeira, the son of a good family, from whom he ran away when very young to seek his fortune in Brazil. On his arrival in Pernambuco he was glad to be taken into the service of a merchant, for no other wages than his maintenance. He became, however, ashamed of holding this menial character in a city where he was always liable to be recognized by some of his countrymen; and leaving Recife for this reason, got into the employ of another merchant, who first tried his abilities and principles, then trusted him confidentially in business of the greatest importance, and finally enabled him to trade for himself. When the Camp of Bom Jesus was taken he was made prisoner, and was one of the persons whom the conquerors, by an infamous act of cruelty and injustice, compelled to pay a ransom for their lives. Feeling afterwards that things were hopeless in

*Rise of
Joam Fer-
nandes Viei-
ra.*

*Vol. 1.
p. 470.*

*Vol. I. p.
508.*

CHAP. these Captaincies, according to the manner in which the war
 XX. was carried on, he yielded to the times, waiting for a happier
 1645. season, and ready to take advantage of whatever fair occasions
 might occur. In the course of ten years he became one of the
 wealthiest men in the country; his riches were considered a
 pledge for his fidelity; and by the uniform wisdom of his con-
 duct, the fairness of his dealings, his princely liberality, and his
 winning manners, he obtained the confidence of the Dutch, and
 the love and respect of the Portugueze. One of the members
 of the Great Council, with whom he lived in intimacy, left him
 for his sole agent when he returned to Holland, giving him a
 deed at his departure, by which, as by a last will, he enjoined
 his executors, in case of his demise, to receive the word of this
 his agent as a sufficient voucher, and forbade them to institute
 any legal proceedings against a man in whom he so entirely
 confided. Joam Fernandes bought the property himself; and
 prospered so well in all his undertakings, that he had at one
 time five sugar-engines of his own in full employ. He married
 Dona Maria Cesar, the young and beautiful daughter of Fran-
 cisco Berenguer de Andrada, a native of Madeira, who traced
 his descent from the Counts of Barcelona. During this career
 of prosperous fortune he had made himself thoroughly informed
 of the strength of the Dutch, and of their weakness; his heart
 was fixed upon the deliverance of Brazil from these heretics,
 and neither domestic happiness nor worldly prosperity made
 him lose sight of this great object. With many good qualities,
 and many great ones, Joam Fernandes Vieira was blindly de-
 voted to the Romish superstitions; and his abhorrence of heresy,
 and his dread of the progress which it might make among a
 catholic people, strengthened the patriotic resolution which he
 had formed.

*Valeroso
 Lucideno,
 p. 159.
 Castrioto
 Lusitano,
 5. § 7.*

*His libera-
 lity.*

A characteristic anecdote of his politic liberality shows also

in what manner designs of such magnitude affected his manners and disposition. A Portugueze, whose ship had been taken at Angola, was landed at Recife with scarcely clothes to cover him. After soliciting in vain the charity of Gaspar Diaz Ferreira, the richest Jew in the province, he went with his melancholy story to Fray Manoel do Salvador, who advised him to apply to Joam Fernandes. The applicant found him in the act of mounting his horse, and received this answer: "I am putting foot in the stirrup to return to my house, which is nearly two leagues off; and therefore, Sir, I have no leisure now to relieve you; but if you will take the trouble to follow me there, you shall find support as long as my means hold out; if they fail, and there should be nothing else to eat, I will cut off a leg, and we will feed upon it together. If you cannot walk, I will send a horse for you." This was said so gravely, and with so severe a countenance, that the poor Portugueze, comparing the strangeness of the speech with the hardness of his manner, complained to Fr. Manoel of his ill-fortune in being again repulsed. The Friar told him, that Joam Fernandes was rarely seen to have a cheerful countenance, but that his goodness might be relied on; and accordingly in the course of the afternoon a mulatto arrived at the Friar's door, with a horse for the petitioner.

About sixteen months before Nassau left Brazil, Joam Fernandes appeared voluntarily before the Governor and Great Council, and said, he had been informed by certain Jews that he and his father-in-law Berenguer were suspected in Holland of having sent letters to the King of Portugal, tending to the detriment of the State, by Antonio de Andrada, Berenguer's son. He admitted that a letter had been sent in the manner stated, but declared that it only contained a recommendation of his brother-in-law, with a view of procuring for him some advancement in the Portugueze service; and this he offered to prove by

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1645.

*Valeroso
Lucideno,
p. 59.*

Decem-
ber 1642.

*He is accus-
ed before
the Council.*

CHAP. producing a copy of the letter. The copy was examined, and
 XX. substantiated what he had said of its contents. Joam Fernan-
 1645. des then, more to confirm the Council in the good opinion
 which they entertained of his loyalty, advised them, as a mea-
 sure necessary for the safety of the State, to disarm the Portu-
 gueze and their dependents. This was accordingly done: the
 suggestion removed all suspicion from him; and the measure
 itself was no impediment to his views, for fresh arms could be
 provided long before his projects would be mature. After six
 months had elapsed, the accusation which he had foreseen and
 forestalled came over in a dispatch from the Council of Nine-
 teen. A Dutchman, formerly in the service of Joam Fernan-
 des, who had accompanied Francisco de Andrada to Europe,
 had testified, that there was a letter, signed by Joam Fernandes,
 Berenguer, Bernardino Carvalho, Joam Bezerra, and Luiz Bras
 Bezerra, wherein they assured the King of Portugal that they
 were provided with men, money, and arms for recovering the
 provinces which had been wrested from him; and which letter,
 the Dutchman said, had been communicated to him in confi-
 dence by Andrada, the bearer. The accusation seems to bear
 with it strong marks of falsehood: it would have been gross
 imprudence to have trusted their agent with a paper, which, if
 intercepted, must condemn themselves, and, if safely transmitt-
 ed, contained nothing which that agent might not with equal
 authority have delivered by word of mouth; and it is absurd to
 suppose they should tell the King that they were well supplied
 with men and arms, when their difficulties arose from the want
 of both. The Company did not give much credit to the charge;
 they only advised the Council to keep a watchful eye over the
 persons accused.

Nieuhoff,
p. 35.

Begins to
prepare the
minds of his
countrymen.

Joam Fernandes had taken no step which could endanger
 himself before Nassau was recalled: the weakness of the garri-

son, the imprudent security of the Government, and the increased vexations of his countrymen under a worse administration, then appeared to offer the opportunity for which he waited. Hitherto his designs had been confined to his own breast; the first communication was an awful crisis; when that was once made he would no longer be master of his own secret; his life and fortune would irrevocably be set upon the die, and both be at the mercy of the truth or discretion of others. This danger he could not but distinctly perceive; and one day when the sense of the risk pressed upon him with more weight than usual, he retired into his oratory, and poured out his heart in prayer to a Crucifix which stood before a picture of the Trinity. The earnestness with which he then devoted himself to the cause of his country and the catholic faith, while he implored the protection of the triune and incarnate Deity whose images were there before him, produced the confidence for which he prayed. He left the oratory in a state of calm determination, and began from that hour to sound the numerous guests who frequented his table. The Portugueze had long complained to each other of their intolerable oppressions, and Joam Fernandes saw by the bitterness with which they resented their present condition, that they would eagerly engage in any enterprize for the deliverance of their country.

At this time Andre Vidal de Negreiros came to Recife with Fray Ignacio, a Benedictine. Vidal was one of the bravest, wisest, and best of the Portugueze. He had been appointed to the Captaincy of Maranhã, and was come to visit his parents in Paraiba, that he might either take them with him to his Government, or receive before he went what might too probably be their last blessing. The Monk also had relations in Pernambuco, who served as the cause or pretext of his journey. To these persons Joam Fernandes imparted his designs. While

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1645.

Cast. Lus.
5. § 30—2.Sept.
1644.
Opens his
project to
Vidal.

CHAP. Vidal was at Recife, preparing to embark for his return, four
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1645. Portugueze marauders, who had been apprehended near Porto Calvo, were brought in; it was immediately said that they would be put to death, upon which Vidal and Fr. Manoel do Salvador went to the Council to intercede for them. These men, they said, were deserters from Bahia, and the fittest mode of proceeding would be to deliver them to Vidal, that he might take them back to St. Salvador; where they would be punished as their offences deserved, and in such manner as might remove all suspicion that they or such as they had acted under the Governor's order or connivance. If the Council objected to this, let them be sent prisoners to Holland; either course would gratify the Portugueze, a people easily conciliated by kindness, but who were not to be governed by rigour. Moreover the culprits had brethren and kinsmen in Pernambuco, who, if they were executed, would endeavour to revenge their death. Vidal added, that if the Council would grant a safe conduct for the purpose, he would touch at Porto Calvo on his return, offer a pardon to the marauders in that part of the country for the offences in consequence of which they had deserted, and take them all off with him. The Dutch gladly accepted this proposal, and granted passports for all such persons who should accompany Vidal by sea, or if they were too late for this, return with his Alferaz by land: this latter officer was therefore immediately dispatched to Porto Calvo to make the arrangement known. Touching the prisoners, the Council only replied that they would execute justice with mercy: but as soon as Vidal and the Friar had left the Chamber, orders were sent to hang three of them, and cut off the hands of one before his execution: the fourth escaped by bribing the Fiscal, through a Jew to whom he was related. There can be little doubt that these fellows deserved their fate, but the Council aggravated an ill-

timed act of severity, by refusing to let them be accompanied by a priest of their own faith. Fr. Manoel protested loudly against this breach of the terms upon which the Portuguese had submitted to the Dutch Government. It was the worst of tyrannies, he said, to deprive them of the consolations of religion, and the benefits of confession; the worst of cruelties thus to kill the soul as well as the body. Upon this remonstrance the Council suffered him to visit the prisoners, but not to attend them to the place of execution, when the Dutch chose that a Calvinistic preacher should make trial of his skill. This silly act of bigotry wounded the Pernambucans in their tenderest feelings. Vidal also felt personally offended, and the offence was heightened by a subsequent act of injustice, as well as cruelty. The marauders accepted the invitation, and came to Porto Calvo to embark there. One man was taken ill, and the Alferes remained to travel with him by land, if he should recover. But when the Council heard that Vidal had set sail, they seized this poor wretch, in defiance of the officer's reclamations, brought him to Recife, and there had him hanged and quartered.

Vidal was bitterly incensed, and vowed vengeance for this perfidy. He was one of those men who are above all selfish considerations; rank, honours, and emoluments were as nothing in his eyes when placed in competition with the service of his country. Having seen the sufferings of the Pernambucans, and the state of the forts, he thought no more of Maranham, but entered into the prospect which Joam Fernandes had revealed to him with all his heart, and devoted himself with all his soul and all his strength to its accomplishment. Joam Fernandes had through him addressed a memorial to the Governor of Brazil. The enemy, he said, were off their guard, their fortifications neglected, the palisades rotten, the garrisons weak; the best officers had departed with Nassau, and many of the soldiers had

CHAP.
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1645.

*Valeroso
Lucideno,
p. 163.*

*His representations to
the governor
general.*

CHAP. since followed, as their terms expired, because the harvest of
 XX. plunder was over. The greater part of the remaining Dutch
 1645. were traders of different descriptions, who had usurped the
 sugar-works and farms of the Portugueze, and were living upon
 them as much at their ease as if they were in Holland. The
 city was chiefly inhabited by Jews, most of whom were origi-
 nally fugitives from Portugal; they had their open synagogues
 there, to the scandal of Christianity; for the honour of the faith,
 therefore, the Portugueze ought to risk their lives and proper-
 ties, . . . yea, they ought to think that both would be well lost
 for the service of Christ their Redeemer, in putting down such
 an abomination. He did not dissemble or extenuate the diffi-
 culties of the attempt; but the die, he said, was cast, advice
 would come too late, and what he asked for was assistance.
 The Governor, to whom the preservation of the State was en-
 trusted, could not want means wherewith to assist him: and he
 protested before God, that if he were disappointed of assistance
 in that quarter from whence he properly looked for it and ex-
 pected it, he must apply to strangers, . . . for in fact some of the
 Portugueze declared, that if their own natural Government
 refused to help them, they would apply to Spain, or even give
 themselves up to the Turks, rather than endure the intolerable
 yoke of Holland. By the same channel Joam Fernandes wrote
 also to Camaram, who was then before Seregipe, requesting
 from him and his native troops that cooperation which the Per-
 nambucans had ever found him ready to bestow, and which
 they had so much reason to expect from him, as one who was
 born in that province, and had often shown himself there to be
 one of the bravest and faithfullest subjects. He wrote also to
 Henrique Diaz, whose services had been rewarded with the title
 of Governor of the Mina-Negroes. At the same time he sent a
 memorial to be dispatched to Portugal, in which he laid before

the King a detail of the grievances and outrages which compelled him and his compatriots to take arms for their own deliverance, protesting that no law, truce, or treaty could deprive them of their natural and indefeasible rights.

The course which Antonio Telles had to pursue when he received this application from the Pernambucan patriots, accompanied by the encouraging intelligence which Vidal and his companion had obtained concerning the Dutch force, and the state of the fortresses, was sufficiently plain for one who understood the disposition of the Portugueze court. Should the insurrection succeed, there was no fear of being disavowed; his business was carefully to foment it, but as carefully to withhold any avowed assistance, and take care to commit no open breach of the truce. As secretly therefore as possible, he sent sixty chosen men, under Antonio Diaz Cardozo, to act in whatever manner Joam Fernandes might direct; and mindful that he had deprecated all useless advice, reminded him only, that it behoved him to weigh well what he was attempting before he began, and when it was too late to recede, then to go resolutely forward. The detachment consisted mostly of experienced officers; they made their way singly or in small parties, unseen or unsuspected, and without arms the better to escape suspicion; and when they got to the place appointed, they were concealed by Joam Fernandes; one faithful servant, by name Miguel Fernandes, being the only person entrusted with the secret. He had begun to make deposits of arms, ammunition, provisions, and money upon his different estates, and in the woods; but it had not been possible to collect arms enough, and four of these auxiliaries were sent back to Bahia to solicit a supply. The letter which they carried was written in such a manner that its enigmatical meaning would readily

CHAP.
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1645.

Val. Lus.
p. 164.
Cast Lus.
5. § 34.
Cardozo
sent into
Pernambu-
co.

Decem-
ber 1644.

Cast. Lus.
5. § 35-7.

CHAP. be understood by the person to whom it was addressed, but pass
 XX. undiscovered if it should fall into the hands of the enemy.

1645.

*Joam Fernan-
 des de-
 clares his
 intentions.*

*Val. Luc.
 p. 167.*

Camaram and Henrique Diaz received the invitation to take arms like men who hated the Dutch, and moved in their native element only when they were engaged in war. The former thanked Joam Fernandes for inviting him to bear a part in the glorious enterprize which he was preparing; the latter said, he rejoiced in this opportunity of making some return for the good offices he had formerly received at his hands, and vowed that he would never again wear the cross of the Order of Christ with which he had been invested, till Pernambuco should be recovered: both promised instantly to begin their march. The chances of discovery were now so much increased, that Joam Fernandes, in concert with Cardozo, determined upon opening his designs to his friends and kinsmen: they were therefore all invited to an entertainment, and at the conclusion of the feast he told them for what purpose they had been there assembled. He was resolved, he said, to effect the deliverance of Pernambuco, or to perish in the attempt. During many years he had been preparing for this great enterprize. The Governor of Bahia, knowing and approving of his design had sent him sixty soldiers, most of whom were experienced officers, under a brave and distinguished leader. Camaram and Henrique Diaz were on the way to join him. There was the example of Maranham to encourage...there were their own manifold wrongs to sting them to the attempt; and what was there to deter them? The fear of losing their property? alas! bitter experience had proved that there was no way of securing it, except by their own right hands! Was it the love of their families? better see them at once cut off while the purity of their faith was yet inviolate, than living in a contagious society of heretics!

*Cast. Lus.
 5. § 36, 40.*

Was it the fear of death? better to die in vindicating the liberty of their country, than continue to exist in that country a conquered, oppressed, despised, and insulted people!

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This harangue produced various effects upon the various hearers: they whose fortunes were desperate received it with joy, the young and enterprising with generous ardour, the elder patriots with calm and religious approbation: some there were who listened with dissembled fear, and resolved to provide for their own safety by giving immediate information to the Dutch Government. All, however, requested that they might see Cardozo. A second meeting was appointed for the ensuing day, at a stock farm belonging to Joam Fernandes; and there the parties met, going singly, and taking different routes. Cardozo confirmed to them what they had already heard of the approbation and support of the Governor at Bahia, and the advance of Camaram and Henrique Diaz with their troops. The whole assembly then with one voice saluted Joam Fernandes as their General and Governor during the insurrection. They who wanted courage for such an undertaking were constrained to yield for the moment, and join in the general expression: but they took their measures so well, and diffused their own fears so artfully, that before three days elapsed, the whole party came to Joam Fernandes, some with simulated, and more with real concern, and told him that the Great Council was informed of their meeting, and possessed a list of all their names. It was impossible for him to know who the informers were, but he knew that they were present. Dissembling this, however, he affected to treat their alarm as groundless; whatever suspicions the Council might entertain, he said, whether they only suspected the design, or if it had been actually betrayed, he would undertake to remove them. It was well known in what estimation

Meeting
with Cardo-
zo.

Some of the
Portuguese
seek to deter
him,

CHAP. he was held by the Dutch Government ; a lie^s from him would
 XX. outweigh the truth from any other person. Joam Fernandes
 1645. said this with perfect calmness and intrepidity ; they who had
 betrayed the conspiracy were sensible that it was no idle boast ;
 they saw themselves in danger of being treated as impostors by
 the Dutch, and as traitors by the Portugueze ; and as the means
 of extricating themselves, they proposed to treat with the Coun-
 cil in such a manner, that the Government should gladly grant
 Cardozo and his men a safe conduct to return to Bahia. Fer-
 nandes replied, that it was useless to propose a plan to which
 Cardozo, as a soldier and a man of honour, could never con-
 sent. Leaving them then, he hastened to Cardozo, to tell him
 what had occurred, and who the persons were whom he suspected
 of being the traitors, that he might be on his guard against them.

Cast. Lus.
 5. § 41-6.

and to make
 Cardozo
 return to
 Bahia.

This warning was in good time. While Cardozo was brood-
 ing over it in his lurking place, one of the traitors came to tell
 him that the Dutch were informed of his arrival, and troops
 would be sent from Recife, with orders not to desist from search-
 ing the woods till they had found him. It was impossible, the
 man said, that he could escape ; and therefore the best measure
 both for his own safety and that of the confederated patriots
 was, that a passport should be obtained for him, which would
 at once deliver him from danger, and the Council from their
 fears. Cardozo replied, that such terms might very well be
 accepted by a set of traitors ; but he wore a sword, wherewith
 he could make terms for himself ; and if he were taken, it would

³ "Para com os Magistrados, mais pezava a sua mentira, que a verdade de muitos." (*Cast. Lus.* 5, § 45.) Raphael de Jesus puts these words in the mouth of Joam Fernandes, under whose patronage, and from whose information he wrote.

be to the destruction of those who betrayed him ; for they might be assured, that without being put to the torture he would at once give up their names, declare that he had been invited by them into Pernambuco, and persist in affirming that Joam Fernandes had neither joined in inviting him, nor known of his coming. Provoked at the tone and manner of this reply, the Pernambucan ventured to threaten Cardozo in return, but took to flight upon seeing him draw his sword. Cardozo and Fernandes now consulted together, and agreed that the former should address a letter to the latter, which might be laid, if necessary, before the Council, for the purpose of exculpating him, and criminating those who had revealed the conspiracy. It was to this tenour ; that Cardozo had been drawn into Pernambuco by the repeated solicitations of the Portugueze inhabitants, confiding in their oaths and protestations signed by their own hands, that they were leagued to throw off the yoke of the Dutch. Deceived by these assurances, he had reached the place appointed, after suffering such hardships upon the way as God and his men could witness ; and no sooner had he arrived than he found himself betrayed. Against this, however, he was upon his guard, having always in some degree apprehended it, because of the anxiety which the conspirators expressed to conceal their proceedings from Joam Fernandes. This anxiety on their part had prevented him from showing that respect to a person so distinguished among his countrymen, which both courtesy and inclination would otherwise have alike required : and he would not do it now, lest it might give occasion for any doubt of his loyalty in the Dutch Government, who were so greatly beholden to him for the example which he had afforded of fidelity. Cardozo added, that he wrote this letter as the only mark of respect which he could pay to Joam Fernandes, informing him that he was about to return to Bahia, lest those

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CHAP. who had tempted him into Pernambuco should deliver him up
 XX. to the Council. He had a sword wherewith to defend himself
 1645. in this danger ; if that failed him, he should proclaim aloud who
 were the traitors, and appeal to the favour of Fernandes in his
 misfortunes.

Cast. Lus.
 5. § 46-8.

Having prepared this well-devised paper, Cardozo retired to a different part of the woods, whither he was guided by a trusty servant of his politic confederate. Joam Fernandes meantime sent for the persons to whom his designs had been imparted, and giving them the letter to read, asked what cause Cardozo could have for returning so suddenly without taking any other leave of them than what they there saw? He warned those among them who were guilty to beware of the consequences to themselves ; for they well knew, that as he had both ability and spirit to spend more in one hour than they could do in the whole course of their lives, a word from him would be of more avail with the Dutch than all their oaths conjointly. The letter, he said, he should carefully preserve, as evidence to lay before the Council.

Cast. Lus.
 5. § 49.

Embarrassment of the Council.

Fernandes was too subtle a conspirator for the Dutch. So well had he concealed Cardozo and his men in the woods, that all search for them proved in vain. The Great Council were now considerably embarrassed. They had been informed that the Portuguese had been meditating a revolt from the time of Nassau's departure, in consequence of the aggravated extortions and grievances which they had since that time endured : that Vidal's visit to Pernambuco had been undertaken for the purpose of ascertaining the real state of affairs ; that the Portuguese even counted upon the Company's negroes for assistance, most of them being Catholics, and that Joam Fernandes and his father-in-law Berenguer were the heads of the conspiracy. Several others had been named ; but they complained in

their dispatches to the Company that they could not obtain sufficient information for committing them to prison; and they did not venture to make a search and disarm the Portugueze, lest it should occasion an immediate insurrection, against which they were ill prepared; for their magazines and storehouses were not secured, they could not draw from the garrisons a force equal to protect the open country, and all who lived at a distance from the forts would be cut off by the insurgents. Thus circumstanced, they earnestly solicited immediate reinforcements, till the arrival of which all they could do was to provide as much as possible against the danger, and continue to make the most vigilant enquiries.

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Nieuhoff,
p. 41.

Meantime Cardozo's messengers reached St. Salvador; the Governor observed as usual the most cautious language, but he promised all the assistance in his power to the Pernambucans, if the Dutch should continue to oppress them, and secretly permitted volunteers to accompany them on their return. About forty adventurers offered themselves for this perilous service; they accomplished their march in safety, were placed under Cardozo's orders, and quartered secretly in the woods. It was at this time reported, that the Tapuyas were to be let loose against the people of Paraiba, and that the Great Council had determined to cut off all the male Portugueze in their conquests between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five. The former report was not incredible, because a German, by name Jacob Rabbi, was stationed among those savages, as agent for the Dutch; he had married the daughter of one of their chiefs, and accommodating himself with little difficulty to their way of life, and with less to the ferocity of the savage character, it was to be expected that when the war began he would prove a cruel enemy. The latter project was beyond all doubt a calumnious imputation. The Dutch were capable of such a crime, . . . for they have proved

*The Govern-
or promises
to assist
Fernandes.*

CHAP. themselves so at Batavia; but at this time we know by the
 XX. dispatches of the Great Council, that they did not dare take
 1645. measures for disarming the Portugueze, though they knew their
 danger; much less then would they venture upon a massacre. Joam Fernandes could not possibly have believed the report; it was very probably a falsehood of his own fabrication, for he circulated it as an assured fact, of which he had obtained certain intelligence; and urged his associates to make ready with all speed, that they might prevent the blow which was aimed against them. He had now indeed proceeded too far to escape detection; it was therefore necessary that no time should be lost; Camaram and Diaz were hourly expected to arrive; and acting with the authority of general, with which he had been invested at the first meeting, he nominated captains in every district, drew out their commissions in the customary form, and sent them orders how to act.

Cast. Lus.
 5. § 54—5.

*Prepara-
 tions of Fer-
 nandes.*

He had long been laying up stores for this great enterprize. As President of many religious fraternities, he had ventured openly to purchase considerable quantities of gunpowder upon the pretext of using it for fireworks upon the different saints' days; and he had procured other quantities through the interior from Bahia. All this was carefully concealed in the woods, where in like manner he had made deposits of pulse, grain, fish, and meat, both salted and smoked, wine, oil, vinegar and salt, and spirits, in distilling which he employed some of his own works. These things were carried into the woods by the carts which went there to bring back logs of Brazil. He had also sent off the greatest part of his numerous herds to his *curraes*, or grazing farms, in the interior, pretending that in the *Varzea*, or cultivated plain in the immediate vicinity of Recife, they were stolen by the negroes, and that many of them died in consequence of eating a certain plant called *fava*. Under such pretences and by such means he had laid up stores for the intended war.

Val. Luc.
 p. 160.

One of the first persons to whom the project had been imparted, was a man of considerable influence, by name Antonio Cavalcanti. He entered warmly into the scheme; but when the time of action was drawing nigh, the difficulties and dangers were magnified through the medium of his fears, and he began to waver and hold back. He had a son and daughter, both at this time marriageable; for the purpose of securing him, Joam Fernandes proposed that they should intermarry with a sister and brother of his wife, and promised to settle them upon two of his *Ingenios*, or Sugar-works, giving them the whole produce for four years, and requiring only a third as rent for a second term of the like duration. The proposal was gladly accepted, . . . but little did the parties whose union was thus contracted for imagine what were the preparations for the marriage feast! The friends of both families would of course be invited; and as Joam Fernandes gave the entertainment, it was expected that all the chief officers of the Company, civil and military, would in compliment to him accept the invitation. It was his intention to ply these guests well with wine, and then with one band of conspirators to fall upon and slaughter them, while another party should enter Recife and obtain possession, before the Dutch could recover from the consternation into which they would be thrown by so unexpected an attack, finding themselves deprived of their leaders. Having resolved upon this act of atrocious treachery, he communicated his design to the men of the Varzea, and ordered them to dig up what weapons they had secreted, to procure as many more as they could, and to be ready for the work. They answered him with acclamations, ⁴ Long live King Joam the fourth! Hurrah for the

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1645.

*He plans a
massacre of
the leading
men among
the Dutch.*

⁴ “*Nam podiam reprimir o alvoroço com que gritaram a huma voz, Viva el Rey D. Joam o quarto nosso Senhor; Viva a Fé Catholica Romana, que professamos; e Viva, viva Joam Fernandes Vieira!*”

CHAP. Roman Catholic faith! and Joam Fernandes Vieira for ever!
 XX. The project cannot be condemned too severely: but in judging
 1645. him who planned, and those who thus approved it, we should
 call to mind, that little more than half a century had elapsed
 since a medal was struck by the head of their Infallible Church,
 in honour of the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day.

Cast. Lus.
 5. § 57—60.

*Intimation
 given to the
 Council.*

The men of the Varzea, in the ardour of their hopes, began now to seek for arms with eagerness which could not escape observation. The Council were informed of this; still their intelligence was incomplete, notwithstanding what the timorous rather than traitorous Portugueze had said to intimidate Joam Fernandes and Cardozo; and neither knowing whom to seize, nor venturing upon any bold and general measure of preventive arrest, they affected to treat what they had heard as a vague report. But the Jews were loud in their expressions of alarm; they had more at stake than the Dutch; they were sure of being massacred without mercy during the insurrection, or roasted without mercy if the insurgents should prove successful; they therefore besieged the Council with warnings and accusations. The most specific information, however, came from some Portugueze, in a letter which was signed Truth, and delivered to the Council by a Jew physician. Herein the writer advised them to apprehend Joam Fernandes Vieira, as the head and prime mover of the conspiracy, some of his servants, his father-in-law Berenguer, and Antonio Cavalcanti; if this could be done, the whole would be brought to light. He advised also that all the planters of the adjacent territory should be summoned to Recife, under an assurance that they were not to be molested for their debts; and that when there they should be detained, upon pretence of securing them against the violence of the rebels in the country; a like measure was recommended at Paraiba and at Porto Calvo, as equally beneficial to the Government and to

many individuals : . . . we beseech you, said the letter, take care of this poor nation, lest they should be forced to join the rebels against you ! The insurrection, it added, was to begin at Whitsuntide. The writer also stated, that three persons were concerned in giving this information ; that at some fit season they would not scruple to declare themselves, and that they would communicate farther intelligence as they obtained it : a promise which seemed to be repeated in the words *Plus ultra*, placed after the signature.

Information thus positively given by men who hardly affected to conceal themselves, having sent the letter by a messenger through whom they might be traced, convinced the Council both of the certainty and imminence of the danger ; and they consulted in what manner to get Joam Fernandes into their power. Lichthart and Haus proposed to invite him to a fishing party and then seize him ; this plan however was not attempted, or it failed to deceive the wary conspirator. Another method was devised by the Council. His dealings with the Company were very extensive, and he had for some time been negotiating a new contract with them ; it was therefore determined to send for him into the city, with his two sureties Berenguer and Bernardino Carvalho, under pretence of compleating the agreement and signing the papers. But Joam Fernandes had three persons in the city who were sold to him, and who advised him of all that passed in the Council ; and he had long been upon his guard. By day, while he was about his house as usual, centinels were upon the look-out on every side ; he affected to be as accessible as ever, and to be employed in his ordinary concerns, yet he took care to see no person whom he wished to avoid. His servants were equally prepared for resistance and for flight : he had nearly a hundred negro slaves about his dwelling, armed with darts and bows and arrows ; a secret

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1645.

Nieuhoff,
p. 43.

They seek
to entrap
Fernandes.

CHAP. door had also been made, through which he might escape in case
 XX. of emergency ; his horse was always saddled, and every night
 1645. he retired into the woods, accompanied by his secretary, Diogo
 da Sylva a youth of Madeira, and by Luiz da Costa da Sepul-
 veda, who shared with him in all his difficulties. When the
 Council's broker arrived, he admitted him, and expressed the ut-
 most readiness to conclude the contract ; he could not indeed
 go himself on the morrow, he added, which was the day ap-
 pointed, because pressing occupations would prevent him ; but
 he would send his agent with sufficient powers. The Dutchman
 insisted that his presence was indispensable, urged it with an
 impatience which would have given cause to suspect the design,
 if he with whom he dealt had not already been sufficiently con-
 scious and sufficiently wary, and betrayed himself still farther,
 by offering him a protection in the Council's name. Joam Fer-
 nandes made answer he was not ignorant of what enemies he had
 at Recife, nor of what schemes had been laid against him ; and as
 for protections, the best protection was that of his own house.

Vol. Luc.
p. 172.

Cast. Lus.
5. § 50—6.

Movements
of Camaram
and Diaz.

Camaram and Henrique Diaz were not yet arrived : the lat-
 ter, when he was invited to this service, was employed in an
 expedition against a Mocambo, or settlement of Maroon ne-
 groes, in the interior : this had delayed their march, and the
 weather had impeded it, for the wet season set in with a severity
 which the oldest persons had never remembered in Brazil. The
 Council knew that these troops were expected ; but having
 charged their commander at Seregipe to advise them of the
 movements in that quarter, they were answered that Camaram
 was gone to keep his Easter at Bahia, and that the men were
 employed in cultivating the ground. This information tended
 for some time to encourage them in that belief of security which
 they willingly indulged. They were thus deceived by the con-
 duct of the Carijo chief, whether that conduct was accidental or
 politic ; and repeatedly as they had been told that troops from

Bahia were in the woods, they never succeeded by any search in detecting their hiding-place, so well had Joam Fernandes and his faithful agents concealed them. Advices, however, at length arrived, which awakened them to a full sense of the danger; from the S. Francisco they were informed that Camaram and Diaz had past the river, and from the Lagoas that some of their party had ventured into the houses there to procure provisions; that they had been seen and spoken with, and that the Dutch commander going in person to discover their design, had found the track of their march far in the interior; a symptom which left no doubt that their intentions were hostile.

While these troops were impeded on their march by the rains, Joam Fernandes could no longer wait safely for their arrival. It was now evident that the Dutch intended to secure his person, and now when artifice had failed, he knew that force would be employed. He therefore sent off his wife, who was far advanced in pregnancy, to the house of one of her kinsmen, while he himself retired into the woods, never venturing to any of his own estates, nor ever sleeping twice successively in one place. Berenguer always accompanied him, with a few of the most resolute patriots, and a number of his own slaves, whose devoted attachment to him shows that he had been a kind master. It was not long before he received certain advice that Camaram and Diaz had past the S. Francisco; the letter containing this intelligence he sent to the Vigario of the Varzea, Francisco da Costa Falcam, the head of the clergy there, who was deeply engaged in the conspiracy. He was charged to communicate it to the Portugueze in his district, and call upon them to declare themselves at once, that Joam Fernandes might know whom to protect and whom to punish. The answer was unanimous; they were all true and loyal Portugueze, ready with their properties and lives for the service of their natural King and Country.

CHAP.

XX.

1645.

Val. Luc.
p. 172.
Nieuhoff,
p. 42—4.
Cast. Lus.
5. § 61.

Fernandes
takes to the
woods.

June 7.

Cast. Lus.
5. § 61—4.

CHAP.

XX.

1645.

*Miracles at
the Chapel
of S. Anto-
nio.*

No open act of insurrection had yet taken place. The Dutch were not informed that Joam Fernandes had left his house, and they hoped to surprise him there in the night preceding S. Antonio's day, . . . a saint whom the Portuguese regard as their patron, and the most illustrious of all their canonized countrymen, and whose festival they celebrate with peculiar devotion. Orders were sent to seize the leaders of the conspiracy at the same moment through the Dutch Captaincies. On the eve of S. Antonio's, just at night-fall, a considerable number of troops, in parties of from twenty to thirty, went out of Recife, taking different roads, but all with instructions to surround the house and works of Joam Fernandes. They met there, forced their way in, and found the place deserted: all the neighbouring habitations were in like manner abandoned; . . . for the Portuguese expected this, and were hid among the canes and in the woods. Miracles had been performed to encourage them, and prepare them for thus outlawing themselves. Fernandes had a chapel dedicated to S. Antonio: about a month before the Saint's holy-day, the person whose business it was to take care of this chapel found the doors open in the morning, though he had locked them over night, and taken home the keys. Nothing had been stolen, nor did it appear that any person had entered. The same prodigy happened the second and the third morning; the sexton now fully believed it to be supernatural, and related it to several priests, who affected to consider it as a trick played upon him by some of his neighbours. He watched at night to ascertain this; no person appeared, and still the doors were open at morning. Joam Fernandes was now made acquainted with the miracle which occurred nightly at his chapel; as the possibility of some person's possessing another key was still suspected, the doors were locked in the presence of a number of persons, and he sealed up the key-hole with his own

signet. At morning the doors as usual were found open, and the seal unbroken. Easily as all this was done, it past for miraculous. Some inferred that the saint encouraged them to take the field, avow their designs, and begin the good work without farther delay; others discovering a closer allegory in the portent, maintained that he signified by this token his intention of protecting the faithful Portugueze, shewing that they would always find him with the door open to their prayers. A third party differed from both; it was a sign, they said, that they ought to secure themselves and their families, and leave their houses. Lest there should be any doubt that this was the true interpretation, a second prodigy confirmed it; on the same day, while they were attending mass in the chapel, the canopy which was over the altar before the saint's image, fell upon the altar, at his feet. It was universally admitted that this was a warning for them to strip the chapel, remove their effects, and retire.

The Dutch were not more successful in other points, though they had nearly surprized Berenguer and Bernardino de Carvalho, with two other men of note, who were sleeping in the refining-house of an Ingenio, when they were awakened by the noise of the soldiers in the habitations adjoining; and breaking their way out, crost the Capivaribi with the water up to their necks, and got into the woods. The night was wet and stormy, and the Dutch were impeded every where by the mire and sloughs. No sooner had they turned back from their unavailing search, than the Portugueze came from their hiding places, met as they had appointed at the Mother Church in the Varzea, and kept the festival with more passionate feeling than had ever before sanctified it. Fr. Manoel do Salvador preached upon the occasion; for a long time he had delivered his sermons with the fear of the gallows before his eyes, the Dutch

CHAP.
XX.
1645.

Cast. Lus.
5. § 64—8.

*The Dutch
disappointed
in their
search.*

CHAP. XX. 1645. having set spies upon him and watching all his words. Here he knew his congregation, and spake boldly; he took for his text, Let your loins be girded; and preached a fiery discourse. With right Portuguese feeling, he reminded them of Portugal's old fame, and the heroic achievements of their ancestors; and he dwelt with suspicious ingenuity upon the recent miracles which S. Antonio had performed before their eyes. He addressed himself to willing and greedy auditors: their piety, their patriotism, and their superstition were wrought to the highest pitch: and he may be believed when he tells us that they left the church weeping with emotions of generous joy, and devoting themselves anew to the cause of their country and their faith.

*Valeroso
Lucideno
p. 179.*

*Measures of
the Council.*

Two persons only of all whom the Council had ordered to be apprehended in the Varzea were taken: one was altogether ignorant of the plot, the other was Sebastian Carvalho, one of those who had written the letter: he now acknowledged this, and to confirm the truth of the information which he had given, declared that he had been privy to the conspiracy, and had signed a paper, whereby he bound himself to take an active part in its execution; but he signed it, he said, in the fear of death, Joam Fernandes having threatened to make away with all who should refuse to join him, and having actually caused several to be murdered on that account. Carvalho was now detained in confinement, at his own request, to secure him from the suspicion of his countrymen. The Council gave immediate orders to widen the ditches, and strengthen the fortifications of Mauritas, and they sent to seize all the meal which could be found for their garrisons; a price, however, was to be paid for it. They offered a pardon to Antonio Cavalcanti and Joam Paes Cabral, leading men among the disaffected, whose desertion they thought would materially weaken and discourage the pa-

tricts, and whom they hoped to bring back to submission, because they had large families in the power of the Dutch. The expected arrival of Camaram alarmed them for the fidelity of their own Indians, and they resolved if possible to get the wives and children of these people into the Island of Itamaraca, under pretext of securing them from the insurgents, but in fact as hostages for their tribe.

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1645.

Joam Fernandes meanwhile, as soon as he was informed that search had been made for him, and knew that it was no longer possible to protract the time, collected his associates, and took post upon an eminence in the woods, high enough to serve as a watch-tower. The spot seems to have been appointed as a meeting-place, for there he was joined by all the persons whom he employed upon his different estates, armed with weapons which had long been secreted for this purpose. Thither also his slaves came, induced by their attachment to an indulgent master, by the promise of liberty and reward when the enterprize should have succeeded, and by that love of activity and adventure which is natural to man. At the end of three days he found himself at the head of an hundred and thirty resolute and trusty men; but many of them were ill-armed, and all undisciplined. He then moved to Camaragibe, a place well fitted for defence, being surrounded with marshes, and about two miles from the Varzea, so that he was well situated for receiving and communicating intelligence. From thence he sent out his advices on all sides, calling upon all the Portugueze to take arms and join him; and inviting slaves, by an offer of the pay and privileges of the soldiers, and a promise that he would from his own private property purchase the freedom of every one who belonged to a patriot. Many obeyed the call, met together by night, fell upon the houses of those Dutchmen and Jews who happened unfortunately to be within their reach, killed the

Nieuhoff.
p. 45-7.

Fernandes
summons the
people to
take arms.

CHAP. inhabitants, plundered the houses, and then joined the camp of
 XX
 1645. the insurgents. Some who were not able to provide subsistence
 for their families if they absented themselves, unwillingly re-
 mained quiet; and there were not a few, who regarding nothing
 so much as their own tranquillity, hoped to see the insurrection
 speedily suppressed.

*Castrioto
 Lusitano.
 5, § 69—71.*

*Precaution-
 ary measures
 of the Coun-
 cil converted
 into means
 of extortion.*

The first measures of the Council were prompted by that
 cupidity which was the characteristic and the curse of the
 Company's Government. They apprehended men at random
 throughout their provinces; those who were really implicated
 in the conspiracy had already joined Joam Fernandes, and it
 seemed as if these persons were apprehended only to make them
 pay for their release. The consequence might have been foreseen:
 many who would have remained in obedience if they might
 have lived unmolested, fled now to the insurgents, because they
 were indignant at having been arrested without cause, or be-
 cause they did not chuse to feel themselves at the mercy of
 every venal or malicious informer. An edict also was publish-
 ed, requiring all the Portugueze who had left their houses to
 appear within five days at Recife, upon a promise of pardon
 and protection for all persons except the ringleaders. They
 were to take a new oath of allegiance, and then be left in quiet
 possession of their property, as in aforetime. The harpies in
 office converted this into a new means of extortion. They
 represented, that all the Portugueze must for their own safety
 take the oath, and provide themselves with a protection; for
 which, of course, they exacted fees. All who were not actually
 in arms were compelled to purchase these protections.

*Cast Lus.
 5, § 73—5.
 Val. Euc.
 182.*

*They offer
 money to
 Fernandes.*

Profit, in it's gross trading sense, was so much the object of
 the Dutch Government in all their proceedings, that they seem
 to have considered it as every man's ruling principle. They
 would gladly have had Joam Fernandes in their power, and

have put him to death; but now when he had eluded them, they thought that it would be a saving bargain to purchase his submission at a high price, and thus avert the destructive war which would otherwise be waged against their plantations and storehouses. In this spirit they found means, through two of his own countrymen, to offer him 200,000 cruzados, to be paid in any place, and secured in any manner that he might please to appoint, provided he would abandon his project, and leave the Captaincy in peace. Fernandes affected to give ear to the proposal, for the sake of gaining time till his expected succours should arrive; and when it was no longer possible to delay giving a final answer, he sent word to the Council that he would not sell the honour of punishing oppressors at so low a rate. Enraged at this, they proclaimed a reward of 4000 florins for any person who would bring him in dead or alive: he replied by a counter-proclamation, offering twice that sum for the head of any of the Supreme Council; and he posted his manifestos in all public places, even within Recife, calling upon all Portuguese to take arms with him against their tyrants, on pain of being treated as enemies of their country; and promising to all strangers and Jews who would remain peaceably in their houses, protection as vassals of the Crown of Portugal. Still farther to intimidate the Council, he wrote to them, saying, they need not by so many base means seek to circumvent him, for he would soon pay them a public visit in their city, for which intent he was making ready with 14,000 European soldiers, and 24,000 Brazilians and Indians. The extravagance of the first part of the assertion was palpable; but the Dutch knew from their own population lists that the latter number was not incredible, if the Portuguese were generally engaged in the conspiracy.

CHAP.
XX.
1645.

Cast. Lus.
5. § 72—8
—9.
Val. Luc.
183.

The first place at which hostilities began was Ipojuca, a

*Character of
Pagundes.*

CHAP. township near Cape S. Augustine. Joam Fernandes had ap-
 pointed Amador de Araujo to the command in this district, and
 XX.
 1645. that officer had given a Captain's commission to Domingos Fa-
 gundes, a free mulatto, the son of a wealthy and noble father. Some anecdotes of this man, which are related in his honour by the two historians of this war, one a Benedictine abbot, and the other a friar, are too characteristic of the state of law and of morals to be omitted here. After having borne a part in those predatory incursions which had so greatly annoyed the Dutch during the former war, he had submitted to them, and settled at Porto Calvo. A Dutchman, who had married the widow of Sebastian de Souto, and settled in the same township, speaking one day of this Fagundes, said he was one who made no scruple of killing a man in the woods, but never did it openly in the fair field. This was repeated to Fagundes, who ere long met this Master Jan, as the Dutchman was called, walking with one of his countrymen. Notwithstanding it was in time of peace, the Dutchmen were each armed with pistols and blunderbuss, and the Portugueze had a musquet in his hand. The mulatto stopt him, and said, You are Master Jan ; I am Domingos Fagundes, . . . kill me, and show yourself the better man if you can ! . . . and at the same moment, before Jan could lift his blunderbuss, he shot him through the heart. This was under Nassau's government ; but although there had been a witness of the fact, there was so little law in Pernambuco, or the provocation was considered to have been so great, or money was so omnipotent, that he obtained a protection, and lived safely at Recife. Here a Dutch soldier accidentally struck him with the end of his gun when turning in the street : Fagundes resented it as if it had been intentional, and the soldier then gave him a blow. The Portugueze marked him well that he might know him again ; and meeting him afterwards out of the town, at-

tacked him unawares, ran him through the body, and then fled to Ipojuca, where he was secreted in the house of a friend. On the way he visited his friend Fr. Manoel do Salvador, not to receive absolution for what he had done, (for this was ranked among his good works by his Confessor as well as himself) but to communicate to the Friar his future plans. There were forty brave fellows, he said, fit for any thing, who were willing to take to the woods with him, and acknowledge him for their Captain: they had only two musquets at present, and some swords; but they would lie in wait for the Dutch, kill all the stragglers who came in their way, bury their bodies in the thicket, and thus provide themselves with arms. The Friar approved highly of his laudable disposition, but dissuaded him from this project, telling him that it might occasion great inconvenience to his countrymen, and that the time would soon come when he might display his zeal for the King's service.

The time was now come when such a man might follow his vocation meritoriously. He engaged with Araujo to raise a company for the insurrection, and soon enlisted sixteen men; every thing was ready at Ipojuca, and they waited only for intelligence of the leader's movements, when an affray happened between one of the inhabitants and a Jew merchant; help came to both sides, and in the course of the tumult three Jews were killed. Fagundes and his men took advantage of the confusion, and fell upon the Dutch, plundering their houses, and destroying every thing with fire and sword: the garrison took flight, and the insurgents obtained arms among their spoils. Flushed with success, Fagundes attacked three vessels laden with sugar and flour in Porto do Salgado, won them, and massacred the Dutchmen on board. All the Portugueze of the township and of the adjoining parts immediately joined the insurrection, inflamed by the tidings, now opportunely arriving, that their Governor was

CHAP.
XX.
1645.

Val. Luc.
p. 175.

*Commence-
ment of hos-
tilities.*

CHAP.

XX.

1645.

Cast. Lus.
5. § 82.
Nieuhoff,
48.

June 19.
*The com-
mander in
chief march-
es against
the insur-
gents.*

in arms. Araujo placed himself at their head; and thus the land communication between the Dutch at Cape S. Augustine and all the parts to the southward was cut off, and the fort at the Cape could not without great difficulty be supplied with water from the river.

This news occasioned much alarm at Recife, accompanied as it was by intelligence that the garrison at St. Antonio, a township to the N. W. of Ipojuca were besieged in the church by the insurgents, and that Camaram and Diaz were committing open hostilities about the Lagoas. There were two companies at the Lagoas, a force wholly insufficient for the defence of so wide a district: a ship therefore was immediately dispatched to bring away as many as it could hold, leaving their baggage behind, and they who could not be received on board were directed to make their way by land to the garrison at the river S. Francisco. At the same time, in order to keep open a communication with the south, Haus went in person with two hundred and twenty Dutch and four hundred native troops to relieve the garrison at S. Antonio, and reduce the rebels at Ipojuca. It was not possible that the half-armed and undisciplined insurgents could resist this force in the field, and they were too wise to attempt it. Fagundes took post in the woods with twenty men, and killed some of the enemy as they passed, then fled to rejoin Araujo. The Dutch commander proceeded to Ipojuca, hung one of the patriots who had fallen into his hands, and offered pardon and protection to all who would take advantage of the proclamation within three days. About two hundred persons accepted it: they were without weapons, or means of subsistence to enable them to join the Governor; and with that duplicity which wars of this nature inevitably occasion, submitted now that they might revolt at a better opportunity. Haus then hastened to cut off Araujo before he could effect his

Nieuhoff,
49, 50—2.
Cast. Lus.
6. § 3, 4.

junction with Joam Fernandes: a traitor guided him, and he came up with the patriots; they were easily routed, but they fled into the woods, losing only five men, reunited there, and continued their march toward the General.

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1645.

Meantime Joam Fernandes had received intelligence that the Dutch were preparing to attack him at Camaragibe; he retired to a Mocambo, or negro hiding-place in the woods, and there Cardozo joined him. Their little army consisted only of two hundred and eighty men, and Cardozo was appointed Sargento Mayor, with all the privileges of Lieutenant General. The Dutch were apprized of this movement, and meant to surprize him there. For this purpose Blaar, who of all his countrymen had the worst character for cruelty, was to go with two hundred Pitagoares and three hundred European soldiers, armed with blunderbusses and musquets, instead of harquebusses, that the smell of the match might not betray them. The intention was discovered by Fr. Manoel do Salvador. This remarkable man, who was soldier, preacher, poet and historian, had among his other gifts a special talent at converting Jews; and had actually persuaded two of his converts to go to Portugal, with a particular recommendation to the Grand Inquisitor. He had at this time a catechumen under his hands, who gave good proof of his sincerity by informing his spiritual father of Blaar's intended march. Joam Fernandes was thus timely advised, and withdrew his troops to a place called Maciape, making their way through the woods, and endeavouring to leave no traces of their path. Here four of his Captains joined him, with ninety men. A party was sent to call upon the inhabitants along the Capeviribe with all their slaves to take arms for the deliverance of the country. Father Simam de Figueiredo commanded the party; he had been a Captain before he entered into holy orders; and had a company given him, as a sort of military

*Movements
of Fernan-
des.*

CHAP.
XX.
1645.

Val. Luc.
187.
Cast. Lus.
5, § 83—5
—7.

*He crosses
the Tapicura
in sight of
the enemy.*

cure, in this war against the heretics. The call was willingly obeyed; and in the course of five days eight hundred volunteers flocked to the appointed meeting-place. They had only thirty fire-arms among them; those which Fernandes had secreted were now brought out, cleansed from the rust which they had contracted, and distributed among them. He had not with all his long preparation been able to procure enough; great part of his men were armed with hunting-spears, or with stakes, which being of the close-grained woods of Brazil, and pointed in the fire, were no contemptible substitutes for the pike. With this force he marched to S. Lourenço, and had the good fortune on the way to fall in with a convoy of flour for Recife, escorted by fifty men, about half of whom were cut off. At S. Lourenço the bells were rung, and the inhabitants went out to meet him, and swore fellowship and obedience in the common cause.

The weather which impeded Camaram and Diaz impeded the operations of the enemy also: the floods were out; and Fernandes thus obtained time to make arrangements for a supply of provisions. The Council, notwithstanding the vigilance of their agents, had great difficulty in obtaining intelligence of his movements, a difficulty which is always experienced by those who are engaged in war against a people. Haus coming from Ipojuca, was to form a junction with Blaar. The latter was on his way to the Mocambo, when he learnt that the insurgents had left that position, and was fain to halt till he could receive information of their course. Meantime, giving way to that ferocious temper which had already rendered him infamous, he sent out parties toward Garassu along all the roads, who burnt the houses, murdered the people without distinction of age or sex, and committed such cruelties and profanations as drew down the censure of Haus, when he arrived and took the command. Fernandes was apprized of the intended junction. S.

Lourenço was not a defensible post, and his purpose was to delay fighting as long as possible, in expectation of Camaram and Diaz. He therefore broke up from his quarters, crost the Capivaribi on rafts, and leaving fifty men as an outpost, proceeded to the Tapicura. The river was no longer fordable. They stretched a cable across, formed of those limber and leafless parasites with which the woods in Brazil are hung; by means of this the troops were ferried over upon a small raft, carrying only eight at a time. Blaar was near enough to behold this, but not to prevent it. A mulatto guided him to the outpost in the night: but though the Portugueze were completely surprized, they broke through the enemy; then trusting to their thorough knowledge of the country, they dispersed in the woods, and soon rejoined the army.

CHAP.
XX.
1645.

Valeroso
Lucideno,
190.
Catrioto
Lusitano,
3. § 6.

Discontents
in his army.

The Governor in the Cause of Liberty, (*Governador da Liberdade*) as he stiled himself, now took up a position at a place called Covas. Here he had to contend with a danger more to be dreaded than the enemy's military power. In his own army, if that name might be given to the ill-armed, undisciplined, motley assemblage under his command, there were some who had joined him reluctantly, and because their fears compelled them to this course; some few who affected patriotism that they might be the better able to serve the Dutch, and obtain a high price for treason skilfully performed. Both descriptions wished to excite discontent, and began to murmur against his proceedings. What were his plans? they said; if he meant to fight the Dutch, wherefore had he not provided stores, arms, surgeons, and medicines, necessary for an armed force? Why did he not take post in some strong situation, and there fortify himself, instead of wandering about from one place to another, and skulking with his men like a band of gipsies? Liberty was the watchword with which he had led them from their homes, . .

CHAP. but it would end in banishment. Well would it be if they could
XX. find their way to Bahia at last, . . . the object which Joam Fer-
1645. nandes perhaps had in view for himself from the beginning : this
would be the best chance that could betide them, for in Per-
nambuco they had no quarter to expect. Many persons who
were sincere in the cause lent ear too readily to these insidious
suggestions. Where so much was sacrificed as well as risked,
anxiety naturally produced a state of feverish apprehension ; and
in wars of this kind, treachery is not more mischievous by its
frequent occurrence, than by the perpetual suspicion which its
frequency occasions. The growing discontent threatened to
break out in mutiny ; the priests, however, were of great use
in abating it, and most of the captains had full confidence in
their general. Joam Fernandes being well informed of what
was going on, ordered a false alarm to be given ; upon which
Cardozo, as had been concerted with him, divided the troops
into small bodies, taking care to separate those who were disaf-
fected. When this was done, and the scouts brought assurance
that there was no cause for the alarm, these bodies were march-
ed in succession before the general ; who harangued them,
praised the alacrity which they had displayed on this as on
every former occasion ; and said, that if there was any among
them who for want of zeal or courage wished to quit the service,
he might freely confess it, and depart without injury or molesta-
tion. The traitors dared not speak ; and they who had been
deluded, and whose murmurs proceeded from impatience, joined
in one general protestation of obedience to their leader, and
ardour for the cause. Joam Fernandes then proceeded to de-
clare, that he had staked his life and possessions upon the issue
of this great enterprize ; and from that day forward, if any one
were found attempting to seduce the meanest person of that
army from his duties, whatever the rank of the offender might

be, he would assuredly order him to be hanged as a traitor. Having thus overawed the turbulent, and quelled the incipient faction, it behoved him to guard against the worse danger of assassination, which he and his friends apprehended. For this purpose he selected a body-guard, to attend him day and night; and lest any attempt upon his life should be made by poison, two soldiers were stationed to prevent all persons from approaching the place where his food was prepared by a servant, of whose fidelity he was assured.

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1645.

Joam Fernandes had curbed the discontented with the strong hand of authority, but the reasonable part of their complaint was not lost upon him. The want of medical help was what any man might have cause to lament, he knew not how soon; and to supply this want, he sent a small detachment to catch a Frenchman, who practised medicine in the township of S. Amaro, and bring him, willing or not. The poor surgeon, when he found himself in the hands of such a party, cried out that he was a Roman Catholic Christian, and had always cured the Portugueze with the greatest attention and tenderness; . . . if the gentlemen meant to carry him into the woods and murder him, he intreated that they would rather have the goodness to kill him at once, near the church, where some good Christian would bury him for the love of God. But if they wanted him to attend the wounded Portugueze, they must get him a horse, for he had a bad leg, and could not go on foot. A horse was accordingly put in requisition, with as little ceremony as the doctor had been; his whole stock in trade was packed up, and Mestrola, as he is called, made his appearance at Covas as a volunteer, with the philosophy of one who had learnt from the Portugueze to take things patiently when there was no remedy, and with the gaiety of a Frenchman to boot. Here also Araujo joined the patriots; having collected on his way the insurgents of Moribeca, who

Cast. Lus.
6, § 7, 8, 9.

Want of
medical aid.

CHAP. like himself were flying from Haus, and those of S. Antonio do
 XX. Cabo; he brought with him four hundred men. The joy at
 1645. receiving this reinforcement had scarcely abated, before a trumpet was heard, and seven Indians appeared, armed with Biscayan muskets: the superior quality of their arms indicated from whence they came. They belonged to Camaram's regiment, and brought tidings that their commander and Henrique Diaz would arrive in the course of a week. The centinel whose good fortune it was to announce the approach of these welcome messengers, was rewarded by Joam Fernandes with a present of two slaves.

Val. Luc.
p. 196.
Cast. Lus.
6. § 12.
Cast. Lus.
6. § 10, 11.

*The Dutch
 expel the
 women and
 children.*

Meantime the Council issued a proclamation, commanding all women and children whose husbands and fathers were among the insurgents to leave their homes within six days, on pain of being punished as rebels themselves; and declaring, that all persons who presumed to harbour them would be considered as no longer under the protection of the States. The Dutch historian says, that this measure was first advised by some of those whom he calls the faithful Portugueze. In all similar struggles it is ever found that the most cruel enemies of those who take arms against oppression, are some of their unworthy countrymen; but wherever this measure originated, the guilt and infamy are imputable to the Government which adopted it. The reasons assigned for it were, that if the rebels were thus encumbered with their families, their consumption of food would be greatly increased, and they must necessarily change their quarters oftener, while they could neither march nor encamp with the same facility as before, nor lurk as they had done in the wilds; that they would be in more danger of attack, and in greater fear, as being less able to withstand it, . . . consequently, they would be disheartened; and that as the women by means of their negroes acted as spies for them, this channel of intelli-

gence would be cut off. Some of the most respectable of the Portugueze who were not yet in arms, presented a petition to the Council in behalf of these poor people, praying, that as the ways were impassable in consequence of the inundation, they might be permitted to remain in their houses, at least till the waters had abated. But even this was refused.

Father Manoel do Salvador was one of those who applied personally to the Governor on this occasion. The Friar had lived a busy and extraordinary life in Recife, and contrived to make himself popular among all descriptions of persons, at a time when others of his profession could not appear in the streets without receiving insults. For this he was indebted to his lively disposition, and to an adroitness of talent, which enabled him to intrigue not only in affairs of state, but in every family where he could obtain footing. Wherever the wife or the husband was Catholic, there he contrived to christen the children according to the Romish forms, unknown to the Protestant part of the family. He performed a secret mass upon holidays for the Papists in the Dutch service; in converting Jews he possessed a singular dexterity, and once he tells us, when he ejected the Devil out of a boy by his exorcisms, he delivered at the same time all who were present from the spirit of heresy. Upon the present occasion, he spoke with a warmth which his former intimacy with Nassau, and the estimation in which he was held, justified; he dwelt upon the protection which the Company had pledged itself to afford; reminded the Governors that this measure went to punish those who had committed no crime; that the woods were full of soldiers and armed savages; and that the Portugueze, though patient of all other wrongs, never forgave an injury offered to their wives and daughters. If the edict were enforced, he said, the Dutch must expect to be at war with the Portugueze as

CHAP.
XX.
1645.

*Nieuhoff, p.
53—4—62.*

*Fr. Manoel
do Salvador
intercedes
for them.*

CHAP. long as its remembrance should endure. His representations
 XX. were of no avail. The Members of the Council shewed him the
 1645. letter which they had received from Joam Fernandes, and
 which had so exasperated them that they betrayed themselves,
 saying in their bitterness, that there were those who would de-
 liver him into their power, dead or alive; and to prove that this
 was more than a mere boast, they put into his hands a letter,
 wherein a promise to this effect was expressed in metaphorical
 terms. The Friar affected not to understand it, and said it
 concerned not him. But immediately he sent off a messenger
 to Joam Fernandes, and began to provide for his own safety,
 thinking that even if there had been no just ground for suspi-
 cion against him, the Council might think they had trusted him
 too far. So he dispatched his two negroes with all his manu-
 scripts in a canoe, and without attempting to preserve any thing
 else, fastened the door of his house, and walked out, staff in
 hand, as if for recreation. But when he was out of the fortifi-
 cations, he struck into the woods. He had soon the satisfac-
 tion of hearing, that the Dutch said he was the greatest traitor
 in Pernambuco.

Val. Luc.
p. 192—4.

*Situation of
 the expelled
 families.*

The edict against the women and children was accordingly
 issued, and they had no alternative but to expose themselves to
 the rains and floods, and the reptiles and beasts of the wood, . .
 or to remain at the mercy of the ruffian soldiery, and the savages
 who would be let loose upon them. "Let the compassionate
 reader," says F. Manoel, "consider what these poor miserable
 women could do, not knowing where to seek their fathers, bre-
 thren, and sons, . . . forsaken, helpless, in the midst of a dreadful
 winter, without food wherewith to support life in the woods, . . .
 and the sword of the enemy thus, as it were, at their throats!
 Some fell upon their knees, and with streaming eyes and uplifted
 hands called upon God to forgive their sins, and have compas-

sion upon them ; others, with the rosaries of the Virgin in their hands, told over the beads again and again ; some embraced their innocent infants, and lamented over them ; some lay upon the ground, as if they were stupified with affliction ; others, who had never gone out of their houses, except to church in time of Lent, and on the principal festivals, and then leaning upon their pages, lest they should fall, strove now with sudden fear to run into the woods, and there throwing themselves under the trees, they implored the mercy of God, and the help of the Virgin Mary, and those saints to whom they were most devoted, . . . for from no other quarter could they hope for remedy or succour.”

CHAP.
XX.
1645.

Val. Luc.
190.

If any mode of warfare can preeminently deserve to be called wicked, it was this. It was attacking the Portugueze, not as enemies, nor even as insurgents and rebels, who were amenable to law, however sanctioned in their enterprize by the higher obligations of justice, . . . but as civilized and social beings, in their moral and human nature. The anguish which the tidings excited in the camp was excessive ; but they had arms in their hands, and Joam Fernandes, knowing that they who are least accessible by worthier feelings are most accessible to fear, issued a counter-edict, which, to the astonishment of the Dutch, was posted up in all the most frequented parts of Recife. The Dutch, he said, contrary to the laws of nations, and of ordinary policy, had made war upon that sex, which the courtesy of nations, and its own weakness, exempted from all acts of hostility. The decree which had been published was void by its own barbarity. No person was bound to obey it ; and He, the General of the Portugueze, ordered all his countrywomen to remain fearlessly in their houses under His protection ; for he protested that He would take cognizance of, and exact rigorous vengeance for the slightest injury which should be offered to any the meanest among them. The Council were either now ashamed of the

Counter-
edict of
Fernandes.

July 15.

Cast. Lus.
6, 5 2-113.

CHAP.

XX.

1645.

*Massacre of
the Portu-
guese at
Cunhau.*

measure, or not improbably intimidated by the threat; they forbore either to repeat the proclamation, or to enforce it; and those persons who had not already fled, received no farther molestation upon this ground.

The bare threat had exasperated the Portugueze; and their indignation was soon more violently excited by a massacre which the Pitagoares and Tapuyas from the Potengi committed in the township of Cunhau. The savages entered on a Saturday evening, and their leaders sent round a summons to the Portugueze, to attend at the church on the following day, that they might confer together, after mass, upon business of importance to themselves and the service of the state. When they were thus collected, they were put to the sword. In this manner sixty-nine persons were butchered; there were but three men who escaped, but many of the women were preserved by the humanity of the Jews and foreign settlers in the township, who secreted them. The men were some of those who had brought in their arms, and surrendered, in pursuance of the proclamation. It is more likely that the savages acted from their own love of blood, and the resentment of their own wrongs, than that they should have been instigated by the Dutch Government: the effect, however, was the same. The insurgents represented it as the act and deed of the Council, . . . as an example of the general massacre which would have been perpetrated, had not they by their insurrection prevented it. The accusation was readily believed; and the Portugueze of the Northern Captaincies, seeing that there was no security in submission, became eager for an opportunity of joining their countrymen in arms.

*Cast. Lus.
6, § 14.
Do. 4, § 19.
20.
Nieuhoff,
p. 65.*

*The insur-
gents take
post at Mon-
te das Ta-
bocas.*

July 31.

While the patriots were in a state of fury with the horror which this massacre excited, intelligence came that Haus, having formed his junction with Blaar, had ascertained the place of their encampment, and was preparing to attack them. Covas

was a good post for concealment, not for defence; they removed therefore to the Monte das Tabocas, about nine leagues to the westward of Recife; a spot chosen by Cardozo, who knew the country well, and whose sound judgment was manifested by the choice. The hill derived its name from a species of thick and thorny canes, so called. The river Tapicura, a small stream, except, as now, in the rainy season, flows near it on the west; a level ground, opening to the south, and about half a mile in length, lay between the river and a thicket of these canes, which surrounded the whole mount with an impenetrable rampart, about fifty feet in thickness. Between this and the foot of the eminence there intervened a second but smaller glade, and then again a second thicket of tabocas; the top of the hill was covered on the south with trees, which formed in themselves a strong place of defence, and were strengthened by an outer row of these formidable canes. Along the eastern side was an old cart-track, made when Brazil-wood was cut in these wilds, but now forgotten and overgrown, through long disuse. About a league and a half to the north was a chapel, dedicated to S. Antonius the Great, from whom the settlers in that district looked for protection against the wild beasts by which it was infested; and here also were a few mud houses, to which their owner had given the appellation of the City of Braga, naming it thus sportively after himself, and in fond recollection of his birth-place in the mother country.

Joam Fernandes, leaving an outpost in some sugar-works a few miles distant, encamped upon this mount. His own quarters were fixed upon the summit, and on the sides tents were spread and huts erected, to shelter the men from the rain. His first business having been thus to provide for the troops, the second was characteristic both of the individual and of the people whom he

CHAP.
XX.
1645.

Cast. Lus.
6. § 16.

Re-conversion of a converted priest.

CHAP. XX.
1645. commanded. A priest, by name Manoel de Moraes,⁵ who had abjured popery under the protection of the Dutch Government, and now preached as a Calvinistic divine, happened to live at no great distance; and Fernandes sent a detachment expressly to apprehend him. The attempt succeeded, and Moraes was brought into the insurgents' camp. Having no inclination for martyrdom, he threw himself at the Governor's feet, and protested that his apostacy had proceeded not from an error of judgement, but only from corruption of heart; that he had indeed yielded to the lust of the flesh, but that his reason had never been perverted. According to the morals of the Catholic church this was an extenuation of his offence; he was accepted as a repentant sinner, and his reconciliation to the faith was regarded by the general and by the army as an appropriate token of a victory soon to be achieved over their heretical enemies.

Cast, Lus.
6. § 17.

*Murmurs in
the camp.*

The traitors in his army were still planning his destruction. They took advantage of the delay of Camaram and Diaz to aggravate the impatience of the troops, and provoke them, if possible, to mutiny. "Where were these long-expected succours? or rather, were there any succours to expect? Was it not from the first a fable without foundation, devised by Joam Fernandes, for the purpose of seducing them from their peaceful homes, and making them the tools and victims of his own desperate ambition?" They even talked among those who were most discontented, or most hopeless, that it would be well to fall upon him, and punish him at once with death, and then they might return to Recife, with the cer-

⁵ He is said to have written, while in Holland, a History of America, from which Jan de Laet derived many good materials for his *Novis Orbis*.

tainty of pardon and reward. Fernandes was informed of all their purposes; this was no time for punishing them; he therefore affected not to know the designs of his enemies, but carefully kept them at a distance, doubled his guards, and quartered Cardozo near his own tent. While he took these precautions against the traitors, he endeavoured to quiet the impatience of the army, by sending off a detachment of forty men to meet Camaram and Diaz, and guide them to the encampment, . . . thus implying that he knew them to be near at hand.

Haus, meantime, after his junction with Blaar, had received all the reinforcements which could be spared from Recife; for the Council rightly considered, that the preservation of their conquests might possibly depend upon their first successes, and that it would never be so easy to strike an effectual blow against the insurgents as at this time. The Dutch general had with him fifteen hundred European troops, well armed, thoroughly disciplined, and accustomed to consider themselves superior to an enemy whom they had so often defeated: he had also a considerable Indian force, and many of the slaves who followed for the service of the camp, were armed in case of need. Joam Fernandes had decamped so secretly from the Covas, that Haus was uninformed of his movements, and expected to surprize him there. Provoked at the disappointment, he set fire to an Ingenio there, of which the buildings are described as sumptuous. A Portugueze centinel, who was posted upon an eminence, observed the smoke, and hastened to inform the Governor. While he was sending off a reconnoitring party, a soldier arrived with intelligence that the outpost was engaged with the rear of the Dutch army, and that notwithstanding their inferiority in numbers, their knowledge of the country and their position in the woods enabled them to make head. Joam Fernandes then sent orders to the commander to fall back to the

CHAP.
XX.
1645.

Cast. Lus.
6. § 18.

*The Dutch
advance.*

Nieuhoff,
62.

Cast. Lus.
6. § 19.

CHAP. Monte das Tabocas, where he had determined to await the
XX. enemy.

1645.

*Battle of
Monte das
Tabocas.
Aug. 3.*

The Portugueze were under arms, and ready for action, when a sharp firing was heard, and the scouts were driven in; the enemy, they said, were approaching, and preparing to cross the river. Cardozo had cut three openings in the outer cane thicket, and laid an ambush in each. The governor remained with his guard in reserve upon the summit, from whence he could see the whole fight, and send succour wherever it should most be needed. Fagundes with his company was ordered to dispute the passage of the Tapicura, and when that could be done no longer, lead the Dutch on toward the ambuscades. The banks of the river were covered with wood, and Haus poured a heavy fire among the trees, for the double purpose of dispersing any troops who might be posted there, and of passing the stream under cover of the smoke. Fagundes disputed the passage, resisted the Dutch step by step after they had effected it, and thus fighting and retreating drew them on. They were now skirting the canes, and seeking a way through; when Cardozo, who had placed himself as soon as the action began in the first ambush, opened his fire upon them, and every shot took effect. Enraged at their loss, they pushed on, and received the fire of the second ambush, which checked their ardour: the second battalion came up and joined them, and their numbers being thus increased, the fire of the third ambush proved more destructive than either of the former. They fell back at this; Joam Fernandes saw them from the summit; his eagerness mastered him . . . "At them," he cried, "Portugueze! sword in hand! for God is with us!" And he would have sallied against them with the reserve, if his cooler friends had not interposed, and by means of Cardozo, whose experience gave him all the authority of command, prevented him from executing his rash purpose.

The Dutch had been severely galled, but they were neither broken nor dispirited. They fell back to form a new disposition, and the Portugueze, rushing forward, attacked them on both flanks; their superior force enabled them to divide into three bodies, and while two of these repelled the patriots, the third made for the passage through the canes. The ambushes again opened upon them; but they were now prepared for this: they poured in their fire toward the place from whence the shot proceeded, and many of the patriots fell. Here Joam Paez Cabral was wounded, a man of noble family, of the name, and probably the lineage, of the discoverer of Brazil. His men would have borne him from the field; but he exclaimed "It is nothing... at them again! Christ's faith for ever!" and advancing again to the fight, he received a second shot, which was instantly mortal. Here also the Alferez Joam de Matos died, whose father had already lost three sons in the wars of Pernambuco; the moment he fell, his body was seized by the Indians, and cut in pieces. A second time would Joam Fernandes have hastened to the scene of action, . . . not now in the joy of victory, but to prevent defeat: he was withheld by Father Figueiredo, and the important warning that the ball of a traitor would fly with surer aim than that of an enemy. So much was this apprehended, that his chosen guard never left him, and when Cardozo went into the field, Figueiredo had returned from it to watch over the Governor, and hold him back by force if he should attempt to enter the battle. The enemy were now visibly gaining ground. One of the Priests arose in the moment of danger: "Sirs and Portugueze," he said with a loud voice, "here we are, with death before our eyes. If there be any man among us who is at enmity with another, let him now be reconciled to his neighbour: and if any have his conscience troubled with sin, let him confess forthwith, and make his peace with

CHAP. God, that God in his mercy may help us in this our need."

XX.

1645.

The Priests then hastened to the hottest of the fight, with the sword in one hand and the crucifix in the other. They absolved the dying, they heard the hasty confession of the living, and they fought with all the ardour of generous patriotism, and all the ferocity of inveterate zeal. Moraes, whom the Governor, by help of the gallows, had so lately reclaimed from Calvinism, particularly distinguished himself, and by the desperate valour which he displayed against his late friends, convinced the Portuguese of the sincerity of his conversion. The insurgents now stood their ground resolutely: but few as their fire-arms were, they had not sufficient ammunition for their use; Cardozo knew that if this were known it would occasion a general despondency; he therefore boldly gave out, that whoever wanted a supply might fetch it from the Governor's tent; and this prevented the majority of the army, who were fighting with pike or with sword, from feeling any fear of being left unsupported. At this time one of those accidents which so often influence the fate of battle, occurred in their favour. Two officers, with some thirty men, armed only with spears and sharpened stakes, had taken panic, and fled into the woods upon the skirts of the glade. One of their countrymen called out to and upbraided them in vain; fear possessed them too strongly, . . . when in the hurry and blindness of their panic, they came out full upon one of the Dutch wings; the Dutch, supposing it to be another ambushade, took fright in their turn, fled at full speed, and were pursued by men, who in the very act of flight found themselves victorious.

Val. Luc.
200.
Cast. Lus.
6, § 23—7.

The Dutch were a second time repulsed; but the whole of their force had not yet been brought into action, and after a short breathing-time they came up with fresh troops to the attack. The ambushades were less destructive than before, for

lack of powder; and the Portugueze were weary with an engagement which had continued several hours. They gave way from mere exhaustion; and the fresh force of the enemy pressing upon them, drove them from each of the ambushes, and made way into the inner glade. It was now that a priest standing beside Joam Fernandes elevated the crucifix, and with a loud voice called upon Christ, adjuring him by his cross and passion, and by the anguish which his Virgin Mother endured at the foot of that cross, that he would not permit the enemies of his holy faith, who had so often profaned his temples, and defaced the images of his saints, to triumph over those who were fighting for his honour; but that as the cause was his own, he would give the Portugueze the victory over their tyrannical enemies, that the world might know how the assistance of heaven never was wanting to those who were engaged in the cause of God. Then he exhorted his countrymen to fight manfully, and make vows for their good success. Accordingly, at his exhortation vows in abundance were made of fasts, pilgrimages, alms, and offerings, and disciplines, and cilices. Joam Fernandes vowed to build a church to the Virgin, under her invocation of N. Senhora do Desterro, . . . the circumstances of his own outlawry reminding him of the flight to Egypt. He now sent off his guard; it consisted chiefly of his slaves, and he promised to give them their freedom if they played their parts well this day. They rushed down the hill, blowing their horns, and uttering such yells as their savage countrymen used in war; and the insurgents charging the Dutch with fresh spirit, drove them back through the canes, and recovered the ground which had been lost. But Haus had risked too much upon the action to give it over while there was any possibility of success. He made another attack; by this time the passes through the canes were well known, the places of ambush had been laid open,

CHAP. stratagem was no longer of avail, and the fate of the day was to
 XX. be decided by close fighting. The Portugueze seemed once
 1645. more to be yielding to numbers, and the bodily strength of his
 nearest friends was again required to hold back Fernandes from
 the battle, while they called upon him in God's name not to
 expose a life upon which every thing depended. The new
 convert, Moraes, cried out that they should sing *Salve Regina*,
 in honour of the Mother of God. Joam Fernandes, falling
 upon his knees, began the hymn; the troops caught the strain,
 and joined in: . . . they concluded with shouts of victory, for the
 enemy now gave way, and retired from this last and decisive
 repulse.

Val. Luc.
p. 201.
Cast. Lus.
6, § 28.

Night was closing round; it was stormy and dark, and under cover of the darkness the Dutch recrossed the river. The conquerors were not aware of their complete success; their first business was thanksgiving; their next to prepare for another attack, which they expected on the morrow. All the remaining powder was distributed to the centinels, trenches were thrown up in the glade between the two cane thickets, and space for an ambuscade was cut in the third, which skirted the wood on the summit. The main body of the patriots then retired to the summit, as a place where they could not possibly be surprized. A party of negroes had been sent to observe the motions of the enemy, and harass them during the night; they came up with the rear of the Dutch, while employed in crossing the river, crost after them, dispersed them, and drove them into the woods. When this was reported, a party of veteran troops was sent to explore the country for two leagues: they fell in with a detachment of fifty Dutch, escorting (as it afterwards appeared) about four hundred wounded; the Portugueze saw only the number of the enemy, and as the escort prepared for defence, they turned back, and fled to the Governor, with tidings that the Dutch

were forming again, and preparing for another attack. In consequence of this alarm, the patriots past the night under arms. Daylight discovered to them the whole extent of their victory: weapons and ammunition in abundance were lying on the field; the soldiers armed, and the Negroes and Indians clothed themselves with the spoils. About nine a countryman arrived with intelligence that the Dutch were flying toward Recife; he bore a message from Haus, requesting that the Portuguese would give quarter to the wounded, who were following the retreat in carts; the laws of war, he said, entitled him to make this demand; and if it were refused, the vengeance should exceed the offence. The whole army being now assured of their deliverance and their great success, fell on their knees, and returned thanks to the Giver of Victory; the hill then echoed with shouts of "Long live the Roman Catholic faith! Liberty for ever! Long live King Joam!" while Fernandes went, hat in hand, through the troops, congratulating, commending, and embracing them one by one. He immediately, according to his promise, emancipated fifty of his slaves, advanced them to the rank of free soldiers, and divided them into two companies of four and twenty each, with captains chosen from among them. Three hundred and seventy Dutch were found upon the field; some had been swept away by the river, which was swoln with rains; and of those who died during the retreat, or in the hospital at Recife, no account was known: but the Portuguese assert that three parts of the Dutch force were destroyed. The insurgent army consisted of twelve hundred Portuguese, and about an hundred Indians and Negroes; there were not more than two hundred firelocks among them, chiefly fowling-pieces; the greater number were armed with swords, which had rusted in concealment, bill-hooks, hunting

CHAP.
XX.

1645.

CHAP. spears, and javelins pointed by burning. Thirty seven fell in
XX. battle, including some of the principal men in the insurrection.
1645. What number of their Negroes and Indians were killed is not
stated; but being few in the whole their loss must have been
small. A defeat would have been fatal; and although victory
was not equally decisive, its value was in proportion to the evil
which it averted. Deeply as it was felt by the patriots, it is
not strange if in their state of feeling, and with their principles
of belief, they fancied themselves beholden to miraculous assist-
ance. Men whom a spent ball had bruised, affirmed that the
Virgin or some patron saint had deadened the force of the blow;
and others who were wounded, accounted it equally a miracle
that they had not been slain. Their leader was as likely to
believe such things as they were to imagine them: policy as
well as superstition gave ready currency to every tale that was
devised, and the impudence of the priests authenticated all.
The miracle of the loaves and fishes was parodied for the battle
of Monte das Tabocas. During the last attack, it was said, the
patriots had only two pounds of powder, and no other balls
than what were made for the occasion from pewter plates; yet
they fired more than a thousand shot, and powder and ball were
left. They appealed even to many of the Dutch themselves, whe-
ther during the hottest of the conflict a woman of resplendent
beauty had not been seen, clothed in azure and white, bearing a
beautiful boy in her arms, and with her a venerable old man, in
the habit of a hermit; they boldly affirmed, and impudently de-
clared the Dutch would testify the same, that these celestial
personages distributed powder and ball among the Portuguese,
and so dazzled the eyes of the heretics, that they threw down
their weapons, and turning away hastily from the unendurable
appearance, took to flight. The woman was that Mother of Mer-

CHAPTER XXI.

Troops sent from Bahia under Vidal and Martim Soares. Farther success of the Insurgents. Hoogstraten deserts to them. They recover the whole country to the south, and encamp before Recife. Massacre at Rio Grande. Treachery of the deserters. Camaram sent to Rio Grande, where he defeats the Dutch. Recife distressed for food. Scarcity in the camp also. The Portuguese troops receive orders from Lisbon to retire. Martim Soares obeys, but Vidal determines to persist in the war.

CHAP.
XXI.
1645.

*Retreat of
the Dutch.*

Haus, with the wreck of his army, continued his retreat during the whole of the night, never halting till he reached S. Lourenço de Ipojuca, a place seven leagues from the scene of his defeat. Here he waited for his wounded and stragglers, and dispatched intelligence of his ill-success to Recife, requesting immediate assistance. Succours were accordingly sent so promptly, that they joined him on the same day; they were sufficient to secure his farther retreat, not to enable him to resume offensive operations, for which, indeed, troops could not be spared from the city. From the commencement of the insurrection the Council felt the weakness to which the Company had reduced them by its improvident economy, and distinctly perceived their danger. They had good reason to distrust the professions of the Governor of Bahia, and to suspect that a force sent by him would speedily join the insurgents; and they were certain that if it were not already dispatched, it would not

*Nieuhoff.
p. 65.
Cast. Lus.
6. § 37.*

be delayed when he should receive the news of this success. They therefore recalled Haus to Recife, where his troops were now considered to be necessary for the defence of the place.

About three weeks before the battle, Hoogstraten and another deputy had again been sent to Bahia, to express the full persuasion of the Dutch Government that Camaram and Diaz were in no degree authorized in their invasion by the Portugueze Governor; and to request that he would recal them, either by proclamation, or such other means as he might deem most forcible and expedient, and punish them according to their deserts; or if they refused to obey, declare them open enemies of the King of Portugal. Antonio Telles continued the same conduct as he had before observed. To the Dutch professions of friendship, and of their earnest desire to maintain with all good faith the established truce, he replied by professions equally amicable, and at this time even less sincere. He retorted upon them their acts of aggression at Angola, at S. Thomas, and at Maranham. As a soldier, he said, he ought not tamely to have submitted to so many injuries, nor to have let pass so many fair occasions of doing himself justice; but he had subdued his own feelings, in obedience to the reiterated commands of his King, enjoining him by every means in his power to preserve and strengthen the good understanding which happily subsisted between Portugal and the United Provinces. The troops who had crost the river S. Francisco consisted of discontented men; and when he was thus required to make them return within their own boundaries, he could not but be infinitely concerned, reflecting upon the calamities which they were occasioning on the one hand, and on the other, how destitute he was of power to satisfy the request of the Council; for Camaram and Diaz were not men to be reduced by persuasions. Touching the Portugueze who were complained of as being in insurrection, true it was that they had

CHAP.
XXI.
1645.

Embassy to
Bahia.

100 86 4
100 86 4
100 86 4

100 86 4
100 86 4
100 86 4

CHAP. applied to him for assistance, pleading that they were subjects
 XXI. of the same King; for they said they had been compelled, in
 1645. consequence of false accusations preferred against them by the
 malicious and perfidious Jews, to abandon their houses and
 possessions, and leave their wives and children, chusing rather
 to endure all the miseries of flight than be subject to imprison-
 ment. Besides, the Tapuyas of the Potengi had been sent for
 to be employed against them, and they must have been exposed
 to the fury of those savages if they had not thus fled. For
 himself, the Governor General said, he marvelled that the Coun-
 cil should have given ear to the fabrications of a race so univer-
 sally despised as the Jews; and though he believed that in the
 present state of affairs the Portugueze of Pernambuco would be
 glad to put themselves under his protection, thinking it better,
 if such were the only choice, to be oppressed by their natural
 King than by strangers; yet to convince the Council of the sincer-
 ity of the Portugueze nation, which was such that no opportunity
 of promoting their own interest, however great, ever stood in com-
 petition with what they thought due to their confederates, he
 would take upon himself the office of mediator, and endeavour
 to appease these troubles. To this end he would speedily send
 persons of known ability, with sufficient instructions and power,
 who should exhort the revoltors to return to their duty: if ex-
 hortation failed, such measures must then be taken as would
 force them to obedience.

Nieuhoff,
p. 56, 60.
Cast. Lus.
6. § 88—9.

Measures of
the Govern-
or General.

While the Deputies remained at S. Salvador, Hoogstraten repeated his offers to the Governor, and expressly engaged to deliver Nazareth into his power; a plan, he said, which he had already imparted to Joam Fernandes. Telles was now persuaded that Hoogstraten was a true traitor, and without farther dissimulation promised, that if he would perform this engagement, he should be rewarded by the Portugueze Government as

so signal a service would deserve. The Dutchman was apprehensive that his private conferences with the Portuguese might excite suspicion in his colleague: with a boldness of duplicity which has seldom been equalled, he told him that the Portuguese were tampering for the betrayal of his fort, and that he gave ear the better to discover their secret purposes. On his return to Recife he repeated the same tale to the Council, and added that the Governor only waited for some ships from Rio de Janeiro to begin his projected attempt against the Dutch Captaincies. This mode of conduct was probably concerted with Antonio Telles; the part which he intended to take could not long continue doubtful: the enemy were already upon their guard; little injury could arise from confirming their suspicions of him; but it was of great importance to prevent them from entertaining any doubt of Hoogstraten's fidelity. Two regiments, under Vidal and Martim Soares Moreno, were now embarked at Bahia in eight ships; the naval command was given to Jeronymo Seram da Payva. The homeward-bound fleet of thirty-seven ships, which had assembled in the bay, under Salvador Correa de Sa Benavides, was to accompany them to Tamandare; there the troops were to be landed, and Payva proceed to Recife with letters for the Council, wherein the Governor General informed them, that in fulfilment of his promise he had sent two officers of unquestionable conduct to remonstrate with the insurgents, and if remonstrances should prove ineffectual, compel them to return to their obedience.

CHAP.
XXI.
1645.

Nieuhoff,
60—1.

Cast. Lusi
6. § 41.

Just at this time the Dutch commandant at Serinhaem had received instructions to disarm the Portuguese in his district. They, in obedience to this order, were about passively to deliver up their arms, when one, by name Joam de Albuquerque, exclaimed that they were yielding themselves to be slaughtered; for it was the intention of the enemy first to render them de-

*The troops
in Bahia
take Serin-
haem.*

CHAP. fenceless, and then to massacre them. The young men gathered
XXI. ed round him, seized and sunk three vessels which were lying
1645. there laden for Recife, and hearing that these troops from Bahia
had landed in the vicinity, hastened to put themselves under
their protection. As soon as their leader saw the two Camp
Masters, he called upon them in the name of God and the King
to deliver the Pernambucans from the yoke against which they
were struggling; and urged them to march without delay against
the fort at Serinhaem. Dissimulation on their part was almost
at an end, and Paulo da Cunha was sent with a detachment to
summon the garrison. In his summons he said, that the Go-
vernor General had sent a force to reduce the Portugueze of
Pernambuco, if they had revolted without just cause, but to
support them if it should appear that they had been driven into
insurrection by repeated wrongs. Having landed among them,
and enquired into their complaints, the Camp-Masters found
that the Dutch Government had treated them not as subjects,
but as slaves; it became therefore their duty to assist in driving
out of Brazil a people who had shown themselves unfit to go-
vern in it. The garrison, seeing themselves surrounded by a
superior force, and having their water cut off, speedily surren-
dered, and basely; for they left sixty Indians to the merciless
vengeance of the Portugueze. The Auditor General, Francisco
Bravo, who accompanied the army, past sentence against them,
as traitors to the King of Portugal; thirty of these injured sa-
vages were immediately tied to the palisades of the fort, and
strangled; the rest were divided among the officers, to carry
their baggage, and their wives and children were distributed
among the inhabitants of the township, not indeed under the
name of slaves, but upon the little less nefarious system of ad-
ministration, as it was called. The greater part of the garrison,
who were eighty in number, entered the Portugueze service; and

of the Dutch who were settled in the district, there were only two who forsook it upon its reconquest. The rest solicited protections from the Portugueze, and remained to repent at leisure. Paulo da Cunha completed his triumph by compelling two Jews to profess Christianity.

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1645.

The joy of the Camp-Masters at this success was heightened by the tidings which they now received of the victory at Monte das Tabocas. Joam Fernandes had remained there seven days upon the scene of action, to bury the dead and heal the wounded. On the seventh day he was informed that the troops from Bahia were landed, upon which he set forth to meet them. The inhabitants of Garassu and Goyana being threatened by the Dutch in Itamaraca, sent to him soliciting succour, and Antonio Cavalcanti requested that he might be employed upon this service. Cavalcanti was the man whom notwithstanding the intended connection between their families, Fernandes suspected of instigating all the murmurs against him, and of plotting against his life. There is no proof of these designs, but had he cooperated heartily in the cause the suspicion could not have arisen. He was desirous of quitting the camp, and Joam Fernandes was glad of an opportunity to dismiss him with his own concurrence; accordingly he was appointed on this service, with a detachment of an hundred and fifty men. At Garassu he remained inactive, so that some doubted his courage, and others his fidelity; ere long he died there of pleurisy, and his countrymen, in that spirit of presumption which too often accompanies religious zeal, ascribed his death to a divine judgment.

Death of
Antonio
Cavalcanti.

Cast. Lus.
6 § 40—4.
Val. Luc.

Camaram and Diaz, with part of their troops, reached the Monte das Tabocas soon after the patriots had left it; and following their traces, came up with them the second night. At the same time Joam Fernandes received intelligence that an hundred and eighty Dutch were posted at S. Antonio do Cabo;

Arrival of
Camaram
and Diaz.

CHAP. immediately he set out to surprize them, and reached the place
 XXI. at day-break ; but the Dutch, notwithstanding the celerity of
 1645. his movements, had been warned in time, and were fled to Nazareth. At S. Antonio he halted. The Bahian troops were at Ipojuca, three leagues off : Joam Fernandes wrote to the Camp Masters, saying, he knew they were sent to pacify the country ; and that notwithstanding the reports which were current, they and he could only have the same end in view, that of assisting the oppressed, and putting down the oppressor. Upon receiving this letter, Martim Soares took post at Algodoaes, a league from the Pontal de Nazareth ; and Vidal with his division marched to meet Fernandes.

Cast. Lus.
6. § 45.

*Interview
between
Fernandes
and Vidal.*

A great concourse of men, women, and children, who had flocked to the army for protection, were present at the meeting. Vidal addressed him with a loud voice, saying that he was sent by the Governor General to arrest him, Joam Fernandes, in consequence of complaints made against him by the Council at Recife ; and also to punish the leaders of the insurrection. Fernandes replied, that as the Governor General had heard the complaint of the Ruler, so also was it just that he should hear the cries of the people. " I know," he continued, " you bring conditional instructions, which you are to execute according to the merits of the two parties, giving to each the punishment or the support which it deserves ; and you are arrived at a time when you may with your own eyes behold the miserable slavery to which these Captaincies are reduced. The inhabitants, here in their own country, are fain to take shelter in the woods, thinking even beasts themselves less dreadful than their oppressors. They come to me for protection and for deliverance ; and I have undertaken to deliver and avenge them, by virtue of that natural and universal law which authorizes all men to use all means for the preservation of life and honour." His speech was followed

by a general clamour of mingled voices, some uttering their griefs, others bursting out in indignation. One of Vidal's soldiers stepped forward, and harangued his comrades. "The injustice of the Dutch," said he, "has driven all these people from their homes; some of them are flying from oppression, others are in search of vengeance, and have we not all to lament for parents, kinsmen, friends, countrymen, destroyed by the cruelty of these Flemings, . . . losses which we can at no time forget, and which are at all times calling upon us for retribution! We have now opportunity in our hand, example before our eyes, and fortune on our side. What therefore have we now to do as Patriots and as Portuguese, but to offer up our lives for the service of God and of our country? If any among us be of a different mind, let him return to Bahia!" Vidal had foreseen, or perhaps concerted this: the speech was received with acclamations, as he expected: and the declaration of the troops, he said, precluded him from obeying the orders which he had received. He was now a soldier like themselves, and knowing, as he well did, to what extent the patience of the people and the insolence of the foreigners had been carried, he rejoiced to fight in such a cause, under the banners of so brave a general and so dear a friend as Joam Fernandes. The Bahian troops then fell into the ranks of the insurgents, and Vidal, having embraced Fernandes, went with him to his tent, and continued to be his comrade from that time till the end of the war.

The first measure was to send a detachment under Araujo against the fort at Nazareth. Martim Soares, hearing what had past with Vidal, and probably having agreed with him how to act, affected in like manner to yield to the will of his people, sent to inform Fernandes that he and his troops were at his disposal, and then proceeded to join the force against Nazareth. The main body of the patriots, increased with its new succours,

CHAP.
XXI.
1645.

Cast. Lus.
6. § 46.

*Troops sent
against Na-
zareth.*

Aug. 16.

CHAP. and with a long train of settlers and their families, Indians, and
 XXI. slaves, moved on to Moribeca. Fernandes would have proceed-
 1645. ed without halting to the river Tygipio, but Vidal represented
 how much the fugitives in their company had suffered from the
 floods and miry roads, and that it would be inhuman not to
 allow them some rest and refreshment. They halted, therefore,
 a few hours, and came to the river about six in the evening.
 The Camp-Master was in the van; Joam Fernandes brought
 up the rear; and before the men encamped, he placed a guard
 at each of the paths and roads around, to prevent any intelli-
 gence from being carried to the enemy.

Cast. Lus.
 6. § 47—8.

*The women
 of the Var-
 zea seized as
 hostages.*

Blaar had that day been sent to seize all the Portuguese women in the Varzea as hostages, and to plunder the houses of the insurgents. Especial search was made for the wife of Joam Fernandes; but he, anticipating this danger, had secreted her in the woods, with a mulatto to attend her, in a place known only to one of his servants, who had it in charge to supply her with food, and watch over her safety. The other leaders having been less provident, many of their wives and children were seized; among others, those of Berenguer, Bezerra, and Amaro Lopes; . . . persons whose houses were privileged from all officers of justice. The prisoners were conveyed to some houses which bore the name of their owner, Dona Anna Paes, and where Haus had his head-quarters; from thence they were to be removed to Recife, about a league distant. A chaplain of Fernandes, who officiated in the Varzea, and had intelligence of all his movements, that he might at all times know whither to send information, hastened with this news to the encampment. It was made known to the army, and immediately they moved forward to rescue the women. Fagundes led the advanced guard: he fell in with two of the enemy's scouts, learnt from them all that they could communicate, then put them to death,

*Fernandes
 marches to
 their rescue,*

and proceeded, till coming in sight of some sugar-works, he halted, upon hearing an uproar there. A party of Dutch were busy at the work of plunder, and Fagundes, considering that if he attacked them, and only a single man should escape, the design of surprizing the enemy, upon which so much depended, would be frustrated, wisely kept his men concealed till they departed with their booty. By midnight the whole army reached these sugar-works; it rained heavily, and the night was dark; they crowded under cover as many as could, and ate the food which they had brought from Moribeca; and here they halted for three hours: but then Fernandes started up from the mat upon which he was lying, and declared that St. Antonio had appeared to him, and reproved him for sleeping at such a time. The army was soon put in motion, and just at day-break the van reached the Capivaribe; the river was greatly swoln, the ford was judged impassable, and neither boat, nor canoe, nor raft could be discovered. The enemy's quarters were almost in sight. A mulatto of Fernandes' household, who swam excellently, ventured first into the water; Fernandes himself followed; . . . the water reached the pommel of his saddle, but he effected the passage; and the men, encouraged at this, fastened their firelocks upon their heads, and advanced into the river, holding by each other, that they might the better withstand the violence of the current.

Having accomplished this passage, which the slightest resistance would have made impracticable, they proceeded through the woods, till the Casas de Dona Anna were in sight; they then halted, while a small party went forward to surprize some of the Dutch centinels. Two were soon taken; their account was, that two squadrons of their countrymen were drawn up in the Terreiro, (or Green, as it may be called,) of the settlement; one destined for Olinda, the other for the Varzea, where they

CHAP.
XXI.
1645.

Cast. Lus.
6. § 49, 52.
Val. Luc.
p. 217—8.

*and delivers
them.*

CHAP. were to lay waste every thing with fire and sword. The officers
 XXI. were within at table, and as soon as they had finished their
 1645. meal they were to march off with the prisoners. The Portu-
 gueze advanced upon this intelligence, and came in sight of two
 other centinels at the entrance of the works; these men they
 fired at; the one fell, the other fled, but was speedily cut down.
 The officers at table heard the guns, but seeing that none of the
 centinels came to give the alarm, they continued over their
 morning cups. It was not long before Camaram blew his whis-
 tle, . . . the signal for his dreadful troops: the Dutch beat to
 arms; and the sound of drum and trumpet, drowned in the
 discharge of musquetry and the cries of battle, made them start
 from table, . . . too late to avail themselves of any advantage
 which the ground might have offered. Their men were driven in;
 Blaar, who expected no quarter, and who deserved none, was for
 fighting their way through to Recife, . . . but this was impracticable,
 for Vidal had effectually cut off their retreat. All which could be
 done was to defend themselves as long as possible in the dwelling-
 houses. There was a large pile of wood at hand, ready for the use
 of the furnaces; it served as cover for the Portugueze, and they
 perforated the thin sides of the larger house with their musket-
 balls, making great havoc among its crowded occupants. The
 Dutch then brought out the Portugueze women, and exposed
 them at the windows to receive the fire, in sight of their husbands,
 relations, and children. Upon this the assailants sent a white
 flag, proposing terms of surrender to the enemy: the Dutch
 seem to have supposed that they had fallen upon a sure device
 for their own safety: they fired upon the flag, and killed the
 ensign who bore it; and at the same time taking aim at Vidal,
 who had approached in confidence of the flag, and whom they
 knew by the Order of Christ which he wore upon his breast,
 they shattered one of his holsters with one shot, and killed his

horse. It might well be imagined how this exasperated the Portuguese. They forgot the women in their fury. The house which they were attacking was built upon pillars, like a granary: they laid wood under the floor, and set fire to it; the wood was wet, and this first attempt produced only smoke. Searching for drier materials, they found brushwood, and soon kindled a flame which terrified the enemy. Haus then opening one of the jealousies, hung out a white signal, and shewed himself at the window, holding the hilt of his pistol presented toward the Portuguese, hat in hand, in the attitude of one who surrendered.

Joam Fernandes and the Pernambucans were for giving no quarter; they remembered all their wrongs, the recent massacre at Cunhau, the edict against the women; their zeal as well as their fury was inflamed by the sight of an image of the Virgin, which an old inhabitant of the Varzea exposed to them during the heat of the action, with its arms hackt off by the Dutch, in their contempt for the palpable idolatry of the Portuguese: drops of water were falling from it; the man exclaimed "A miracle! A miracle! The image of Our Lady sweats!" The Pernambucans seeing this, and that the fire was kindled, and the Dutch within its reach, perceived in the spirit of their cruel church a peculiar fitness in destroying the enemy by this mode of death, and cried out that they should be burnt alive, as obstinate and incorrigible heretics. But Vidal, whose natural humanity neither the character of the times, nor the circumstances of Brazil, nor the deadly superstition of his country had destroyed, opposed them, and by his orders the flames were extinguished. S. Lorenzo's day was just past, and the people were reconciled to his determination by a remark, that as this saint had been martyred by fire, he did not chuse that the Dutch should perish in the same manner as himself. Haus and Blaar were now suffered to come out and make conditions. All they demanded was

CHAP.
XXI.
1645.

Cast. Lus.
6. § 53-6.
Val. Luc.
p. 222.

*Haus and
Blaar made
prisoners.*

CHAP. that their lives should be spared ; and they would fain have
 XXI. stipulated that the Indians in their service should be spared
 1645. also. The Portugueze demurred at this ; they regarded these
 people as rebels, and they were exasperated by the recent ex-
 cesses which they had committed. The unhappy savages put
 an end to the discussion, . . . knowing how little mercy they could
 expect, they attacked their inexorable tyrants, . . . and when
 they were overpowered no mercy was shown. Every man was
 put to the sword. Camaram was related to their chief. The
 christianity which he had been taught did little toward abating
 the ferocity of the savage character ; . . . his kinsman, in his judge-
 ment, deserved death doubly, as a rebel to his King and to his
 God ; but that he might die with as much honour as possible,
 he put him to death with his own hand, and gave him decent
 burial ; the bodies of the others being left to the beasts and
 birds. The number who were thus massacred was about two
 hundred. One of the Indians having received a mortal wound,
 dropt, and lay like a corpse among the dead : but when the first
 Portugueze came within his reach, he sprang up with a dying
 effort, and stabbed him thrice, then fell and expired. The wives
 of these wretched Indians, beholding the slaughter, caught up
 their children, and dashed out their brains against the stones !

Cast. Lus.
 6. § 56—7.
Val. Luc.
 p 222—30.
Nieuhoff,
 84.

*Loss of the
 Dutch.*

More than two hundred Dutch were made prisoners, and
 above six hundred stand of arms fell into the insurgents' hands ;
 they found also many good horses, and abundance of provisions.
 Their own loss in killed and wounded was about three score.
 Diaz¹ was hurt in the leg, but did not leave the action. Fagun-

¹ Henrique Diaz was his own surgeon upon this occasion ; he fried some
 wool in fish-oil, and laid it scalding hot upon the wound. Ambrose Paré's
 improvements in the treatment of gunshot-wounds had probably not reached
 Brazil, . . . and the Negro acted upon the old system, of killing the venom of the
 gunpowder.

gundes was shot through the belly, and recovered. The priests distinguished themselves here as in the former victory, and here also they embellished it with miracles. The sweat from the mutilated image of the Virgin was not the only one which was invented for the occasion. It was reported and attested, that some of the Portugueze, who having foundered on the way, were left in some sugar-works, just within hearing of the action, when they heard the musquetry, went with the Chaplain of the Establishment into the Church, and kneeling before St. Sebastian's altar, implored his assistance for their countrymen. Immediately the image began to sweat, like one who was violently exerting himself; and the drops continued to run as long as the action lasted, so that all who were present wetted their handkerchiefs in the miraculous effusion.

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1645.

Miracles.

*Cast. Lus.
6, § 62.*

Blaar murdered on the way to Bahia.

Joam Fernandes was now undisputed master of the field, in a country where he had so lately wandered from place to place, with a handful of outlawed insurgents, seeking shelter in the woods. One of his own sugar-works, called St. John the Baptist, from the saint to whom its chapel was dedicated, was near at hand, and thither he now returned in triumph. Music went before, the prisoners followed, then came the Portugueze, escorting in festival march the women whom they had rescued; and lastly the people, shouting and rejoicing as they returned thanks to God, and blest and magnified the author of their deliverance. Some of the prisoners enlisted in the Portugueze service; the others were sent to Bahia. A detachment could not be spared to guard them; it was therefore ordered, that the inhabitants of one township should escort them on to the next, the whole Captaincy being now in arms; and that in this manner they should be consigned to the Governor General. Upon the way Blaar met with the fate which he had anticipated, and which his former cruelties had provoked and deserved; he was marked

CHAP. XXI.
 1645.

for vengeance in one of the places through which he past, and shot. He was the only victim upon the march; the other prisoners had no cause of complaint; but such as were invalided, or straggled on the road, and had afterwards to make their way, when they were no longer under the safeguard of the general order to escort them, were killed by the peasantry.

Cast Lus.
6, § 63.

Olinda taken by the insurgents.

On the day of this second victory Olinda was taken possession of by a party of thirty Pernambucans, headed by Manoel Barboza, a youth of distinguished family. His elder sister, being a widow, kept house a league from Mauritas, and her sisters resided with her; while Manoel with five companions, young and resolute as himself, was secreted in the adjoining woods, waiting for an opportunity to join Joam Fernandes. A troop of sixteen Dutch came this way, escorting a party of negroes, who were laden with plunder. It was night, and they stopt at Dona Luiza's house, and demanded admission. The inhabitants feared, as well they might, to open the door to such guests; upon which they broke in, and presently the cries of the women were heard. Barboza and his comrades were within hearing; they had two muskets, two swords, a reaping-hook, and a staff shod with iron; with these weapons the six Portuguese attacked the enemy, either being ignorant of their numbers, or more probably disregarding all danger upon such an occasion: this boldness made the Dutch suppose them to be more numerous, and the darkness was in their favour; they slew most of the party, put the rest to flight, and found arms enough among the spoils to equip fourteen of their countrymen, who in consequence of this success joined them in the morning. Increasing now in numbers and in audacity, even thus close to Recife, they harassed and defied the Dutch, and now took possession of Olinda, notwithstanding there was a fortified redoubt above the town. Joam Fernandes rewarded their leader by sending him a Captain's commission.

Cast. Lus.
6, § 69.

Martim Soares meantime was lying before the Fort at Nazareth, which he summoned by Paulo da Cunha. Hoogstraten received this officer publicly, and declared his resolution of defending the post; but privately assured him that he was ready to fulfil his engagements with the Governor, as soon as the Camp-Master Vidal should join the besieging army with his division, and give him a fair opportunity. Vidal, who was then at the Engenho of St. John the Baptist, came accordingly, and a second summons was sent upon his arrival. The messenger was not one whom Hoogstraten knew, and this cautious traitor declared he would return no answer to the Portugueze commander, unless a man of sufficient rank were deputed. Paulo da Cunha upon this went a second time, and Hoogstraten again gave him audience in public, and then replied aloud, that as an individual he was the old friend of the Portugueze; but as commander of that fortress, his country must be his only friend, and his duty was to die in defence of his post. After this bravado he attended Paulo to the gate, and told him on the way, that the Portugueze should without delay assault the fort at the Bar, which he had taken care should fall into their hands; and that they should also take possession of the watering-place. After these points had been thus betrayed, it was not difficult to convince the garrison that all hopes of relief were cut off, and that as the want of water must soon reduce them to capitulate upon any terms, they had better make good ones while it was in their power. A bargain, rather than a capitulation, was made. The troops were to be paid the arrears due to them by the Company: as many as so pleased might enter the Portugueze service, they who preferred serving in Europe should be sent to Lisbon, and such as chose to return to their own country should be provided with means of transport. These conditions were transmitted to Fernandes. He had raised a contri-

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XXI.
1645.

*Hoogstraten
delivers up
Nazareth.*

*Hoogstraten
delivers up
Nazareth.*

CHAP. XXI. 1645. bution among the insurgents, which fell short of 2000 cruzadoes, and 9000 were required for the present important purpose; he himself made up the deficiency. The whole garrison entered the Portugueze service.

Cast. Lus.
6. § 70—7.

Aug. 12.
Lichthart
sent against
the Portu-
guese squa-
dron,

While the Bahian troops were thus actively cooperating with the insurgents, Salvador Correa, according to his instructions, proceeded to Recife with the homeward-bound fleet. Its formidable appearance excited the utmost alarm; and weakened and disheartened as the Dutch were by the defeat at Monte das Tabocas, if the city had been attacked at this time it would probably have surrendered without a struggle. But the Portugueze admiral knew nothing of what had past on shore, and his orders from the Governor General were, to offer to the Council the services of that fleet, as well as of the troops under Vidal and Soares, . . . a mockery which seems so far to pass all ordinary bounds of political dissimulation, that it might almost be considered as an insult. The Dutch felt it to be so, and deliberated whether they should arrest the two persons who had been landed with the Governor's letters: but their own ships were inferior in number to Correa's, and were not ready for action; and they feared to give him any cause for commencing hostilities. So they sent a reply, couched in friendly terms, remonstrating against the conduct of the Camp-Masters, and requesting that the Admiral would withdraw his fleet out of the roads, because while it remained there it encouraged the insurgents. This they had good cause to say: the appearance of the fleet had excited the utmost ferment; the heights were crowded with joyful spectators, and those inhabitants who had not yet taken arms, were now eagerly seeking for weapons, that they might join in the expected attack upon Recife. But Correa, who had discharged his instructions, and was eager to be on the way with his convoy, did not wait at anchor to receive the Council's answer; he was

Cast. Lus.
6. § 64.
Val. Luc.
p. 232.
Nicuhoff,
p. 68—71.

already under sail when it reached him. The Council then recovered courage, and ordered Lichthart ² to get his ships ready with all possible speed, and sink, burn, and destroy the Portuguese wherever he could find them.

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1645.

Jeronymo de Payva was at this time lying with his eight ships in the Bay of Tamandare. The Camp-Masters, as soon as they had completed their business with Hoogstraten, wrote to acquaint him with their success, and advise him to put into the port at Nazareth, where he would be safe; they added, as a farther inducement, that they meant to receive the sacrament in the fort, which they had had re-named, in honour of that mystery, and where they had found a mass-book, . . . a thing, they said, of no small service to them. They urged this advice by a second dispatch, having learnt from an intercepted letter that the Dutch fleet was at sea in search of him. Both dispatches fell into the enemy's hands ³; and the Portuguese, not knowing that Nazareth was in possession of their countrymen, remained in an open bay. There Lichthart found them, hoisted the red flag, and attacked them. His force was greatly superior, and the advantage of skill, as well as of confidence and numbers, was on his side. One of the Portuguese stood out to sea in time, made her way through the Dutch, and reached Bahia; two were abandoned and set on fire; other two ran aground,

and destroys
it.

Sept. 2.

Sept. 6.

Sept. 8.

² Raphael de Jesus calls this the most infamous treachery that ever human breast could devise. 6, § 66. The manner in which he represents these whole transactions would be ludicrous from its extravagant injustice, . . . if it were not a melancholy thing to observe, through the whole course of human history, how lamentably men deceive themselves perverting all laws of right and wrong as their passions and prejudices induce them.

³ So it must be inferred, because they are given by Nieuhoff, who could not have obtained them by any other means.

CHAP. but they were defended so well that the enemy could not effect
 XXI. their destruction; the remaining three were taken. Payva's
 1645. ship was boarded in three places at once, Lichthart having
 commenced the attack by singling it; he defended it most gal-
 lantly; and when the enemy were masters of the deck, stood
 sword in hand at his cabin-door, cut several of them down, and
 was not made prisoner till he had fallen, exhausted with exer-
 tions, and with loss of blood from his numerous wounds. The
 Portugueze are said to have lost seven hundred men in this
 action. They accused the Dutch of treachery in having thus
 attacked them, because for two days before some of Lichthart's
 smaller vessels had been watching them under a white flag; . . .
 they forgot with how little reason in this war either party could
 upbraid the other with dishonourable dealing. With more jus-
 tice they complained of the cruelty shown to the prisoners; . . .
 many having been thrown overboard, of whom some saved
 themselves by swimming, and others were fished ⁴ up with bullets
 and stones fastened to their necks and legs. When the news
 reached Bahia, the Governor issued an edict, forbidding any
 person to put on mourning for those who had perished in the
 treacherous affair at Tamandare, and promising before God and
 man that he would exert all the power of the state to take ven-
 geance for, what he called, so abominable a treason.

Nieuhoff, p.
73—80.
Cast. Lus.
6. § 68.

Insurrection
in Goyana,

While these things were passing in Pernambuco, the Portu-
 gueze of the other ceded Captaincies were not inactive. About
 the middle of June the Council had dispatched Paulus de Linge
 to Paraiba, to take measures for the security of that province.

⁴ Vidal asserts this, . . . a man whose authority may be believed. The letter
 in which he states it is in reply to one from Payva; but I suspect that that which
 Nieuhoff has given as Payva's is not genuine. The Carmelite Giovanne Giuseppe
 says erroneously that Payva was slain in the action. *Part. 2, p. 72.*

He fixed his head-quarters impolitically in the Convent of S. Francisco, and made the inhabitants renew their oath of allegiance, as if oaths taken by compulsion would be any security for their obedience, and as if it were not as easy to be absolved from the oath as to take it! Linge arrested four of the suspected persons, and chose them so well, that the two whom Fernandes had appointed Captains for the district were among them. One of the arrested was put to death; the body of another, who died in confinement, was dragged through the streets; the other two were detained in prison. This, however, did not prevent the inhabitants of Goyana from rising. Two officers from the Pernambucan army were sent to head them; and they were strong enough to resist any force which the Dutch could spare to act against them. At this juncture the Tapuyas committed the massacre at Cunhau; nothing could be more ill-timed or more unfortunate for the Dutch: it was universally imputed to the Government, and obtained a ready belief for the monstrous charge which Fernandes circulated, that a general massacre of the Portugueze was intended. The widows and children of the slain went about in mourning, calling upon God and man to revenge them. Instead of striking terror through the Captaincy, this horrible act excited deeper indignation, and exasperated a people who were already eager to avenge themselves for their long sufferings. It afforded them also a pretext for requiring arms from Linge. These same Tapuyas were on the way to Goyana; they would pass near Paraiba, and if we are without means of defence, said the Paraibans, the same horrors will be perpetrated here as at Cunhau. They accompanied their petition by a gift, and it was enforced by Linge's own fear, for he had now heard of the defeat of his countrymen at Monte das Tabocas. He granted them permission to provide themselves with any weapons except fire-arms, and retired with part of his

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troops to Fort Cabedello. The Paraibans being thus allowed to take measures for their own defence, began to fortify those places which were most defensible, and it soon appeared that their alarm had not been groundless. For the Tapuyas, with a body of Dutch under Willem Lambartz, who had been sent to solicit the aid of these savages, came on, murdering all the Portuguese whom they found upon the way. Jan Duwy, their Royalet, according to the statement of the Dutch themselves, demanded, when he agreed to grant his assistance, that all the Portuguese in Paraiba should be destroyed. It was in vain that Lambartz endeavoured to prevent their cruelties; part of the Tapuyas, being satisfied with their booty, affected to take umbrage at his interference, and turned back. The rest continued to advance till they came within sight of Goyana, which they meant to enter during the night. There was a river between them and the town, and in the darkness they fancied that a force stronger than their own was drawn up to defend the ford: they were seized with a panic, and fled. The Tapuyas dispersed, and returned to their own forests, and the Dutch retreated to Cabedello, from whence Lambartz sailed for Recife, to render an account of his bootless expedition.

Nieuhoff,
p. 94.
Cast. Lus.
6. § 79—86.

and in Pa-
raiba.

After the capture of Haus and Blaar, the two Governors, as Fernandes and Vidal were now called, sent officers to Paraiba to command the insurgents. One was Vidal's nephew, and like him a native of that Captaincy. A Captain from Camaram's regiment, and another from that of Henrique Diaz were also sent, that the Indians and Negroes might be enlisted under men of their own colour and nation. They halted about three leagues from the city, and sent to three of its inhabitants, who had been nominated Governors of the Province, communicating to them their appointment, and requiring them to take measures for proclaiming the liberty of Paraiba. Those measures were

so well concerted, that in one day all the Portugueze throughout the Captaincy followed the example of Goyana, and the acclamation of liberty, as it was called, took place. An Engenho of Jorge Homem Pinto, called St. Antonio's, was chosen as the best position for defence ; it was fortified, and obtained the name of the Camp. Linge sent a force of three hundred Dutch and six hundred savages to surprize it, making at the same time a feint of attacking the city by water. The insurgents, seeing the launches ascend the river, were deceived, and prepared to defend Paraiba ; but they had left a sufficient force in the Camp, who sallied, and attacked the enemy. The Dutch were perhaps weary with their march ; a heavy shower lessened the advantage which they would otherwise have derived from their matchlocks ; the patriots closed with them, and they were defeated, leaving about fourscore slain. There was a church upon the field of battle, dedicated to the Saints Cosmo and Damiano ; the doors were found open, though it was never known by what human hand they had been opened ; and thus the people of Paraiba also had their miracle as well as their victory. This success made them so secure, that they recalled their wives and children, whom they had sent into the woods. They now began a secret negociation with Linge for the purchase of Fort Cabedello. Every thing was nearly concluded, when, by a rare instance of infidelity, a Portugueze priest revealed it to the Calvinist minister ; and the Dutch commander, to save himself from suspicion, hung the agent of the patriots. So the fort remained in the power of the Dutch, while the Portugueze were masters of the rest of the Captaincy.

The affairs of the Dutch were even more unsuccessful to the southward of Recife. Hopeless of succouring their garrisons at Seregipe, at the River S. Francisco, and at Porto Calvo, they sent orders to evacuate these forts, and bury or destroy the

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Sept. 11.

Cast. Lus.
6, § 87, 92.
Nieuhof,
p. 92.

Porto Calvo
surrendered
by the
Dutch.

CHAP. guns ; . . . but even this was too late. At the latter place the
 XXI. insurrection broke out upon the arrest of one of the prin-
 1645. cipal inhabitants ; the others took arms under Christovam Lins,
 whom Fernandes had appointed Captain of the district. The
 Dutch Commander sent a detachment to crush them before
 they should gather strength ; Lins laid an ambush so judiciously,
 that the whole were cut off. Three days afterward he surprized
 a vessel which was coming up the river Mangoaba, with stores
 for the fort ; and having thus acquired arms and confidence,
 he blockaded the enemy. The Dutch Commander, Klaas Florins,
 was a mere mercenary, and knew that his men had no better
 principle of action than himself. He represented to them that
 they were not bound to defend the place to the imminent peril
 of their lives ; for as they only served for pay in order that
 they might live by that pay, it was absurd to suppose there
 could be any reason why they should die for it. Such logic
 was irrefragable under such circumstances, and Florins, with
 the full approbation of his troops, sent to propose a capitulation,
 or more properly, to offer the fortress for sale ; but with a
 delicacy respecting his honour not to have been expected in
 such a logician, he requested that an officer from the army
 might be appointed to treat with him, lest it should be said he
 had bargained with those persons who had lived with him in
 intimacy. An officer was accordingly deputed by the Governors,
 and for seven hundred milreas distributed among them, the
 soldiers, about an hundred and fifty in number, marched out
 with the honours of war, and then laid down their arms. The
 fortress was immediately razed, at the desire of the inhabitants,
 and its eight brazen guns were sent to the army of the patriots
 in the Varzea.

Cast. Lus.
 6, § 93—7.

*The Dutch
 abandon the
 R. S. Fran-
 cisco.*

The first occurrences at Fort Mauritz upon the river S. Francisco were nearly similar. One of the Portugueze was arrested

and rescued. Seventy soldiers were ordered to chastise the insurgents, entrapped into an ambush, and all cut off. The patriots then, under Valentim de Rocha Pita, laid siege to the fortress, and sent to Bahia to intreat succours. The Governor General, who no longer thought it necessary to dissemble, dispatched a small force under Nicolao Aranha. They marched from Rio Real to the S. Francisco in fourteen days, which, when the distance and the season were considered, astonished every body. The Portugueze, notwithstanding the fortress, were masters of the river; they surprized many small vessels, and drove back those which brought the order of the Council for withdrawing the garrison. The Dutch made one attempt to sally: but the first four were shot as they attempted to pass the gate, so near had the Portugueze posted themselves, and so certain was their aim. Their comrades were too much intimidated by this to expose themselves in like manner to destruction. Aranha offered terms; they requested three days to consider of them. Just at this time Haus and the prisoners who were taken with him arrived here on their way to Bahia: their appearance proved the deplorable state of the Company's affairs in Brazil, and the garrison forthwith surrendered. Two hundred and sixty-six men laid down their arms; about eighty had been killed by the Portugueze marksmen during the seige. So expert were these people, that when any man of the besieged, venturing to look at the enemy from the ramparts, bent down on each side the broad flaps of his hat to assist his sight, the hat and the hands were immediately pierced with a ball. Several of the prisoners showed both hands thus perforated. This conquest⁵

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July 27.

⁵ Fr. Manoel do Salvador embellishes this conquest with a miracle. Soon after Aranha learnt the defeat of his countrymen in Tamandare Bay, and while the enemy were deliberating whether or not to surrender, a bell was heard in the

CHAP. was of great importance ; the fort was considered as the key of
 XXI. Pernambuco ; there was now nothing to oppose the free pas-
 1645. sage of the Portugueze from Bahia, and the insurgents could
 be supplied with food from the extensive pastures along this
 great river. The fort was razed at the request of the inhabi-
 tants, and Aranha proceeded with his troops to join Fernandes
 and Vidal in the Varzea.

Nieuhoff,
 92.
 Cast. Lus.
 6 & 98 105.
 Val. Luc.
 p. 261.

The desert-
 ers formed
 into a regi-
 ment.

Vidal and Soares had now joined Fernandes after the capture
 of Nazareth : they consulted with him in what manner to re-

camp ; presently some of the soldiers heard music, like the chaunt of the litany, and a great light was seen. "Sirs and comrades," said Pedro Aranha, the Captain's brother, "without doubt this must be the souls of the departed, who are come to succour us. I am especially devoted to them, and every day commend them to God, . . . having this moment finished those prayers which I daily offer to God in their behalf. Let us promise them a chaunted mass to-morrow as soon as it shall be day, . . . that being the day on which the Holy Catholic Church is accustomed to say mass and offer suffrage for them. The mass accordingly was performed, and at the moment of elevation, when the troops fired a salute, a gun was fired from the fortress, to intimate that the garrison would surrender." P. 261. There is nothing extraordinary in the miracle, which is not ill conceived, and might very easily have been performed ; . . . but it is worthy of notice, that Raphael de Jesus reprehends Fr Manoel for relating it, and affects to discredit it, as not having been required for the occasion. "*Nam duvidamos do muyto, que alcança de Deos a devaçam das almas, e do quanto as obriga quem a inculca ; poreo sabemos que nam faz Deos milagres sem porque : Quando quer dar os fins, dispoem os meyo ; e o que pellos humanos se pode conseguir, escuza os milagrosos : Com mas evidencia neste cazo, em o qual o motivo relatado pello sobre-dito Author, foy tam occulto ao hereje, que nam o avia de convencer do erro, nem enformar do castigo ; e a doutrina Catholica nos ensina, que para convencer incredulos obra Deos a seus olhos as maravilhas ; e socorre uos fieis com milagres nas occasioens, e apertos, aonde nam chegam as forças humanas.*" Cast. Lus. 6, 104. This Benedictine swallowed camels without hesitation : the wry face which he makes at a gnat may be explained by a certain degree of jealousy toward an author who had anticipated him in all the more brilliant parts of his history.

ward Hoogstraten for his treason, till he should receive that recompence from the King which was to be expected for such a service ; and it was proposed that all the Dutch deserters should be formed into a regiment, which should be given him, with the rank of Camp-Master ; and that all who deserted from the enemy in future should be incorporated in it. Fernandes objected to this ; these northern troops, he said, could never be too much distrusted ; brought up in heresy, and ready every day to adopt a new creed, how was it to be expected that they who did not keep their faith towards God should keep it towards man ? He advised that they should be divided among the Portugueze regiments : but both Vidal and Soares differed from him. They observed, that when two regiments of different countries were in the field together, emulation made each exert itself to the utmost ; and they urged the weightier argument, that to mix in the same regiment men who spake different languages would cause confusion. Fernandes apprehended worse consequences from leaving them together ; but he yielded to their judgement.

About a league from Recife, upon the neck of sand which divides the river from the sea, was the fort of S. Cruz, commanding the communication of Recife with Olinda, and with the country on that side. Barboza was master of Olinda ; it was of importance to obtain possession of this fort, and accordingly the insurgents resolved to assault it. But Hoogstraten, being acquainted with the commander, persuaded him to sell the place, and enter, with all his men, into the deserters' regiment. Being now completely masters of the country, it was debated whether they should restore the old camp of Bom Jesus, and blockade the city. Fernandes thought this would be giving the war too much of a defensive character, when more active operations were required. He advised that a fort should be erected to secure the ammunition and stores ; and that under

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Cast. Lus.
6, § 107.

*Fernandes
encamps be-
fore Recife.*

Cast. Lus.
6, § 108.

CHAP. its protection the troops should encamp so near the enemy as
 XXI never to have them out of sight. This plan was followed, and
 1645. a fort built upon an eminence four miles from the city. Fer-
 nandes chose the spot; no man knew the country better, and
 as the encampments which were made in consequence destroy-
 ed the plantations of three of his own sugar-works, it was mani-
 fest that no other motive than the public good could have in-
 fluenced his choice. In three months the work was completed,
 according to all the rules of art, and the appellation of the Good
 Jesus, which had been given to the old camp, was transferred
 to the new castle. A little town speedily grew up under its
 shelter, which was called the New Camp; and here Fernandes,
 for the benefit of the sick and wounded, established one of those
 charitable institutions known in Portugal by the name of *Casas*
de Misericordia, or Houses of Compassion, and raised funds for
 it by a contribution levied upon the Pernambucans, according
 to their respective means. Every assistance, medical and spiri-
 tual, was provided for the patriots; and similar institutions
 were soon founded in the other revolted provinces.

The Dutch beheld with consternation the progress of the
 enemy. The people of Recife petitioned that Nassau's palace
 might be pulled down, lest it should be taken possession of by
 the insurgents: the Council refused to do this, saying, they
 hoped to make it useful for the defence of the city; but they
 destroyed the outhouses and gardens which had been made
 upon so magnificent a scale, and broke down the bridge of
 Boavista. An attempt was made to fortify Mauritas; but ei-
 ther finding the situation unfavourable, or their force too scanty,
 the Council judged it more expedient to issue an edict for to-
 tally demolishing the new town; the inhabitants were com-
 manded by beat of drum to pull down their houses within ten
 days, after which time any person might seize for his own use

Cast. Lus.
6 § 113—5.

Do. 106.

*Preparations
for defence
at Recife.*

Aug. 29.

whatever materials were found standing. The anxiety of the people continued so great, notwithstanding these precautions, that the Council thought it necessary to communicate to them the contents of their last dispatches to Amsterdam, in order to satisfy them that their imminent danger had been represented to the Company in terms as strong as the urgency of the case required.

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Nieuhoff,
88, 91-4.

*Attempt
upon Itamaraca.*

There was a fort on the beach, called from its form the Fort of the Five Angles. Fernandes proposed to attack it by night; but Hoogstraten had lately surveyed it, and therefore knowing its strength, dissuaded him from making the attempt, and advised an expedition against the island of Itamaraca, which was the granary of all the enemy's remaining possessions. The camp was left under Diaz, while the main body of the army marched to Garassu, and ordered all the boats of the neighbourhood to be collected at the bar of the river Catuama. A ship had been stationed, to defend the passage of the channel between the island and the mainland; it was surprized and captured; and the troops effected their landing unperceived. A Dutch woman, flying, probably for some offence, from the city of Schoppe, as the conquerors had named their chief settlement on the island, fell into their hands, and in her resentment against those from whom she was absconding, offered to lead them, unperceived, within the enemy's entrenchments. She proved a bad guide, and Cardozo, who had trusted to his own knowledge of the ground, reached the scene of action with his detachment first. The Indian women, going out of the town at day-break, some for water, others to collect shell-fish, discovered his approach: they gave the alarm; and the firing which ensued served to direct Joam Fernandes and Vidal, with the rest of the army. After three attacks the assailants forced their way into the town; the Dutch were driven into the intrenchments with which they had

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 1645. fortified the church, and there they were preparing to capitulate, when the Portugueze, by their rapacity and cruelty, were deprived of the victory which they had at this time actually achieved. The troops from Bahia fell to plundering, an example which was eagerly followed by Hoogstraten's regiment. Cardozo, at the commencement of the assault, had given orders to put the Indians to the sword; these men, knowing they had no mercy to expect, made a desperate attack upon the enemy, who thought their conquest completed. The Dutch, seeing the assailants in confusion, recovered heart, and sallied out upon them; and the Portugueze, instead of making themselves masters of the island, thought themselves happy in effecting a retreat, and carrying off as many of their countrymen as were disposed to join in insurrection. The loss fell chiefly upon Hoogstraten's regiment; Camaram was wounded; Vidal and Fernandes escaped unhurt, though the latter had some of his hair carried away by a ball, and the former received a shot upon his pistol. Seven of the Dutch regiment were found to have brought away their knapsacks full of booty, and to have lost their arms: Hoogstraten condemned them all to death, and when the sentence was mitigated they drew lots for their lives, and one was executed.

Nieuhoff,
p. 95.
Cast. Lus.
6, 116-24.
Val. Luc.
268.

Contagion in
the camp.

The Portugueze having fortified Garassu, and secured all the roads by which the enemy from Itamaraca could molest them, returned to the camp, and were kept inactive there till the close of the year by an infectious disease. It began with an oppression of the chest, which was followed by acute pains, and pleurisy: some died suddenly, others in a few hours; no person to whom it proved fatal survived the third day. The physicians, having never seen a like disease, knew not how to treat it: at length, however, they discovered that frequent and copious bleeding was successful. Joam Fernandes, seeing that both the

Hospital and the Casa da Misericordia were full of soldiers, who were daily dying of this contagion, set up an image of St. Gonzalo among the patients, that saint being one of those who peculiarly exert themselves against the plague; mass was celebrated every day before this idol; and in order to secure another advocate, the image of S. Sebastian was brought there also in procession. Other processions were made, wherein all persons went barefooted, and some scourged⁶ themselves. To these measures the cessation of the evil was ascribed, after a great mortality. No race or colour was exempt from this pestilence. While it was raging in Paraiba, where it began, Jacob Rabbi and the Tapuyas entered the Captaincy of Rio Grande, and massacred all the Portugueze upon whom they could lay hands, in revenge for the execution of their countrymen at Serinhaem. This massacre⁷ was accompanied with hateful circumstances of treachery, as well as atrocity; and the odium fell upon the Dutch, not undeservedly, because, though the sufferers had not been engaged in the insurrection, their cattle were seized and their property sold for the benefit of the Company.

The Camp-Masters had sent a detachment to protect their countrymen in this province, and collect cattle there for the use

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Cast. Lus.
6. § 125.
Val. Luc.
p. 295.

*Massacre at
the Potengi.*

Nieuhoff.
p. 96.

*Desultory
warfare.*

⁶ Fr. Manoel do Salvador adds, that he himself preached upon this occasion with that doctrine, erudition, and spirit which he always used to display: . . . *pregou tambam o P. Fr. Manoel do Salvador com a doutrina, erudiçam e espirito que sempre costumava fazer.* P. 295.

⁷ The manner in which Raphael de Jesus relates this massacre, embellishing it with all the most approved circumstances of martyrdoms and miracles, is a complete specimen of Popish church-history. *Cast. Lus.* 6, § 127—141. Nieuhoff's manner of recounting it is not less characteristic; after saying that the Dutch upon the Potengi were not strong enough to punish these cruelties, he adds, "it had this good effect, that the province was for the time entirely purged of that rebellious crew." P. 96.

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of the army ; they arrived too late ; but the massacre, like that of Cunhau, made the Portugueze more implacable, and convinced those who had not yet taken arms, it was in arms alone that safety could be hoped for. Meantime the main force of the insurgents continued before Recife ; they were not provided with means for besieging the place, nor while the enemy were masters of the sea was it likely that they could reduce it by famine : still their blockade distressed the town, and some favorable chance might throw it into their hands. That kind of contest was now carried on which affords little for relation, though perhaps more military talent and more personal courage are displayed in it than in any other form of warfare. Every day, almost every night, some sally was made, some ambush posted, and skirmishes and stratagems called forth all the skill and activity of both parties. Each was now so well acquainted with the temper and character of the other, and both had such good intelligence, that no opportunity was lost on either side. The great holiday of the negroes in Brazil was the festival of the Rosary, which was celebrated with peculiar solemnities at Olin-da, on the first Sunday in October. Henrique Diaz, knowing that the Dutch knew this, expected they would take the opportunity of making an attack in that quarter ; he warned the captains at the nearest stations ; the attack was made, and the Dutch, though at first successful, were finally repulsed with considerable loss. If the enemy eluded the Portugueze scouts and centinels, while they went above the reach of the tide for fresh water, their track was soon discovered in the woods, and parties were stationed to intercept them, or dispute the watering place. Even when they succeeded in filling their casks, they were sometimes deprived of a necessary which had been so difficultly obtained. About fifty pipes of water were lying under the guns of the Affogados ; a party of the besiegers stole under the walls in the night, staved the whole, and carried off some

horses, which, with the same incaution, had been exposed to their attempts. Great part of the booty which the Portugueze acquired during these unremitting hostilities consisted in slaves: for many of these people, seeing the present state of the contest, and the different spirit by which the two parties were animated, believing that they must fall sooner or later into the power of the insurgents, came over to them while they could claim some merit for so doing, or exposed themselves to be taken. The generals, for the sake of encouraging the troops, usually distributed them among the captors; and for the same reason winked at those who concealed such as had fallen into their hands. If they had belonged to any of the Portugueze, they were restored to the owner, on payment of a sum in the nature of salvage. The negroes who had been Dutch property were sold, and the produce applied to the costs of the war.

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Cast. Lus.
7, § 5-6.

The Dutch were at this time in hopes of striking an effectual blow by means of Hoogstraten's regiment. His treason indeed was of that kind which left him neither claim for, nor hope of, forgiveness; but most of the men, it was presumed, had entered the Portugueze service in order to avoid ill treatment, and with a view of escaping from it; and none of them, it was known, could have any principle to detain them in it, if anything were to be gained by a second breach of faith. A correspondence was easily opened with them, and the bargain was soon concluded. It was agreed that they on their part were not to fire with ball, and that the troops from Recife should never aim at them, till they could find an opportunity to join their countrymen during action, and turn upon the Portugueze. Meantime they were for their own security to distinguish themselves by wearing a folded ^s paper in the hat. This part of the scheme

*Treachery
of the de-
serters.*

Cast. Lus.
7, § 8.

^s In the manner, says Raphael de Jesus, that clients wear one in the girdle.

CHAP. was defeated by an unexpected and whimsical accident: the
 XXI. Portugueze admired the paper cockade, and thinking it had a
 1645. soldier-like appearance, chose to wear it also.

Joam Fernandes always regarded the regiment of deserters with a suspicious eye, and though the other leaders are said not to have entertained the same doubts concerning them, they had never blindly trusted them. From time to time small detachments of them had been sent off to different stations, till about two hundred and fifty were all that remained with the main body of the army. These, under the direction of a captain, by name Nicolzon, were waiting for the first opportunity to escape. To favour them, a sally was made in great force from the city, under Garsmann, who upon the capture of Haus and Blaar had succeeded to the command. The deserters got together, and were only prevented from effecting their purpose by a chance movement of Cardozo's. During the whole war for the recovery of Pernambuco, the Portugueze were never in such danger as on this day; for had they been suddenly attacked in the midst of a doubtful action by part of their own army, their defeat was certain, and would have been almost irremediable. This plan having been baffled, the enemy were driven back, after an action in which some loss was sustained on both sides. Paulo da Cunha and Pedro Cavalcanti were wounded; a ball grazed Vidal's hat, and occasioned for a time a dimness of sight. The backwardness and suspicious conduct of the deserters on this day could not escape notice; and Nicolzon being aware of this, went with one of his confederates to the Camp-Masters, and in the name of his countrymen requested that they might be allowed to wipe off the imputation which lay upon them. They knew, he said, that the enemy would be venturing out for water; they would lie in wait, and either cut off his whole party, or perish in the attempt. The Camp-Masters assented to this, upon Hoogstraten's suggesting what he thought a sure method of preventing

any treachery: it was, that he would observe what men Nicolson and his comrade were inclined to select for this service, and instead of letting them go, he would appoint others of his own choosing, on whom he could depend: for though he thought it likely enough that there might be many in the regiment who would gladly desert back to the service of their own country, this renegade had persuaded himself that the greater number were heartily engaged in their new cause. Accordingly, he selected about threescore men from the different companies; they set forward, and concealed themselves, as if in ambuscade, among the trees by the Beberibe; but when the river became fordable at low water they crossed it, and with drums beating, and firing salutes, marched into Recife. Hoogstraten could not be suspected of any part in this treachery: as soon as the fact was ascertained, Joam Fernandes and the Camp-Masters sent for him, to consult how they should act with the remainder of his regiment; for when they on whom he had most reliance had acted thus, what could be looked for from those whom he distrusted? He was in despair at what had occurred: all, he said, beyond a doubt were equally guilty, and by the laws of war all were worthy of death, and he himself deserved the same punishment for having been the commander of such wretches. They were immediately surrounded and disarmed; their quarters were then searched, and proofs enough of their communication with Recife were discovered, . . . for like true Dutchmen, they had provided themselves with Dutch cheese, Dutch butter, and Dutch herrings; things no otherwise procurable than by a direct intercourse with the city. Orders were expedited to disarm all those who had been detached to different stations, and to send them and their families to the Camp; they were then marched to Bahia, under good escort, and in different parties, there to be disposed of as the Governor

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1645.

Nov. 12.

CHAP. General should think fit⁹. All who were Catholics were there-
 fore believed to be innocent, and permitted to remain; and any
 Catholic woman who wished to rid herself of an heretical hus-
 band, had only to plead her religion, and obtain an effectual
 divorce. The surgeons were detained, for they were too useful
 to be dismissed; and two engineers were detained also, who
 were employed upon the works of the camp. Hoogstraten and
 La Tour, his Sargento Mor, requested leave to serve in Bahia,
 feeling humiliated in their present situation: their request was
 granted, and on their arrival at S. Salvador they were appointed
 to the same rank in a Portugueze regiment.

Cast. Lus.
 7. § 9—17.

*The Dutch
 suspect the
 deserters.*

As the contest was now carried on with all the mines and
 countermines of insidious policy, the Camp-Masters upon this
 occasion framed a letter to the Dutch Governors, which pur-
 ported to be written by one of their friends, and stated, that
 Nicolzon and his party were acting in collusion with Hoogstra-
 ten and Joam Fernandes; that if it had not been thus, they
 could not possibly have effected their escape in so large a body;
 and that if the Dutch were not carefully upon their guard, they
 would soon feel the effect of this refined stratagem. This letter
 would have completely succeeded if the disarming of the deserters
 could have been delayed. Spies were immediately set upon the

⁹ Nieuhoff says that the Portugueze pretended to send them to Bahia, but that in reality they murdered them and their wives and children upon the way. *P.* 98. If the Camp-Masters had determined upon putting them to death, they were not men to have shrunk from doing it openly. The fact is, that many of them met with this fate from the people of the country through which they past. Joam Fernandes was exceedingly indignant upon hearing this, and threatened to inflict exemplary punishment upon the places where these excesses had been committed; but the Pernambucans in his army declared that all the Dutch ought to have been executed for their treason, and threatened to leave the camp if any of their countrymen were punished for having taken vengeance upon such wretches. *Val. Luc. p. 291.*

party: it happened that one of these agents found two of them at a tavern, where over their cups they boasted of the regular pay and good living which they had enjoyed in the camp, shewing in proof their money, and the mandioc flour and fresh meat which they had brought away in their knapsacks. To a government so often deceived, in such perilous circumstances, and noways scrupulous in the administration of justice, this appeared a sufficient proof of treasonable designs: the men were sentenced to be hanged; all their comrades were arrested, and would probably have shared the same fate, if intelligence had not been received of the proceedings against the deserters, by which the artifice of the letter was discovered. The suspicion of the Dutch rulers was thus removed from their own countrymen, but it fell upon the foreigners in their service. There were thirty Frenchmen in the garrison of Fort Affogados, who were all arrested; four were put to the torture, and though neither of them confessed any thing, one was executed. A Mina Negro, who deserted from the fort on the same night, informed Henrique Diaz of what had occurred there: that able partizan immediately laid an ambush for the detachment who were to replace the suspected Frenchmen, and relieve the other soldiers; their fidelity being doubted because of their communication with the foreigners. As this was a strong escort, the inhabitants of Recife took the opportunity of sending their clothes out of the city at the same time to be washed in the fresh water; the escort fell into the ambush, and Diaz's black troops stocked themselves with fine linen from the booty. The provisions for this fort were sent with imprudent regularity every Saturday, in sufficient quantities for the ensuing week. Opportunity was hereby given for fresh enterprizes, in one of which Paulo da Cunha bore a part. He was quartered in a house which belonged to Sebastiam de Carvalho, the man who first gave notice of the intended insurrection to

CHAP. the Dutch. Paulo was only a few hours absent, and on his
 XXI. return he found the whole of the premises destroyed by fire.

1645. By whatever accident this happened, the Portugueze converted it into a miracle; they affirmed that though the building, which was one of the best in the Varzea, was of stone and lime, with portals, pillars, and stairs of hewn stone, the whole was reduced to a heap of cinders and ashes, . . . stone as well as wood becoming combustible on the occasion, as if to show the indignation of heaven against a traitor.

Cast. Lus.
 6. § 18—21.

*Transactions
 at the Po-
 tengi.*

A detachment under Barboza Pinto had been sent at the commencement of the insurrection, to protect their countrymen at Cunhau. Arriving too late to prevent the massacre, they took up their quarters in the very sugar-works where the main butchery had been committed, fortified themselves there, and began to retaliate upon the enemy. But the force at Fort Keulen exceeded their's; it was prudent to quit a position which they could not render tenable; and as a motive for quitting it a circumstance was assigned, which was either accident magnified and interpreted into miracle, or an artifice contrived to persuade men to a change of quarters, who, blind to the danger of attack, would rather have remained under a good roof than retreat to the marshes. At night the centinel heard sounds like the steps of a large body of men advancing secretly; the alarm was given, the Portugueze beat to arms, and continued in expectation of an attack till day, when neither vestige nor tidings of any enemy could be discovered. The same thing was repeated two or three successive nights, till all agreed that it was a portentous warning, communicated to them, perhaps, by the spirits of their countrymen who had suffered death upon that very spot. They retired therefore to the marshes, and there fortified a position which was accessible on one side only. Scarcely had they completed their entrenchments before nearly

four hundred Dutch landed in the Bahia do Traiçam, and marched, under cover of the night, to surprize them in the sugar-works: finding the place abandoned, they traced the Portugueze to their new post, and attacked them there; but to such disadvantage, that they were repulsed with considerable loss, and fain to retreat to Fort Keulen.

CHAP.
XXI.

1645.

Cast. Lus.
6. § 143.
Nieuhoff, p.
98.

Here, however, the enemy were superior in numbers to the patriots, and they derived great assistance from a savage chief, known by the name of Pieter Poty, who, though nearly akin to Camaram, and earnestly solicited by him to espouse the same cause, was a zealous partizan of the Dutch. His people perpetrated another massacre in Paraiba. They surprized a number of Portugueze, who were assembled on the eve of St. Martin's at a feast; and they butchered all except one girl, whose exceeding beauty, even at the moment when she saw her father and her other relations murdered, and when the savages were drunk with blood, so much impressed them that they spared her, and conducted her unhurt to the Fort of Paraiba: this is perhaps the most remarkable instance of the effect of beauty that has ever been recorded. Aided by these Tapuyas, the Dutch were masters of the country about the Potengi, and it was feared that the whole of Paraiba also would be at their mercy. Camaram was detached from the camp to prevent this, and to take vengeance for the cruelties which had been committed. He took with him his own regiment, and two hundred Tapuyas from the river S. Francisco. His orders were to collect the cattle for the use of the camp, to take vengeance upon the Dutch and their allies, and put every person whom he found to death; . . . orders which Camaram executed with unrelenting fidelity. Having reached Paraiba, and communicated with the insurgent-leaders in that Captaincy, he took from thence fifty men, who were well acquainted with the country, and proceeded

Nieuhoff,
p. 98.

CHAP. to Rio Grande, destroying all whereof he could not make plunder, burning the villages of the Pitagoares and Tapuyas, and sparing neither sex nor age. This movement excited much anxiety at Recife. It was from the fertile plains on the Potengi that the Dutch drew their supplies of mandioc and cattle, since the Portugueze were masters of Pernambuco ; and should this resource be cut off, while Itamaraca and Paraiba were closely beset by the insurgents, it would hardly be possible to hold out till the expected succours could arrive from Holland. What was to be done? A bold movement, undertaken as a diversion, might recal Camaram from Rio Grande ; but the Portugueze in the Camp, and in Paraiba, and before Itamaraca were in such strength, that an attack could not be risked without exposing all that remained of their conquests to imminent danger. It was resolved, therefore, to make a vigorous effort against Camaram himself. Bas, one of the Members of the Council, had already been sent with two ships to Fort Keulen : as a farther reinforcement, threescore soldiers and an hundred Indians were drafted from Itamaraca, and an equal number from Fort Cabedello, or Margaretha, as the Dutch called it. When these were collected, the whole force amounted to one thousand men, besides an additional body of Tapuyas, under Jacob Rabbi and the sons of Duwy, who were assembling at Fort Keulen. Having thus got together such superior numbers in this part, they thought the only danger was that the enemy should escape them ; and it was debated at Recife, whether, if Camaram should either retreat or be driven into Paraiba, he should be pursued there, and the recovery of that Captaincy attempted also. But upon considering how much they risked, and that they were in daily hope of receiving reinforcements, which would enable them to act again on the offensive without imprudence, they concluded not to hazard every thing upon an enter-

prize, of which the possible evil might so greatly overbalance the possible advantage.

CHAP.

XXI.

1646.

Camaram's
victory.

Before this determination could be conveyed to Fort Keuleh the Dutch had attacked Camaram. He was strongly posted on a little river between Cunhau and the fort. The river being in that part too deep to be forded, protected his front; in his rear was a thicket of *tabocas*, an accident which, reminding the Portuguese of one victory, would be considered as the auspicious omen of another. On the north and south the position was open, and trenches were thrown up to cover it: Camaram stationed Bezerra on the north, and on the south he took post himself. His force consisted of six hundred men, of whom only one hundred were Portuguese, and one hundred and fifty were archers from the river S. Francisco; but his own men were excellent troops; they were unerring marksmen, thoroughly disciplined, and in all things but the art of war, the love of plunder, and the routine of their religion, as savage as ever. He was aware that he should be attacked, and had made all his preparations, military and religious, with skill and devotion equally characteristic. He carried always about him a Relicary, which had a crucifix enamelled on the one side, and on the other the figure of the Virgin; taking this in his hand, he prayed before it for a long time, with such apparent and fervent devotion, that the victory was afterwards attributed as much to his piety as to his military genius, and perhaps even during the action, as confidently expected from it. His musqueteers were arranged in three files; they were ordered to take aim so as not to waste a shot, the first rank to fall back and reload while the second took its place, in like manner to be succeeded by the third. They were to set up the shout of Victory in the heat of the action, in the hope of dismaying the Dutch; and if powder, balls, or matches should fail, instead of calling for what they wanted they were to cry S.

CHAP. Antonio, or S. John ; this being understood, they should immediately be supplied ; and it would have the double advantage of keeping the heretics ignorant of any momentary deficiency of ammunition, and of provoking those slaves of the Infernal Spirit to blaspheme ; for when they heard the saints called upon, they would exclaim “ *Te Duivel!*” and “ *Sacrement!*” Rhineberg, who commanded the Dutch, approached on that side where Camaram had placed himself, and attacked the trenches. He suffered severely in the attempt ; for Camaram’s men, being sure that no ball would be spent in vain, determined to send enough, and therefore put two or three in every charge. By a consequence equally unforeseen and ludicrous, this contributed as much to their own safety as to the loss of the enemy ; for firing with this heavy charge, and as fast as they could reload, their Biscayan guns, when they became heated, recoiled with such force against the breast as to knock them down, a whole rank at a time, and the enemy’s shot past over them ; Camaram, when he first saw them fall, thought that they were killed ; and his surprize was equal to his joy when he beheld them rise again unhurt. Rhineberg, soon finding it impossible to force this quarter, divided his troops into three bodies ; with the one he continued the attack as a feint, and sent the others, one to attempt the passage of the river higher up, the other to force the cane-thicket. Here the former scene among the *tobacas* was repeated ; and the Dutch, having fallen into two ambuscades, and received the fire of both, took to flight. The other body attempted in vain to cross the stream ; the Indian archers were ready upon the banks, and they who entered the river were arrowed there. The cry of Victory was now set up by the main body, with all the success that Camaram could have desired ; Rhineberg thought they were about to rush out upon his divided and dispirited troops, and precipi-

tately retired, leaving an hundred and fifteen of his men dead upon the field, and the whole of his baggage. On the part of the conquerors it is affirmed that not a man was slain, and only three wounded; it is added, that many of them bore bruises upon their bodies, certain and evident signs that the balls of the heretics which struck them had not been permitted to enter. There was some foundation for this miracle, . . . the musket which in its recoil knocked the soldier down, would leave behind it the mark of the blow. Camaram had exhausted his ammunition, and therefore could not pursue the enemy; and having remained a week on the field, he retired to Paraiba, there to wait for stores with which to invest Fort Keulen. One loss had occurred during the action: a great number of cattle had been collected for the use of the Camp before Recife, and these it was not possible to secure; they took fright at the guns, and all, except some two hundred, broke away and escaped. Those which were saved were sent to the Camp-Masters, and the news of the victory was suffered to travel at their pace.

While these things were going on in the north, ill-advised orders came from the Governor General to the Camp-Masters in the Varzea, commanding them to burn all the sugar-canes in Pernambuco. The motive was the old one of distressing the Dutch, and inducing them to abandon their conquests by frustrating their hopes of profit. But Antonio Telles did not sufficiently consider the change which had taken place; that the Portuguese at this time, not the Dutch, were masters of the country; and that although, as he reasoned, three thousand seven hundred and fifty men, who were employed in an hundred and fifty sugar-works, would thus be at liberty to bear arms, and all their cattle be convertible to the service of the army, that he was cutting off the spring of those resources by which that army subsisted. Joam Fernandes saw so clearly the impolicy of this

CHAP.
XXI.
1646.

Cast Lus.
7, § 26, 33.
Val. Luc.
p. 306—16.
Nieuhoff,
p. 101.

Orders from
Bahia to
burn the
sugar-canes.

CHAP.

XXI.

1646.

Vol. Luc.
299.Cast. Lus.
7, § 35.Distress in
Recife.

order that he would not countersign it; but he gave the example of obedience, and ordered fire to be first set to his own canes, which were consumed, to the value of 200,000 cruzados. It was not long before a revocation of the order came from Bahia, but it was too late; the mischief had been done, and though not carried to its full extent, the evil consequences were severely experienced.

By this time the Dutch were greatly distressed¹⁰ for provisions. The garrison, a mercenary band of all countries, began to murmur at their privations, and the Jews, who were more interested even than the Dutch themselves in the preservation of these conquests, raised a large donation for the service of the state. Money, however, could not relieve the general distress. Many soldiers and negroes came over to the Portugueze, and the first news of Camaram's victory was received from these deserters. They reported, that nothing prevented frequent and almost universal desertion, but an opinion, carefully spread by the Dutch Government, that every Dutchman, or person in their service, who fell into the hands of the Portugueze, was put to death with the most cruel torments. Two Indian women, who were taken as they were seeking shell-fish between the enemy's forts, were brought to Martim Soares to be questioned by him, for he spake the Tupi language with perfect fluency: in the early part of his life he had lived much among the Tapuyas, and in the various commands which he held had

Vol. I. p.
391.

¹⁰ An *alquiere* of mandioc flour, (something less than two pecks,) sold for sixteen *testoons*, or five patacas: a pitcher of water for a *testoon*, and an orange for a *vintem*. The greater part of the inhabitants drank only such water as they collected in *cazimbas*, or pits dug in the sand, and this proved salt and unwholesome.

behaved to them always with equal wisdom and kindness : these women recognized him, and wept for joy, displaying the strongest emotions of gratitude and affection towards their old benefactor. They affirmed, that all the Indians of their tribe would gladly come over to the Portugueze, if it were not for the fear of being punished as traitors ; and if they were from Seara, where Martim Soares had formerly been governor, it is probable that they would be thus inclined, knowing him to be in the Camp. The strength of the Dutch, says Fr. Manoel do Salvador, lay at this time in the Indians, like that of Samson in his hair : and the women, though they wished to have remained where they were rather than return to endure the privations of a blockaded town, were now clothed and sent back, that they might report to their countrymen the good usage which they had received, and the disposition of the Portugueze towards all who should come over to them. The Camp-Masters drew up proclamations to the same effect, and a French deserter exerted the characteristic ingenuity of a Frenchman in circulating them, and endeavouring to ruin those whom he had so lately served.

CHAP.
XXI.
1646.

Cast. Lus.
7, § 41.
Val. Luc.
p. 302.

When the Camp-Masters first heard of Camaram's victory, they learnt at the same time that the Dutch had sent reinforcements to the Potengi, . . . a district upon which their preservation now wholly depended, being the only place from whence they could obtain supplies. It was thought, therefore, of so much importance to obtain the ascendancy there, that Vidal went himself to join Camaram, with four companies of Portugueze, one of Mina Negroes, and one of Creoles, as those Negroes were called who were born in the country in a state of slavery. Notwithstanding the prosperous state of the insurrection, there were still some persons in the Camp who were in correspondence with the enemy ; some because they were purchased, others because they hated Joam Fernandes, and some, perhaps, be-

*Vidal goes to
join Cama-
ram.*

CHAP. cause they despaired of final success in the struggle, knowing the
 XXI. resources and the vigour of the United Provinces, the distressed
 1646. state of Portugal, and the baneful indecision and feebleness of
 its councils. Vidal's departure was by some of these persons
 immediately communicated to the Dutch, and Joam Fernandes,
 while he knew that the secrets of the army were betrayed, had
 no means of bringing home the guilt to the suspected party.
 The Dutch profited by it, for they ventured to send off a com-
 pany of fusileers and the greater part of their Tapuyas to Ita-
 maraca, thus lessening the number of mouths in Recife.

Feb. 24.
 Cast. Lus.
 7. § 44.
 Nieuhoff,
 p. 102.

*Stratagems
 and jubilee.*

Fernandes now carried on the war of outposts with renewed
 vigour, that it might not be supposed he had weakened himself
 by sending off this detachment. Domingos Ferreira distinguish-
 ed himself in these enterprizes. Five and twenty head of cattle,
 with a few horses, were pastured by day under protection of
 Fort Affogados, and at night were collected within a pen, the
 gate of which was close to the fortress. Ferreira having recon-
 noitred this place, entered the pen in a dark night, with a few
 chosen companions; they fastened cords to the cattle, and cut
 the ropes by which the horses were secured; just as they were
 about to go through the gate with their booty the stir of the
 cattle was heard, the alarm given, and the fort began firing at
 random; they threw themselves on the ground among the beasts,
 lay there unperceived till the alarm had subsided, then mounted
 the horses, and drove off the whole of the cattle. The captain
 of this fort saved his own horse, which happened to be in the
 stable; but being obliged to turn it out, he appointed a Dutch
 servant to keep watch over it day and night; the man slept in
 the ditch, with the cord with which the horse was tethered tied
 to his own body. The Portuguese cut the rope, and thereby
 gained more than they expected; for when the man woke, and
 found the horse gone, he thought it better to desert than abide

his master's anger. Ferreira provoked the enemy by a more singular stratagem. On a dark night he fastened a number of lighted matches to the trees, in a spot which lay between the forts Affogados, Seca, and Salinas, alarmed the garrisons by a discharge, and instantly withdrew his men. The Dutch from the three forts, and from the platform before the gate of Recife, continued to fire all night upon these matches, while the Portuguese, in perfect safety, amused themselves by firing occasionally to quicken their alarm. Daylight discovered how they had been mocked, and the enemy then prepared piles of wood, mingled with other combustibles, with which they kindled huge bonfires whenever any night alarm was afterwards given. More hazardous enterprizes were attempted. Paulo Diaz, a Negro, who was called San Felice, after Bagnuolo, and who was Sargento Mayor to Henrique Diaz, stormed a redoubt in the night, after a desperate struggle; eight of his men were killed, and more than twenty wounded, many of them by the fire of their own party in the confusion: of the fifty Dutch who garrisoned the redoubt, only four survived. The redoubt was not tenable when it was taken; but such exploits tended equally to dismay the enemy and encourage the Portuguese. The intervals of rest which they allowed themselves were employed in practices not less conducive to that enthusiasm and confidence by which alone their country could be recovered. A jubilee had been proclaimed by Pope Innocent X. to all who should offer up certain prayers for the prosperity of the church, the extirpation of heresy, and peace between Christian, by which was exclusively meant, Catholic princes. The ceremonies appointed for this purpose excited in the Camp as much interest and as much zeal as the operations of the blockade.

Meantime Vidal joined Camaram at Paraiba. He learnt here that the reinforcements which were on their way from Recife to

CHAP.
XXI.
1646.

Cast. Lus.
7. § 45, 49,
50.

Cast. Lus.
7. § 45—8.
Val. Luc.
p. 320.

*Vidal re-
turns from
Paraiba.*

CHAP. the Potengi had halted at Fort Cabedello, and attempted to sur-
 XXI. prize the town; but perceiving that they were discovered, they had
 1646. returned down the river without venturing to land. A plan was
 now laid for entrapping the enemy; but it was apprehended that
 the Jews would betray the intention; for the Portugueze, having
 by the most atrocious system of persecution that ever outraged
 human nature compelled the Jews among them to profess Chris-
 tianity, lived consequently always in fear of concealed enemies
 among their own countrymen. To prevent the possibility of this
 disclosure, Vidal and Camaram marched some leagues inland,
 without revealing their purpose to any person; having thus pre-
 cluded all suspicion of their real object, they turned toward the
 sea, and timed their march so well as to arrive during the night
 at the church of N. Senhora da Guia, near the forts Antonio
 and Cabedello. Here they posted three ambushes, not far dis-
 tant from each other, and sent forty chosen men to decoy the
 enemy from S. Antonio. This party passed near the fort, as if
 on their return from a foraging excursion; the lure not proving
 successful, they then fired upon the fort in bravado, and showing
 themselves behind a sand-hill from time to time, insulted and de-
 fied the Dutchmen. The commander at length became impatient,
 sent to Cabedello for assistance, and landed sixty Europeans,
 with about an hundred and sixty Indians, to cut off these insol-
 lent assailants. A female¹¹ Payé was at the head of the In-
 dians. They called her Anhaguiara, or Mistress of the Devil.
 She came on brandishing a cutlass, and exclaiming, "Let me
 get at these Portugueze dogs! I am a tyger to pursue them, to
 rend their flesh, to drink their blood, and to tear out their

¹¹ I do not recollect any other instance of a female practitioner in juggling
 among the Tupi or Tapuya tribes.

hearts." The advanced party of the Portugueze awaited them, fired two vollies, then retreated in disorder, and easily decoyed their pursuers into the midst of the ambuscade. In an instant they were fired upon on all sides, and above fifty fell, among whom was the Mistress of the Devil herself; the rest ran into the sea. Vidal called out to his men to take a Dutchman alive: two of Camaram's people rushed into the water, and each seizing a fugitive by the hair, dragged his prize ashore. When they perceived that two were taken, they killed the one, and carried the other to their chief, who learnt from him the force of the enemy in these parts. This information satisfied Vidal that his presence was not necessary at the Potengi, so he dispatched Camaram thither with the rest of the reinforcements, and returned himself with one company to Pernambuco.

It was now the beginning of April, and provisions became scarce in the Camp, partly occasioned by a wet season, partly by the injudicious order for destroying the plantations, and partly, perhaps, because many hands who would otherwise have been employed in agriculture were engaged in war: the consequences were such as threatened ruin to the cause for which Joam Fernandes had roused his countrymen. An army like that of the insurgents was under little restraint of discipline; many of the men complained; their complaints became almost mutinous; and some of the troops who had been sent from Bahia, left the Camp, and returned there: many negroes also deserted, and fled to the Reconcave. The Camp-Masters intreated the Governor to apply a remedy to this evil; and Antonio Telles, who was greatly exasperated at the conduct of the soldiers, punished some with death, degraded others to Angola, and sent back those who had been led away by the more criminal. All Negroes also who came from Pernambuco were apprehended, and detained till they could be delivered to their

CHAP.
XXI.
1646.

Cast. Lus.
7, § 51—4.
Val. Luc.
p. 324.
Scarcity in
the Camp.

CHAP. owners. Some time necessarily elapsed before these measures
 XXI. could be efficacious, and in the interim the Dutch, less with the
 1646. expectation of influencing the Pernambucans than that of excit-
 ing mistrust between them and the Bahian troops, sent into the
 Camp copies of a letter from the King of Portugal to his resi-
 dent minister in Holland, wherein he disclaimed all participa-
 tion in the plans of the insurgents. These papers were laid in
 the way of centres and outposts, and were carried to the Camp-
 Masters. Their obvious course was to deny the authenticity of
 the letter; and Henrique Diaz wrote a manifesto, affirming that
 it was a forgery, and attempting to prove it so from internal
 evidence, in a manner sufficiently convincing for those who were
 determined to be of the same opinion, and very probably for
 himself¹² also.

Nieuhoff,
 103.
 Cast. Lus.
 7. § 58, 60.

¹² Raphael de Jesus represents the letter as a forgery; yet he must have known that it was authentic. Fr. Manoel do Salvador writing at the time and on the spot, honestly disbelieves it. "The letter," he says, "ought to have been signed 'I the King,' and not 'His Royal Majesty.' The Dutch understand matters of trade perfectly well, but very little of the manner in which Kings write." . . . "*Muito sabem os Olandeses de mercancias, mas mui pouco de modo com que os Reys escrevem.*" He then enters into a warm discussion of the cause of the insurrection, and breaks it off in a manner characteristic of his amusing memoirs: "*Esta materia pode amplificar quem tiver mais prudencia e mais vagar que eu; porque estam tocandoas caicas a rebate, e eu vou acudir a min ha obrigaçam . . .* This matter may be amplified by one who has more prudence and more leisure than I; for the drums are now beating the alarm, and I must repair to my duty." P. 333. Diaz seems to have been induced to reply to the letter, because he and Camaram were censured in it for having taken part in the rebellion. His personal vindication has been preserved, and it is curious in itself, as well as for being the composition of so remarkable a man. "Sirs," he says, addressing the Dutch Governors, "your tricks and stratagems are so apparent, that the very stocks and stones understand their deceitfulness, treachery, and treason, . . . to say nothing of myself, who by sacrifice of my health and at the cost of my blood, have taken a

The effects of dearth in the Camp were becoming daily more serious, and it was now that the Leaders felt the want of the sanction of authority for their proceedings: imperious as the necessity was, they dared not levy an impost upon the inhabitants, for they knew that it would be resisted, and this would lead to the total ruin of the cause. Joam Fernandes went round the province, to solicit as a donation what he could not raise as a tax. This journey was made subservient also to other purposes: the Camp-Masters began to perceive that reinforcements would more probably arrive for the Dutch than for them, and they apprehended that ere long the enemy would be enabled again to act upon the offensive. It was necessary to secure those ports which they possessed, that ships might not be deterred from coming there to trade with them. Fernandes, therefore, to render the port of Nazareth safe, blocked

CHAP.
XXI.
1646.

The Portuguese secure the ports of Nazareth and Tamandare.

Vol. 1, p. 500.

Doctor's degree in the knowledge of this truth. Sir Dutchmen, my comrade Camaram is not here, but I can answer both for him and myself. Pernambuco is his country and mine; we could not bear to be absent from it so long, and we will either lose our lives in this country or turn you out of it. Even if the Governor General and his Majesty were to command us to retire, we should reply to the command before we obeyed it, and give our reasons for not desisting from the war. The case stands thus: if you chuse to surrender Recife we will grant you the most honourable terms; if you are tired of being shut up there, and wish to take the air for recreation, you may do it; we will receive you right gladly, and give you a smell of the flowers which our muskets produce. Be wise in time, and cease to put yourselves to such costs without profit, for you may give up all hope of ever drawing more from Pernambuco. Even if for our sins we should be compelled to withdraw, (which God will never permit,) we would leave the land as bare as the palm of the hand; and should you plant it again, we would come at the proper season, and in one night burn your year's work. These are not fables, nor words cast upon the wind; for so it shall be. God preserve you, Sirs, and convert you from your false sects and heresies."

Valeroso Lucideno, 334.

CHAP. up that passage through the reef by which Calabar formerly had
 XXI. saved the Dutch fleet. He erected a fort also at Tamandare, at
 1646. the mouth of the bar; and that the work might go on the better,
 a poor man dreamt he had found an image of St. John the
 Baptist among some stones upon the shore. He communicated
 his dream to the priest, the priest communicated it to the peo-
 ple, away they went to the shore, and there, upon the spot
 which the dreamer had seen in his vision, a fine image was found
 among the stones. A more intelligible miracle has never been
 enacted. "God is with me," exclaimed Joam Fernandes at
 this invention, "and the glorious St. John the Baptist, my
 namesake, seeks to do me service! I promise to build a church
 to him upon this place where his image has appeared, as soon as
 God shall have brought the enterprize of our deliverance to a
 happy end!" The fame of this miracle spread throughout the
 province, and the people, delighted by this proof of divine fa-
 vour, and flattered by seeing Fernandes among them, gave libe-
 rally, according to their means, so that considerable supplies of
 flour, pulse, cattle, and sugar were sent to the Camp.

*Vol. Luc.
p. 344.*

*The Dutch
attempt to
intercept the
convoy from
the Potengi.*

The distress being far greater in the city than among the be-
 siegers, deserters frequently came over; some of whom brought
 intelligence that Camaram was completely master of the country
 about the Potengi, and had laid all waste with fire and sword,
 to the very walls of Fort Keulen. This was soon confirmed by
 messengers, who added the welcome news, that a convoy of
 cattle which had been collected there had already reached Pa-
 raiba on its way to the camp; but this joy was allayed by an
 alarm for the safety of the convoy. The Dutch in Itamaraca
 had nearly exhausted their magazines, and as the Indians from
 Recife had been sent thither, it became impossible to feed so many
 additional mouths without obtaining provisions by incursions
 upon the mainland. In Recife they were still more straitened,

because till now they had received some supplies from Itamaraca. A joint expedition, therefore, was now planned from the city and the island; twelve launches sailed from the harbour; they were seen by the Portuguese centinels steering toward Itamaraca, and the Camp-Masters immediately feared for their convoy, which, as they calculated, ought at that time to be at Tejuicapapo, or Goyana. Advice of the danger was dispatched to both places, and followed with all possible speed by two companies, to strengthen the escort. Before they arrived the convoy had past, well guarded, and with trusty guides, Paulo da Cunha remaining with the former escort at Garassu, to rest after a wearying march in most inclement weather.

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XXI.
1646.

Cast. Lus.
7. § 58, 62.

*They are
defeated at
S. Lourenço.*

The vessels from Recife were joined by fifteen from the island, and the whole force consisted of six hundred men, two thirds of whom were Dutch. They made for a port called Maria Farinha, and anchored there, as if about to land. The alarm was given; it was heard at Garassu, and Paulo da Cunha immediately drew out his troops, and posted them in ambush to await the enemy. But the Dutch had only anchored for a feint; as soon as it was dark they put out their oars and hoisted sail, and made all speed for Tejuocopapo, where they landed at day-break, thinking to surprize S. Lourenço. Two sentries saw them land, and agreed that while one remained to watch their movements, the other should run to the settlement. There were about an hundred men among the inhabitants, who retired with their families, and as much of their effects as possible, into a sort of redoubt, erected for such occasions, and fortified with a strong palisade. In these unfortunate Captaincies every man was a soldier, and Agostinho Nuñez, the local commander, happened to be a man of great skill and experience. He sent off a horseman to the Camp for assistance; but the Camp was twelve leagues off, and before these distant succours could arrive the fate

CHAP. of the place would be decided. He appointed Matheus Fernan-
XXI. des, a youth of distinguished courage, to take thirty chosen
1646. horsemen, and harrass them from the woods. With the remain-
ing seventy he prepared for defence; and he proclaimed, that
any woman who set up a lamentation during the attack, should
instantly be put to death. This measure was not necessary, for
the women partook of the spirit by which it was dictated. One
of them, as soon as the assault began, went round the redoubt
with a Crucifix in her hands, haranguing the men, and denounc-
ing vengeance upon the heretics, with a passion like that of the
Anhaguira at Cabedello, but with better fate. Her companions
supplied the soldiers with ammunition and water; and the
Dutch, twice attempting to hew down the palisade, were twice
repelled with loss. A third time they advanced, and succeeded
in making an opening: the women threw themselves into the
gap: they knew what horrors awaited them if the Dutch should
conquer; they were maddened at the sight of the Crucifix, and
the exhortations of the enthusiastic virago who bore it about as
a banner; and they confided in the aid of Saints Cosmo and
Damiano, whose church was in their district. To these saints
the preservation of the place was imputed; it was occasioned
partly by the women; for even in the heat of the assault, ruf-
fians as the Dutch were, they would falter and be confused
when there was no way to advance but by cutting through a
troop of women. But the contest was decided by the little
detachment under Matheus Fernandes: they had severely
annoyed the enemy during their march from the shore, and now
seeing that all was on the hazard, they came out of the woods,
and fell upon the flank of the assailants, pouring in so well-
directed a fire, and attacking them with such fury, that the
Dutch, whom the resistance at the breach had already disheart-
ened, believed nothing but the confidence of numbers could

have given this boldness to the Portugueze, and fled to their vessels, leaving seventy dead on the field. Meantime the horseman who had been dispatched to the Camp arrived there at the same time with Paulo da Cunha, who then perceived how he had been duped. Three hundred men were immediately ordered off, and Vidal with six companies followed as fast as possible: he met the news of the victory, and halted in consequence at Garassu. Here the enemy were seen ere long making for the port, with the design of surprizing the town. Vidal drew out his men, and posted them in two ambuscades: unluckily a German surgeon in his company dropt behind on the way, and riding apace to rejoin the troops, missed his road, and got into the midst of the enemy: alarmed at what they learnt from him, they re-embarked with the utmost speed, and Vidal then returned to the Camp.

Fernandes was by this time returned from his circuit. Shortly afterwards there arrived two Jesuits, whom Antonio Telles had sent with positive orders from the King, that Vidal and Martim Soares should return with all their troops to Bahia, and that Pernambuco should be peaceably relinquished to the Dutch. These instructions were so peremptory that the Camp-Masters were at first confounded, and knew not how to reply. It was intolerable to think of abandoning all the advantages they had gained, and yielding up the country to an enemy whom they so heartily and so justly abhorred; and when Joam Fernandes had recovered from the first shock, he boldly affirmed that the orders ought not to be obeyed: for it was not possible, he said, that the King should have given them, if he could have known what would be the situation of his faithful subjects in Pernambuco at this time. The law of nature was paramount to all laws; its first law was that of self-preservation; but to obey these orders would be delivering themselves over to de-

CHAP.
XXI.
1646.

Cass. Lus.
7, § 62-6.
Nieuhoff.

The Camp-Masters are ordered to retire from Pernambuco.

CHAP.
XXI.
1646.

struction. Let us then, he continued, represent to his Majesty the prosperous state of our arms, and the utter ruin which would follow if his orders were obeyed; and let us continue the war vigorously till he send out fresh instructions. And should it so prove that he should then confirm these orders, for my own part, said the determined patriot, I will never desist from an enterprize so greatly to the service of God and of so Catholic a Prince, as that of delivering myriads and myriads of souls from temporal slavery and from eternal death, both which are certain if they continue in subjection to the heretics. Vidal agreed in this resolution; Soares hesitated: his hesitation and their reply were communicated to the Governor General, and he not daring to take farther responsibility upon himself, sent again to the Camp, and commanded them to obey the King's orders. Soares then advised obedience; Vidal and Joam Fernandes continued firm, and he in consequence gave up his command, and sailed soon afterwards for Lisbon. He had business at court, and in the warm discussion which his advice occasioned, it is said that Vidal upbraided him with preferring his individual interests to the common cause. The reproach was natural, but Martim Soares might have alledged the whole tenour of his life to refute it; nor, although he would have held a higher place in history if he had continued to act with his colleagues, ought he to be censured for leaving them. The orders being positive and explicit, the strength of character required for perceiving when obedience is not the soldier's duty, and for acting upon that conviction, belongs to heroic virtue; and to this, the highest praise that a soldier can desire, Vidal is justly entitled. Joam Fernandes could not have obeyed without becoming a ruined adventurer, dependent upon the charity of a government which disowned him. His conduct, therefore, on this occasion, could not have the merit of Vidal's; neither does his fame require it:

in contemplating his character there is much to subtract from our admiration, but enough is left to admire; his bigotry, his cruelty, his deceitfulness belong to the age; his intrepidity, his perseverance, his wisdom, his high and devoted sense of duty to his country, are his own.

CHAP.
XXI.
1646.

Cast. Lus.
7, § 67, 71.

The orders from Lisbon had not been given without great reluctance on the part of the King, and long vacillation in his councils. Had the struggle lain only between Portugal and Holland, enfeebled as the former country was, the pride of the Portuguese would not have shrunk from the contest; and their patriotism and unweariable patience would have borne them through; for where these virtues meet they are invincible. But Braganza sat insecurely on the throne of his ancestors; the ease with which he had ascended it indicated with what ease he might be thrown down. He had enemies about his own court; some whom jealousy, envy, and discontent had made so; others whose secret hostility was the more dangerous, because it was bottomed upon the deeper principle of revenge; some, perhaps, who conscientiously believed that their allegiance was due to the King of Spain, under whose government they had grown up. It was not to be doubted but that if the Spaniards should obtain any important advantage over him, they would find active co-operation in these persons, and in that worthless crowd which is ever ready to follow the conquering cause. Spain, engaged as it was in other wars, was still an enemy against whose superior force all the vigilance and all the efforts of Portugal were required: what then was to be apprehended if Holland should be provoked to direct and open war? . . . not merely the loss of Brazil and of India, but of Portugal itself. These representations were urged by some of the King's advisers, and their opinion, reasonable as it appeared, would probably have prevailed at the commencement, notwithstand-

*State of the
negotiations
with Hol-
land.*

CHAP. ing the honourable reluctance of Joam to abandon any part
XXI.
1646. of the patrimony which his predecessors had acquired, if the
ambassador at the Hague had not been a man of consum-
mate policy, and so passionately attached to his country, that
he scrupled at no means for promoting its interests. This im-
portant situation was held at this time by Francisco de Sousa
Coutinho, and never did any man discharge a difficult task
with greater skill. When the news of the insurrection first
reached the States, their High Mightinesses regarded it, as
such commotions are usually regarded, with indifference; and
their complaints to the ambassador that the Governor General
fomented the rebellion, were made rather as a matter of form,
than with any real or lively feeling of alarm or resentment. But
Francisco de Sousa saw it in its true light: he knew that the
funds of the West India Company were not equal to carrying
on a long and expensive war: so he advised the King to assist
the insurgents with the utmost secrecy, but with the utmost
exertions in his power: and at the same time, he protested to the
States, that the Pernambucans were acting entirely from them-
selves, and had neither been excited nor assisted, directly or indi-
rectly, by the Court. This artifice succeeded for awhile; but
when fresh intelligence arrived that the insurgents had gained
the battle of Tabocas, had recovered all the southern part of
Pernambuco, and were actually masters of the Varzea, the
Company, whose interests were thus vitally affected, called
upon the States for assistance, and endeavoured to inspire them
with their own vindictive feelings. They obtained a loan of
70,000 florins, and a levy of 3000 men, at the States' expence.
They requested also authority to seize all Portugueze vessels;
this was not granted to the full extent of the demand; but they
were authorized to examine merchant ships, and seize all which
came from Pernambuco, and upon this pretext they captured

all they met. The ambassador now complained in his turn, and was answered in his own manner, that the States gave no encouragement to such proceedings; they had only granted a licence for taking ships from Pernambuco, and such ships could only belong to the insurgents. Francisco de Sousa solicited an audience, that he might propose terms of accommodation; he was told that there needed no accommodation where there was no difference, and there was no difference between the States and Portugal, he having assured them that the King gave no encouragement to the Pernambucan rebels: but all doubts upon that subject would be at an end as soon as their armament reached Recife. The negotiations at Munster were now going on, and it was in the prospect of their near treaty with Spain that the Dutch held this language. Meantime the artifices of Sousa had produced their effect; he had deceived the States so long, that when their determination was taken the winter season had set in, and time was thus gained for the Pernambucans to follow up the advantages which they had gained. But the negotiations at Munster, as they emboldened the States, so they alarmed the Court of Portugal; and it was in the fear of an offensive alliance between Spain and Holland that Joam dispatched those orders to Bahia which Joam Fernandes and Vidal so bravely disobeyed.

CHAP.
XXI.
1646.

CHAP.
XXII.
1646.
Ericcyra,
p. 588.

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1646.

CHAPTER XXII.

Attempt to assassinate Joam Fernandes. Second enterprize against Itamaraca. Recife, when in the utmost distress, relieved by a fleet from Holland. Schoppe returns to take the command, and makes an unsuccessful attempt upon Bahia. Barreto sent out to command the Portugueze. Battle of Guararapes. Recovery of Angola. Negotiations with Holland. Brazil Company established. Second battle of Guararapes. Siege and capture of Recife. Negotiations and final agreement with Holland.

CHAP.
XXII.
1646.

*Attempt to
assassinate
Fernandes.*

The rapid series of successes after the battle of Tabocas silenced all murmurs; and those persons who at the commencement of the insurrection would willingly have returned to submission, and sacrificed Joam Fernandes as an enemy to the public tranquillity, dared not pursue their complots when they saw that he was openly supported by the Governor General. But when the insurgents were now positively disclaimed by the Portugueze Government, and the soldiers who remained to aid them were acting in direct disobedience of positive orders, the discontented again regarded Joam Fernandes as the sole mover of a war which was ruinous to their private affairs, and they renewed their schemes for terminating it by destroying him. He was repeatedly warned of his danger by letters, which stated that the intent was to shoot him, and specified the names of nine-

teen persons who were engaged in the conspiracy : at length, when these reiterated advices produced no effect, the writer went to him, and repeated what he had written, entering into circumstantial details and proofs ; but his zeal was mistaken for malice against those whom he accused, and the man, who really was actuated by an ardent desire to save the champion of his country, had the mortification of seeing himself considered as a calumniator by him whom he was thus anxious to preserve. He went to Vidal with better success, and Vidal, going to Fernandes, remonstrated with him upon his inattention to so important a warning. Fernandes replied, that the accused were related to him, and bound to him by many ties ; if these men sought his death, to whom could he look for protection, or what would it avail to seek it? Upon this Vidal sent for a person in whom he could confide, and who was related to one of the conspirators ; told him what was come to his knowledge, represented to him the certain destruction which would overtake the guilty, should they persist in their plans, and urged him, for his own sake, seeing the infamy of such things, and the consequent ruin which would extend to all who were connected with the criminals, to talk with his kinsman, and induce him to confess the whole treason, promising secrecy, reward, and full pardon. The attempt was made ; the conspirator affected astonishment at the charge, and indignation at the suspicion ; and Joam Fernandes either believed, or affected to believe, that the accusation was groundless. But ere long, coming from one of his sugar-works, and as usual out-riding his body-guard, as he was passing by a thick cane-plantation, three Mamalucos, who were posted there in wait, levelled their muskets at him : two missed fire, the third shot him through the shoulder : he, with his wonted intrepidity, turned instantly to face the foe, sword in hand, but could not leap the fence ; his guard came up, overtook one of the assas-

CHAP. XXII.
 1646. sins and cut him to pieces upon the spot, and set fire to the canes, hoping thus to burn his accomplices; they, however, were seen to escape by persons, who not knowing what had occurred, made no attempt to secure them. Fernandes knew the musquet of the man who was slain, having given it himself to one of the conspirators; but he took no other vengeance than that of privately informing him and his confederates that he knew their guilt, and exhorting them so to act as to deserve the mercy which he had shewed them now, in not delivering them to the indignation of the soldiers. The wound was soon healed.

Cast. Lus.
 7, § 85, 90.

*The Portu-
 guese again
 foiled at
 Itamaraca.*

June 13.

The first enterprize which the Camp-Masters undertook after the departure of Martim Soares was against Itamaraca. There were three places where the channel which separates this island from the main were fordable at the low water of spring tides; and there the Dutch had anchored three guard-ships, for the double purpose of securing the passage against the enemy, and for themselves. The better to deceive the Dutch, Joam Fernandes celebrated the feast of S. Antonio's transit at his own chapel in the Varzea, with the greatest solemnity; volleys of musquetry were fired, and all the artillery of the Camp discharged. This done, he returned to the Camp, and set off in the middle of a dark and rainy night with Vidal and five hundred picked men. The time had been chosen because the Dutch, knowing the devotion of the Portugeuze to S. Antonio, would suppose that they were wholly occupied in the ceremonies of their idolatry, or the rejoicings connected with it: the darkness suited, and even the inclemency of the weather was favourable, by rendering their movements less liable to discovery. They had sent forward two eighteen-pounders, which were planted on a platform, under cover of the mangoes, at Porto dos Marcos, where one of the guard-ships was stationed.

Two boats also had been provided, and some rafts hastily made of no better materials than the palankeen poles of the women of Garassu. Twelve men embarked in each boat, and the rafts followed them; they approached the guard-ship with muffled oars, but they were descried and hailed; the men on watch being answered that they were friends, bade them keep out: they pushed for the ship, thereby showing themselves to be enemies; the Dutch then fired, and with one shot sunk the foremost boat; the men were picked up by the rafts. The second boat got safely on the other side of the vessel, and four of the Portugueze, with their commander Francisco Martins Cachadas, boarded her: the boat was carried away by the current before their comrades could follow them, and these five unsupported men, demeaning themselves as their desperate situation required, won the ship. As soon as it was day the Portugueze prepared with their prize to attack the second guard-ship, at the ford called Tapessuma; but the Dutch, seeing them approach, set it on fire, and the third vessel at the ford of Entre dous Rios was abandoned also. Joam Fernandes now gave orders to erect a fort upon the Praya dos Marcos, where his battery was planted; and leaving Cardozo to complete the projected operations, returned with the greater part of the troops to the Camp, for what remained was not to be effected by force. Some of the gunners at Fort Orange had been bribed to give information where the place might most advantageously be attacked, and to leave the guns on that side unshotted. The correspondence was discovered; but the Dutch abandoned all their other posts to retire into the fort. Cardozo therefore laid the island waste, and carried off eighteen pieces of artillery. Here also a party of Tapuyas forsook the Dutch and joined him, persuaded perhaps by the women whom Martim Soares had sent back.

The desertion of the natives would have been general at this

CHAP.
XXII.
1646.

Cast. Lus.
7. § 75—9.
Nieuhoff,
109.

The Dutch
remove their
Indians.

CHAP. time had it not been for the memory of the cruel wrongs which
 XXII. they had endured from the Portugueze : except this feeling to-
 1646. ward the common enemy, there was nothing to bind them to the
 Dutch, who were themselves the most inhuman of masters, and
 whose cause was now manifestly sinking. The invaders were
 so reduced in numbers that they could not attempt to re-
 lieve Itamaraca ; more than two hundred men could not be
 spared from the city without exposing it to imminent danger, and
 that number would have been insufficient. There were also only
 two barks in the harbour, so that they could neither have trans-
 ported their men, nor have cut off the communication of the
 Portugueze with the mainland. But few as the troops were,
 they were more than could now be supplied with food. A little
 before this time Bullestraet had been sent to the island, to see
 if by any means he could lessen the consumption there, and
 provide supplies for the seat of government. For effecting the
 desired retrenchment, he proposed to give the natives money
 instead of meal, and to supply them with fishing-nets ; forgetting
 that they could already have recourse to the sea, and that sa-
 vages of all men would regard money as worth nothing more
 than what could be obtained in exchange for it, to satisfy their
 immediate wants. The commissioner was of course obliged to
 try more effectual means. Twelve hundred natives, the greater
 part being women and children, whose husbands and fathers
 had fallen in the war, were shipt off for the Potengi a little be-
 fore the attack upon the island. A pound of salt-fish for each
 person, without bread of any kind, was the sole provision for
 their voyage ; they were almost reduced to skeletons when they
 arrived, and this transportation removed the distress rather
 than alleviated it. These poor people had embarked unwilling-
 ly, fearing that the Dutch were about to expose or abandon
 them. An act of treachery in the province to which they were

Jacob Rabbi
 murdered.

bound had excited a deep feeling of indignation and distrust among their countrymen. Jacob Rabbi, the German savage, who had made himself conspicuous by the zeal which he had displayed for the Dutch, and the massacres which he had committed, was murdered by the instigation of Garsman, a Dutch colonel, on his return from a house where they had past the evening together. Duwy, the Tapuya chieftain, was greatly exasperated at this murder; and his resentment cost the Council at Recife a peace-offering of two hundred gilders in money, a thousand ells of Osnaburgh linen, a hundred gallons of Spanish wine, two casks of brandy, forty gallons of oil, and a barrel of powdered beef. The importance of his friendship is shown by the price which was paid for it in a season of scarcity; and the Council, not assenting to the reasons which Garsman offered in justification of his conduct, ordered him into custody.

Itamaraca had been relieved by the removal of these natives; but that island was now laid waste; the garrison had no other resources than what the scanty magazines of Fort Orange contained, and the works which the Portuguese had erected on the opposite shore prevented them from marauding upon the mainland. In Recife the distress was more severely felt: the city was searched for food, and all that could be found was seized for the common stock, a single pound per week being the allowance of bread for soldiers and inhabitants alike. Ere long this miserable pittance was withheld from the inhabitants, that it might be doubled for the garrison, who in their hunger were now beginning to listen to the offers of the enemy. Cats and dogs, which are stated to have been very numerous when the blockade began, were now all consumed; rats had been hunted with such perseverance that the race appeared to be exterminated in Recife; the horses also had all been eaten, and the negroes dug up the rotten bones of such as had been buried, and

CHAP.
XXII.
1646.

Nieuhoff,
103-4.

Famine in
Recife.

CHAP. gnawed them with miserable avidity. Slaves of course suffered
 XXII. even more than their masters ; their faces and bodies were as of
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 1646. living skeletons ; their legs swelled, and many died of inani-  
 tion. No courage, no cunning, no enterprize could relieve  
 them : to venture beyond the protection of the works in search  
 of food was almost certain death. Henrique Diaz and his Ne-  
 groes occupied the nearest station, and carried on the war with  
 the vindictive and unweariable spirit of savages. Wading  
 through mud and water till they were girdle-deep, they hid  
 themselves among the mangoes, so near the walls that none  
 could stir without being perceived : they gave no quarter ; and  
 it was long before the Camp-Masters and their own leader could  
 suppress a ferocious custom which they had established, of car-  
 rying about the heads of the Dutchmen from house to house,  
 as religious mendicants go with a saint in a glass case, and ex-  
 torting money as a remuneration for the spectacle.

*Nieuhoff,*  
*p. 108.*  
*Cast. Lus.*  
*9, § 50.*

*The city re-*  
*lieved by a*  
*fleet from*  
*Holland.*

Month after month had elapsed since the danger of the city  
 and the pressing necessities of the Council had been known to  
 the Home-Council, and still no reinforcements arrived. It is  
 said that a capitulation would have been proposed if the Jews  
 had not used all their influence and entreaties to induce the Go-  
 vernors to hold out. Their condition was desperate ; and they  
 had rightly resolved rather to die sword in hand than surrender  
 themselves to the discretion of a people whom superstition  
 rendered merciless toward them. In this hopeless state of things  
 it was proposed in the Council that they should sally, and break  
 their way through the blockade, or perish at once in the at-  
 tempt : the soldiers were to lead the van, the women, children,  
 and invalids to keep in the middle, and the Members of the  
 Council and the armed inhabitants bring up the rear. That  
 such a proposal was seriously made cannot be doubted, for it is  
 affirmed by Nieuhoff, who was in the city at the time, and who



was perfectly informed of all the measures and councils of the government: it proves that they were reduced to despair, and almost to madness . . . for whither were they to go, or what could they propose to themselves from breaking their way through the blockade, into the midst of a country possessed by a superior and inexorable enemy? There was only rood enough in the city for the allowance of two days more, when two ships with Dutch colours were seen making all sail toward the port: they cast anchor, and by saluting with three guns gave the welcome signal that they were from Holland. "You might have read in all our faces," says Nieuhoff, "the sudden joy we conceived at this relief in our last extremity." Crowds who could scarcely stand crawled to the shore, that they might gaze upon the vessels which brought them life and deliverance; and they were heard, not shouting, but weeping for joy. A golden medal was given to each of the Captains, with this inscription: "The Falcon and Elizabeth relieved Recife." They brought news that a convoy with powerful reinforcements might hourly be expected. Salutes were fired from all the forts, and repeated volleys of musquetry; and at night the same demonstrations of joy were renewed. Like demonstrations were made from the Camp, but from a different cause. It was the festival of St. John the Baptist, which Joam Fernandes was celebrating with peculiar solemnities, because the King's name was John, because his own name was the same, and because he had chosen St. John the Baptist to be his patron in this enterprize for the deliverance of Pernambuco; and lastly, because of the miraculous invention of the image of this very saint upon the shore at Tamandare. For these manifold reasons he confessed and communicated on that day, and feasted all his officers, while the forts of the Camp fired salutes in honour of the Patron Saint. But the rejoicings in the city marred the mirth of the feast, for

CHAP.  
XXII.  
1646.

June 22.

Nieuhoff,  
p. 109.  
Val. Luc.  
p. 351.



CHAP.

XXII.

1646.

*Negociations between Portugal and the States.*

Joam Fernandes apprehended but too rightly the cause, and saw that his own hopes, which had been on the very point of fulfilment, would now be indefinitely delayed.

Francisco de Sousa had exerted all the resources of the most subtle and unscrupulous diplomatic art to delay this armament. He had been bred up in the belief that the end justifies the means, and upon that opinion he acted resolutely. In his own age he was thought worthy of the highest applause, and this reflection in ours may mitigate the condemnation which his conduct deserves. Respecting Brazil he had formed a right judgment, both as to the possibility and importance of recovering the ceded provinces. But the Court of Lisbon was irresolute; and such was the perilous state of Portugal, contending at that time against Castille, with no other support than the deceitful friendship of France, that some of her ablest statesmen thought it better to abandon the Pernambucans, and submit to the loss of half Brazil, than risk the whole, and even the throne of Braganza, by provoking open hostilities from Holland, to whom it was said Brazil had been offered by the Catholic King, on condition that the Dutch would assist him against Portugal. This danger was strongly prest upon the King by some of his counsellors: he listened unwillingly, and hesitated between fear and better feelings. On the one hand, as a Portugeze and a Catholic, he sympathized with the Pernambucans in their patriotism and in their devotion to the Romish faith; while as a King he could not but feel that their generous and unshaken loyalty demanded and deserved correspondent exertions on his part: but he was seated upon the insecure throne of a weak and exhausted country, and had nothing but the spirit and affection of the people to support him; these might suffice for the defence of Portugal, .. for remoter operations they were neither sufficient nor disposable. There are cases in which the



best policy is that which gains time ; and in the present emergency irresolution did as much for Joam as the soundest prudence could have proposed ; for neither daring openly to provoke Holland, nor resolving utterly to desert those who were adventuring every thing for his sake, he left the Governor at Bahia and the minister at the Hague to act as circumstances might induce them, trusting to time and chance, where counsel served only to perplex him.

Few men could so well have been trusted under such circumstances as Francisco de Sousa. But he had to deal with experienced statesmen, who, though they carried the characteristic slowness of their nation into their transactions, saw clearly that the Portugueze minister had been temporizing with them ; and they now called upon him to give a full and explicit account of the intentions of his court, and that so speedily, that if their armament should be required in Brazil, it might not be delayed another season. In reply, he presented a note, stating that he had orders from his Government to treat with them respecting the affairs of Pernambuco, and affecting on his part to be as desirous of haste as they really were. He requested that he might be admitted to a conference in time to save them the expence of an armament, which he averred, from the nature of his instructions, would certainly not be needed. The Dutch refused to listen, saying that he only sought again to delay their preparations. Francisco de Sousa then offered to communicate his instructions, and having some blank papers with the royal signature, he filled up one of them to suit the emergency. The States, however capable of duplicity themselves, did not suspect the possibility of so audacious an artifice ; they fell into the snare, and suspended the preparations. The ambassador informed his own court of what he had done, and begged that the King, in recompence for his services, would order him to be

CHAP.  
XXII.  

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1646.

*Artifice of  
the Portu-  
guese am-  
bassador.*



CHAP. arrested, and cut off his head if necessary to appease the States, XXII. justly offended as they would needs be when they should discover how he had deceived them. Fortunately for him, the 1646. King was at this time inclining to timid counsels; he assured the States, that the insurgents in Pernambuco disregarded his authority as much as theirs; that he had ordered them peremptorily to return to their obedience, and that those orders had been disobeyed. Things being thus, he said, the States were justified in carrying on war against them; but surely this was no reason why they should engage in hostilities with him, who in all points to which his power had extended had faithfully performed the part of an ally. This language extricated the ambassador from the difficulty in which he had so daringly placed himself; for by not disowning his conduct, it threw the whole fault on the pertinacity of the Pernambucans. The States suspected the fact, but made no complaint. Joam secretly approved of what the ambassador had done, and highly esteemed him for it: but it was thought neither decent nor right to express any approbation, nor to confer upon him any reward; for however great the advantage which had arisen, even the casuists of the Portuguese Council felt that it had been procured by direct and deliberate falsehood.

*Ericeyra,*  
1, 638.

*Schoppe returns to Brazil as Commander in Chief.*

The armament which should have sailed in the summer of 1645 was thus delayed till November; the frost setting in prematurely, locked it up in Flushing Roads till February, and then by a series of untoward chances it was not less than six months upon the passage. It took out five new Members of the Great Council, to relieve the old ones, and six thousand troops, besides seamen and volunteers. Schoppe returned in this fleet as Commander in Chief. He came with the confidence which past successes had given him, expecting to find as little concert and as little ability in the Pernambucans as he had formerly encountered; and he expressed this opinion in a manner which seemed



to reflect injuriously upon the conduct of the garrison. Most of the officers heard him in silence, contenting themselves with the belief that the first skirmish would correct his judgement, and perhaps half disposed, in the resentment of offended honour, to wish that it might be thus corrected. One of them, however, observed that the General did not appear to consider the difference which time had produced; . . . the very men who had formerly fled at hearing his name, would now attack him sword in hand. Schoppe happened at this time to call for a cup of water; they brought him such as was to be had in Recife. As soon as he had tasted it he put away the brackish draught, and said he would give them better water by enabling them to fetch it from whence they pleased.

CHAP.  
XXII.  

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1646.

*Nieuhoff, p.*  
110.  
*Cast. Lus.*  
8, § 3.  
Aug. 2.

Accordingly his first attempt was to regain possession of Olin-da, which would have given him water, and laid the country open, access on every other side being defended by the different works of the besiegers. One of those affairs ensued in which the game of war is played upon a small scale with consummate skill: movement was met by counter-movement; each party divined the intentions of the other at every step; reinforcements came to both just when and where they were wanted; and few lives were lost on either side: but Schoppe was defeated in his object, and retired into the city with a wound in his leg. This day's experience made him acknowledge that the character of the enemy was greatly changed since he had last engaged them; and with a mixture of soldierly respect for their courage, and of national pride, he observed, that he never should have thought the Dutch cheese and butter with which he had bred up the lads of Pernambuco would have made them stout and hardy enough to face their old masters. He found also that the men who were now opposed to him were politic as well as brave. The Portugueze rightly imagined that Schoppe would avail

*The Portu-  
guese eva-  
cuate Pa-  
raiba.*



CHAP. himself of all the advantages which the sea afforded him, and  
 XXII. bring his force to bear upon their remotest and weakest points.  
 1646. To lessen, therefore, an evil which they could not prevent, they  
 recalled Camaram from Paraiba, and gave orders that all the  
 inhabitants who had not yet withdrawn from that Captaincy, or  
 from Goyana and its dependencies, should remove now under  
 protection of the troops. The moveable property which they  
 could not carry away they concealed in the woods; and great  
 part of what they attempted to remove they were fain to hide  
 upon the way, for many of the slaves took advantage of this  
 opportunity for recovering the freedom of which they had been  
 robbed, and abandoned their owners in the wilderness. The  
 emigrants were convoyed as far as Garassu, which was to be  
 the frontier of the Portugueze on that side; part remained there  
 under protection of the garrison, and contributing themselves to  
 the defence; others found quarters in the Varzea; the remainder  
 past on to the country about Nazareth. There was land enough  
 for all, and as they carried with them habits of industry, and  
 necessity quickened their exertions, all were so easily and speed-  
 ily provided for, that the Benedictine historian of the war is  
 disposed to represent it as a miracle.

*Cast. Lus.*  
6, § 4—8.

*The Dutch  
propose to  
give no  
quarter.*

Joam Fernandes addressed at this time a letter to the Dutch,  
 well showing <sup>1</sup> the determination with which he and his country-

<sup>1</sup> “The success,” said he, “which we have met with is ample proof that  
 God has been pleased to inflict upon our enemies the punishment of this war for  
 the many outrages committed against this country. You are not ignorant of our  
 strength, which far exceeds yours; and by quitting Paraiba and Goyana we are  
 considerably increased in number, the inhabitants chusing rather to lose their  
 possessions than to endure the indignities which were offered them. This has  
 been the true cause of the insurrection, and not, as has falsely been asserted,  
 because they were unable to satisfy their creditors; for they have abandoned



men had begun the insurrection, and the spirit which would

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more than would have discharged their debts. And if it should so happen that they be not able to maintain themselves, they are resolved to lay all the other Captaincies desolate in the same manner. Beside the Negroes and Tapuyas dispersed from the Potengi to the River S. Francisco, we are at least 14,000 strong: Camaram commands 600 musketeers, Henrique Diaz 800 Negroes, 200 Minas, and 700 Tapuyas: the Tapuyas of the interior are at our disposal whenever we chuse to summon them, and above all, we have God on our side. Your strength did not exceed 600 men before the coming of Schoppe; the succours which he has brought do not amount to above 1200 men, mostly boys; the rest are either sick or dead. I am well acquainted with your numbers, having killed and taken about 2600 of your best soldiers, and 500 Brazilians, besides the wounded who were carried into Recife, and this when our troops had no better arms than pointed sticks and clubs. These are blessings from heaven, and if we could do this without powder and ball, what may we not perform now when we are strengthened with good troops, and provided with sufficient arms and ammunition? Had it not been for respect to the Colonels sent from Bahia, and to the King of Portugal, I had ere this been master of Recife. But if matters are not brought to that happy issue, I will act desperately, and leave neither sugar-works, nor cattle, nor negroes in the country, rather than we will submit to your obedience. Col. Sigismundus Van Schoppe thinks to keep the field against me, as he did formerly; he is grievously mistaken! the inhabitants will not be on his side;...if I heard of one that was I would have him hanged immediately. When were any conquered people ever treated as we were, worse than the vilest slaves? Had we not waited for this opportunity, we should long before have implored help from the King of Spain or of France; or if they had failed us, have had recourse to the Turks and Moors. Let this communication serve as a warning to you; it contains the plain truth: consider what is most for your interest, in which I am ready to serve you; for though your Governors do not direct their letters to me, it is I who have the chief management of this war, the power of the Colonels from Bahia extending no farther than over the troops they brought with them. Be not deceived, for Brazil is not allotted to you. We doubt not but that God will bless our arms: if we fall we shall lose our lives in defence of our holy religion and liberty; and they who refuse to accept our offers will pay for their obstinacy with the loss of their lives, possessions, and debts." *Nieuhoff*, p. 112.



CHAP. bear them through it, though it exaggerated his own force, and  
 XXII. undervalued that of the enemy. He scattered papers also,  
 1646. offering a general pardon and a composition of debts, if the  
 Dutch would evacuate Brazil ; but the enemy were still too powerful and too proud for this, and being elated by their reinforcements, they on their part sent forth proclamations of pardon to the rebels. When this was found ineffectual, Van Goch, one of the new Council, proposed that no quarter should be given for the future : to this it was objected, that in fact quarter was very seldom given at present ; but that if they were openly to declare that the war was to be carried on upon this principle, such of the inhabitants as had hitherto remained quiet might be expected to take arms, and join their countrymen. Nothing, indeed, was needed to exasperate the passionate enmity with which both parties were possessed, owing not only to the cause, but to the nature and character of the war ; for where the numbers engaged were so few, and the leaders personally known to each other, each felt himself individually concerned, and their exertions and animosity were stimulated by personal emulation and asperity and hatred.

*Nieuhoff,*  
*p. 114.*

*Hinderson*  
*sent to the*  
*R. S. Francisco.*

Schoppe, as the Portuguese leaders had foreseen, made a descent upon the northern Captaincies. He found neither enemy nor plunder ; but though the patriots upon this emigration had set fire to the sugar-canes and mandioc plantations, they had not been consumed, owing to the rains, and the Dutch, taking possession of the deserted country, began to raise produce there for Recife. Disappointed in his immediate object, and having considerably diminished his forces, and not a little dispirited them, by many attempts upon the Portuguese positions, he concerted bolder plans, which promised better success. Hinderson was sent with a considerable force to the river S. Francisco, for the double purpose of cutting off the supplies



which the Pernambucans drew from those parts, and of collecting stores there for a more important expedition. His first success was easy; the Portugueze were leisurely demolishing Fort Mauritz, and being unprepared for defence, fled across the river, where the Camp-Master Francisco Rebello was stationed by the Governor General, to protect the Captaincy of Bahia. As the country here abounded with fresh provisions, Nieuhoff was sent from Recife as Commissary, and that faithful traveller, who has preserved for us so much information respecting this portion of history, had nearly lost his life in the river. One evening as he was returning on board, the boat was whirled down by the current and upset; and good swimmer as he was, he could not have escaped if he had not providentially caught hold of a cable which was thrown out to him. Lichthart, who had made his name formidable to the Portugueze, died here suddenly, in consequence of drinking cold water when he was much heated. The Dutch soon also suffered a heavy loss of men: five companies being sent to Orambou, Rebello drew them into an ambush, and cut off an hundred and fifty; but the Pernambucans complained that in the disposal of the booty which he recovered from them he regarded pride more than compassion, for he sent the cattle to Bahia to display the fruit of his victory, instead of remembering that food was wanting in the camp before Recife.

CHAP.  
XXII.  
1646.

*Cast. Lus.*  
8, § 16.  
*Nieuhoff,*  
p. 114.

The greater part of the enemy's naval force had been sent upon this expedition; Schoppe meantime fitted out the rest so secretly as to excite no suspicion in the Portugueze, and set sail early in the year, with the flower of his army. He made for the S. Francisco. Hinderson came out to join him, and the combined force proceeded to Bahia, landed upon the island of Itaparica, opposite the city, and immediately established themselves in a commanding and strong position, which they fortified with four redoubts the ships protecting it on the side of the

*Schoppe sails*  
*for the Re-*  
*concave,*

1647.



CHAP.  
XXII.  

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1646.

*and is at-  
tacked by  
the Portu-  
guese with  
fatal impru-  
dence.*

water. So bold a diversion confused the Governor General; his first thought was to secure the city, by throwing up works to oppose the Dutch on their approach; but while the Portuguese were thus misemployed, the invaders pillaged and laid waste the Reconave. The first measure had been too timid; the second was too rash: Antonio Telles, while throwing up his useless works, had given the enemy time to complete theirs; and then he determined to attack them in their fortified position. Francisco Rebello endeavoured to dissuade him, and his judgement, because of his experience and known intrepidity, seemed to have great weight with the other officers who were summoned to the Council. The Governor, who upon this point was so opinionated that he became angry with those who differed from him, fixed his eye upon Rebello, and said, if there were any man in that Council who wished to find reasons for avoiding the dangers of the assault, he might stay at home in perfect safety. If the attempt failed the Governor alone would be responsible; if it succeeded the benefit would accrue to all: . . . and he promised a reward for Schoppe's head. Rebello was a man of diminutive stature, so that he was usually called the *Rebellinho*, but of a most undaunted spirit; he replied, that it was not for one like him, who had so often beaten the Dutch, to stand in fear of them now; but his Excellency would do well to consider whether it were better for the State to acquire advantage without loss, or to sacrifice lives without advantage. But for himself, since his zeal and his experience were vilified as cowardice, he would let it be seen that he knew as well how to die as to deliver a just opinion. The attempt accordingly was made by twelve hundred men, with desperate intrepidity, and dreadful loss, till Rebello received a ball in his breast, and fell: his wounded spirit alone had made them thus long persist in what was manifestly hopeless, such was the strength of the works and



the position; and upon his death they immediately retired. Above six hundred men were killed in this ill-judged attempt; and in such attempts it is always the bravest who fall: it was the heaviest loss which the Portugueze sustained during the whole of their long contest.

But Schoppe had engaged in an enterprize beyond his strength. Had he suddenly attacked the city, it might probably, as on a former occasion, have easily been won: but the Dutch had learnt by dear experience, that it was easier to take places in Brazil than to keep them when taken; and as a diversion in favour of Recife, little more was to be effected than what the occupancy of the River S. Francisco had already produced. That measure materially distressed the Camp in the Varzea. Joam Fernandes brought the whole of his cattle from all his plantations to the slaughter, and distributed them in rations, the weight of which, says his historian, was regulated more by the necessity of the season than by ordinary usage. The other inhabitants followed his example, and the readiness with which the sacrifice was made prevented all murmurs, though it alleviated the distress only for a time. They looked to the sea also for a resource; fishermen were ordered regularly to go out in those places where they could be protected by the Portugueze fortresses, and the troops were supplied with what was thus taken, while Vidal went to collect provisions in Paraiba, and lay waste the sugar-plantations which the Dutch were raising there. He returned with three hundred head of cattle, and two hundred prisoners, who were mostly runaway slaves. Another expedition to the Potengi and to Seara Morin, a district far to the north of that river, proved more productive, and he brought back to the Camp seven hundred cattle. The Dutch endeavoured to profit by his absence, and made repeated attacks upon the besiegers. They were too weak for any decisive blow;

CHAP.  
XXII.  
1646.

*Cast. Lus.*  
8, 23—9.  
*Rocha Pitta,*  
5, 70—9.  
*Proceedings*  
*at the Camp.*



CHAP. but they kept the Portugueze day and night upon the alarm.  
 XXII. The blockading stations formed a circle of not less than six  
 1646. leagues; and where men were kept together by no other law  
 than that of their own free will, many, as might be expected,  
 requested leave of absence, or absented themselves without that  
 formality, from a lengthened and exhausting service.

*The Portu-  
 gueze can-  
 nonade Re-  
 cife.*

Besides that confidence which the Portugueze derived from a just sense of the goodness of their cause, and an entire faith in their superstition, they were supported by the hope of effectual assistance from Portugal. Upon the arrival of the enemy's reinforcements the Camp-Masters sent Fr. Manoel do Salvador to Lisbon, to represent how nearly they had attained their great object; they fully believed that an armament was at this time preparing in the Tagus to cooperate with them, and the Dutch had the same persuasion: the Dutch believed it because they feared it, and knew how vulnerable they were; the Pernambucans thought that as they did their duty toward their natural government, it was not possible that that Government should refuse to perform its duty toward them. So strongly were Joam Fernandes and Vidal possessed with this opinion, that they concerted in what manner joint operations might best be carried on, when the fleet should arrive to make its attack by sea; and they determined to erect a land-battery in readiness. There was a sort of island, or sand-bank, called the Seca, near Mauritis; the Capivaribi was about musquet-shot wide between this place and the northern bank, and here the river at low-water was only knee-deep; the Dutch, therefore, had built a fort here, because if the besiegers were in possession of this spot, both Mauritis and Recife would be exposed to their guns. The Camp-Masters discovered a spot from whence this bulwark and the city were both commanded, and here they resolved to erect a battery. Having collected all the materials, they left Joam Soares de Al-



buquerque in charge of the Camp, and repaired to the station of Henrique Diaz, for the purpose of directing the work. The chosen spot was covered with brushwood, which concealed their operations. The Leaders set the example of working with the spade at the foundations; and this so excited both officers and men, that when the inhabitants offered slaves for the labour, the offer was refused: this was, perhaps, as much a point of prudence as of honour, secrecy being essential to the success of the undertaking. It was carried on with the most perfect silence; and when the building began to appear above the thicket they worked only by night, and covered the walls at day-break with green boughs. The Dutch had some intimation of what was going on, but no information on which they could depend; nor had they force enough in Recife to ascertain the fact in a sally, which might destroy, or at least impede, the works; for the approaches were well protected by cannon. The battery was at length completed, with a deep trench supplied from the river, and defended by all the means of art within the knowledge and power of the besiegers: the woods in front were then felled, and a fire was opened, the effect of which is described even as more dreadful by the Dutch than by the Portuguese historian. Most of the inhabitants hid themselves in vaults, for Nieuhoff says the consternation which it caused is not to be expressed; and the scenes of horror which he witnessed, and in which he narrowly escaped, justify the fear of those who were not called upon by duty to expose themselves. As he went the rounds, two men with whom he was conversing were killed by a cannon-shot, and a third, in the act of lighting his pipe, had both his hands shot off. A niece of Lichthart was paying a marriage-visit to one of her friends, near Nieuhoff's house; a dreadful scream from their apartment drew him to their assistance; the bride was lying dead, and the guest, both whose legs had been carried off, catch-

CHAP.  
XXII.  
1647.  
October.



CHAP. ing his knees, clung there with such a force of agony, that with  
 XXII. all his strength he could scarcely pull her from her hold. This  
 1647. faithful writer lived in an age when the feelings of humanity were  
 possessed by few, and there were none who pretended to them; he was familiarized not merely to the ordinary events of war, but to cruelties which harden the heart; yet these horrors came so close, and affected him so deeply, that he thought proper to record them: nor ought such things, incidental and undecisive as they are, to be always left unnoticed in history. A true sense of the evils of war can never be impressed too strongly upon mankind: woe be to those through whose guilt they are inflicted, . . . and woe be to those also who shrink from enduring them when duty requires the sacrifice.

*Cast. Lus.*  
 8, § 36.  
*Nieuhoff,*  
 p. 118.

*Schoppe re-  
 called from  
 Bahia.*

*Nieuhoff,*  
 119.  
*Cast. Lus.*  
 8, § 38.

*Vasc. Vida  
 de Almeida,*  
 Vl. 5, § 5—  
 6.

The harbour, as well as the streets, was commanded, and the Dutch were compelled to remove all their ships. By day the Portuguese continued the cannonade, and by night they harassed them with repeated assaults, in one of which they stormed and sacked Nassau's palace. The besieged had no resource but to recal Schoppe to their assistance. He on his part found his situation at Itaparica daily becoming more unpromising. The invincible patience of the Portuguese was now fully understood, and might well dishearten him: it was apparent that the individuals of the nation were prepared for every sacrifice and every endurance, and that their efforts more than counterbalanced the remissness of their government. When application was made from Bahia to Rio de Janeiro for succours, the Provincial of the Jesuits wrote to the College in that city, and that indefatigable order sent a ship with supplies. Aid also was now confidently expected from Portugal, for after this attack upon the Reconcave both parties naturally supposed that all farther temporizing would be useless. Schoppe summoned Hinderson to his assistance from the S. Francisco, whither he had returned;



but even when thus strengthened he was not able to act with effect, and his recal came in time to save him from the reproach of a retreat, or perhaps from destruction. A week after his departure, the Count de Villa Pouca, Antonio Telles de Menezes, arrived as Governor General, bringing out reinforcements in twelve ships, five of which were destined to act against Angola. The Dutch squadron having landed Schoppe at Recife, returned to infest the Reconcave. The Portuguese fleet was ordered out to give them battle; three ships got under weigh, and made for the enemy, . . . but the commander, finding in discipline an excuse for imbecility or cowardice, did not come out to support them. One was burnt, and D. Affonso de Noronha, second son of the Conde de Linhares, perished in her; . . . a youth of high promise, who had given proof of his patriotism by coming from Madrid to take part in the deliverance of his country. The second ship was taken; the third put back, without having been engaged: and the heroic courage which was displayed by those who did their duty did not cover the disgrace which their more numerous comrades that day brought upon the Portuguese navy.

The danger to which Bahia had been exposed was foreseen, and the King of Portugal forewarned of it by Antonio Vieyra the Jesuit, a man extraordinary, not in eloquence alone, but in all things. Te Deum had been sung in the Royal Chapel at Lisbon for the capture of Dunkirk by the French, and the ministers and chief persons about the court kissed hands upon the good news in their gala suits. When this ceremony was over Vieyra told the King that he came to offer his condolence upon the occasion. The King asked him wherefore: Because, he replied, the Dutch till now have been obliged to keep a squadron off Dunkirk to secure the passage of the channel for their ships: being in alliance with France, this is no longer

CHAP.  
XXII.  
1647.

*Misconduct  
of the Por-  
tuguese fleet.*

*Ericeyra,  
l. 648.*

*Money rais-  
ed for Bra-  
zil by Vieyra  
the Jesuit.*



CHAP. necessary ; the force which is thus rendered disposable will be  
XXII. directed against us, and Schoppe will be enabled to do what he  
1647. threatened in the time of Diogo Luiz de Oliveira, . . . that is,  
make himself master of every thing without the expence of a  
drop of blood, merely by cutting off all supplies with his fleet.  
But Vieyra, in pointing out the danger, was at no loss for a  
remedy. A Dutchman in Amsterdam, he said, had offered to  
contract for fifteen thirty-gun ships, and deliver them at Lis-  
bon by the ensuing March, at 20,000 cruzados each. An un-  
usually rich fleet had just arrived from Brazil, bringing not less  
than 40,000 casks of sugar, which had been bought cheap, and  
was selling dear ; an impost of a testoon or of six vintems the  
*arroba* upon this sugar would raise the whole sum required.  
The King desired him to state this proposal upon paper ; and  
after a few days he told Vieyra that it had been laid before his  
ministers, and their reply was, that the business was very crude.  
Some months afterwards the King sent for Vieyra at an early  
hour from Carcavelos, where he was recovering from an illness,  
to Alcantara. " You are a prophet," said he : " News arrived  
from Bahia last night that Schoppe has fortified himself in Ita-  
parica : what shall we do ?" Vieyra replied, " The remedy is  
very easy. Your ministers said my project was crude ; since  
they found it crude then, let them cook it now." A Coun-  
cil was held, and Vieyra, by the King's desire, waited on him  
the next day to know the result. They had all agreed upon the  
necessity of relieving Bahia ; but it would require 300,000 cru-  
zados, and they knew no means of raising that sum. When  
Joam had told him this, the Jesuit indignantly exclaimed, " A  
King of Portugal is told by his ministers that there are no  
means of raising 300,000 cruzados, to succour Brazil, which is  
all that we have left ! I in this patched frock here trust in God  
that this very day I shall provide your Majesty with the whole



sum!" Immediately he hastened to Lisbon, and wrote to a merchant whom he had formerly known in Bahia, saying, the King wanted a loan to that amount, which would be repaid by a tax upon sugar. In two hours this Duarte da Sylva and another merchant promised the money. Vieyra accordingly took them to the King, and the business was managed so that the ministers had the whole credit to themselves.

The Portugueze minister in Holland, insincere as he himself was in transactions with the States, was fully persuaded at this time that they dealt sincerely with him, and that peace would soon be concluded. Important negotiations were going on with France; the ambassadors at Paris and at the Hague differed materially in their dispatches, and the King had reason to suspect that each represented affairs more according to the wishes of his court than to the real state of things, . . . a perilous mode of flattery in times so arduous. He resolved, therefore, without imparting his design to any of his ministers, to send to both courts a man on whose judgement and perfect sincerity he could implicitly rely. Vieyra was the person. The pretext for his journey was a mission to accompany Dom Luiz de Portugal (the grandson of the Prior D. Antonio) to the Conferences at Munster: but it was arranged that he should arrive too late, and that the Jesuit should then employ himself wholly on this secret business, and return as soon as possible to make his verbal report to the King. Vieyra soon discovered that the Dutch entertained the greatest hopes from Schoppe's expedition to Bahia, and that however earnestly they might affect to negotiate, no treaty would be concluded till the result of that attempt was known. He saw also that the contest was becoming unpopular in Holland. The convoy for Recife was twice compelled to put back by storms, having lost several ships, and the men dying fast by disease; so that a notion began to prevail,

CHAP.  
XXII.  
1647.

*Cartas de  
Vieyra, T.  
2, C. 118.*

*Vieyra is  
sent to Hol-  
land.*

*Vieyra Car-  
tas, T. 2, C.  
118, T. 1,  
C. 3.*



CHAP. that Providence did not favour their designs upon Brazil. His  
 XXII. advice therefore was, to hasten the equipment of the fleet, and  
 1647. cut off supplies from the enemy.

*Barreto sent  
 out to take  
 the command  
 in Pernambu-  
 buco.*

*811 D 2*

*at 811 D 2*

*at 811 D 2*

*Cast. Lus.  
 8, § 40—3.*

*Cast. Lus.  
 8, § 41.*

*Cast. Lus.  
 8, § 41.*

But this exertion on the part of Portugal was so long delayed that Schoppe had time to do all the mischief in his power. His recal enabled the Dutch to resume the offensive at Recife, and they in their turn began to annoy the besiegers from a mortar-battery; but their engineer was killed; one who was brought from Paraiba to succeed him was deficient in skill; and on the other hand, the Pernambucans could not continue their destructive cannonade for want of powder. Ceasing their efforts here, they directed them against distant parts, and the country about the Potengi was again laid waste by Diaz, with his usual success and his usual inhumanity; "the fire," says the Benedictine historian, "consuming whatever had value, the sword whatever had life." The ravagers themselves were shocked, after storming a fortified post in the night, at discovering in the morning, that not men alone, but women and children of their own colour had been slaughtered in their undistinguishing ferocity. Incursions of this kind occupied the ruffian part of the insurgents, to whom war was at once a profession and a pastime, and kept up the spirit of the army. The arrival of a fleet at Bahia, which brought no succours for Pernambuco, might have disgusted men whose principle of loyalty was less faithful, and have discouraged minds less resolute. Never had eyes been turned more longingly toward the sea than those of the Portuguese, expecting every hour to see the sails appear which were to bring them victory, and the reward of their long labours. When they were undeceived, they extracted from the bitter disappointment a proud and generous consolation: the work then, they said, would be wholly their own, and the merit and the fame would be also theirs exclusively. They had not, how-



ever, been so entirely neglected as they supposed; for Francisco Barreto de Menezes had been sent out, with the rank of Camp-Master-General, to take the command in Pernambuco, bringing with him three hundred men, arms and ammunition, in two small vessels. Small as this escort was, it ought not to have been risked without some naval force to escort it; and it was an act of worse imprudence to supersede such men as Vidal and Joam Fernandes, in a command for which they were far better qualified than the best European soldier possibly could be. The Dutch obtained information of his sailing, and intercepted the ships off Paraiba, where, after some unavailing resistance, both vessels were taken, and Barreto was carried prisoner into Recife. After remaining nine months, he escaped by the help of Franciscus de Bra, son of the officer to whom he was given in charge: the young villain ran away from his parents, turned traitor to his country, and renounced his religion. The Portugueze rewarded him, as policy required; but it is a curious indication how low their sense of honour had fallen, or how completely bigotry had perverted it, that they should have conferred upon such a subject the Order of Christ!

CHAP.  
XXII.  
1648.

*His capture  
and escape.*

*Cast. Lus.  
8, § 45.  
Ericcyra.  
p. 667.  
Rocha Pitta,  
5, § 86.*

To men less disinterested, or of less devoted patriotism than Joam Fernandes and Vidal, Barreto, under such circumstances, would have been no welcome visitor. But the undissembled joy, the frankness and the respect with which they received him, produced the best effect upon a generous mind, and perfect confidence was established between them; so that an appointment which might so easily have proved fatal to the cause of the Portugueze in Pernambuco, displayed more fully the virtues which it put to the trial. No sooner did the Count de Villa Pouca know of Barreto's escape, than he dispatched orders to Joam Fernandes and Vidal to deliver up the command into his hands. The Pernambucans murmured loudly at this; but the

*The insur-  
gents request  
succours  
from Bahia,  
but in vain.*



CHAP. unanimity of the three commanders, for such in reality they  
XXII. became, satisfied them that all was going on well. Barreto took  
1648. the command in appearance, and conformed himself in every  
thing to the advice of the Camp-Masters. In the course of the  
insurrection they had overrun an hundred and eighty leagues of  
country; from Seara Morim to the River S. Francisco; they  
had taken in the different forts nearly eighty pieces of cannon,  
and killed and captured, according to their own account, not  
less than eighteen thousand persons: and when they delivered  
up their charge they had two months provisions for the army,  
twenty-four *contos* in specie, and the amount of eighteen thou-  
sand cruzados more in effects, or in sure debts. It was known  
at this time that fresh forces were fitting out in Holland; report  
said that the States furnished ships, the Company men, and the  
Jews money. Certain advices came from Lisbon that the ex-  
pedition was against Brazil; many believed that Bahia was the  
point which would be attacked, but the leaders never doubted  
that the great object of the Dutch must be the relief of Recife,  
which, but for the want of ammunition on their part, would ere  
this have fallen. They sent Paulo da Cunha to Bahia, to repre-  
sent in how critical a point the contest stood; that they had  
opportunity in their favour, but means of every kind were want-  
ing. The Conde de Villa Pouca received him honourably,  
heard him attentively, and dismissed him with empty promises.  
He repaired to the Senado da Camara, and entreated the magis-  
trates that they would use their influence with the Count, and  
appeal to the people also, in behalf of their Pernambucan bre-  
thren. Stores and food were abounding in Bahia, while the  
patriotic army was suffering severe privations for want of one,  
and disabled for want of the other from effecting a conquest of  
such unspeakable importance to Brazil and Portugal. But his  
application was received with silent indifference, and the brutal



insensibility of men who were equally dead to the welfare of their country and the sufferings of their countrymen, has been stigmatized by the historian of Joam Fernandes as it deserves. While Paulo da Cunha was thus vainly employed, the expected fleet arrived, and entered the port of Recife with colours flying and the joyful salutes of artillery from ships and shore. It brought out six thousand men, and the Dutch had thus once more a decided superiority of numbers.

Once more they tried the effect of promises and proclamations. Papers were distributed offering an amnesty to all persons, Hoogstraten alone excepted, who should present themselves within ten days; but after that time neither sex nor age would be spared, for the Tapuyas and Pitagoares would then be let loose; and the Dutch protested before God and the world that the horrors which must ensue were not to be laid to their account. Joam Fernandes, who seems to have been as ready to dispute with the pen as with the sword, replied to these papers at considerable length, telling the Dutch that the time was past when Catholick simplicity had trusted in the promises of heretics, and regarded those as men who were properly designated by the church as monsters. The Portugueze, he added, were sufficient in numbers, and confident of success; nor did they require stores or ammunition, though indeed they had both in superabundance, for it was well known that they made more use of the sword than of the musquet, of iron than of lead. Camaram and Diaz also published a reply; they, they said, were too well instructed to listen to the *protestations* of *Protestants*; and the only use they should make of the Dutch proclamations would be to convert them into cartridges, and send them back with the proper answer enclosed. The leaders however perceived the necessity of contracting their limits; they called in their troops from Garassu, Pao Amarello, Juguaribe, Paratibi,

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1648.

*The Dutch receive reinforcements.*

*Cast. Lus. 8, § 46.*

*The Camp-Masters contract their operations.*

*Cast. Lus. 8. § 51—9.*



CHAP. and Olinda, destroyed most of their stations, and confined them-  
 XXII. selves between Serinhaem and Moribeca ; and they ordered all  
 1648. the inhabitants of the Varzea, who were capable of bearing arms,

*Diminution  
 of the Por-  
 tuguese  
 force.*

to repair to the Camp, offered a general pardon to all delinquents, and denounced severe punishment against those who in this emergency should disobey the summons. But many spirits had now yielded under the perpetual disappointment of their hopes, and upon taking a muster, the whole force was found to amount only to three thousand two hundred men ; they were such men as their commanders could rely on in any difficulty : and with this force, small as it was in number, they determined to offer battle to the enemy, whenever and wherever they could meet him. The Dutch, who expected on the arrival of their last reinforcements, that the blockade must necessarily be given up, were surprized at the perseverance of the besiegers : not supposing that it could proceed from the character of the people and their leaders, they imagined that Barreto had brought them certain assurance of support, and under this apprehension they suspended their own movements.

*Schoppe  
 takes the  
 field.*

But when the continued inactivity of the Portugueze made it manifest that they were not strong enough for offensive operations, the enemy resolved to take the field ; and they prepared for the expedition with a public fast and prayers, which the Portugueze, as proceeding from heretics, call useless, superstitious, and diabolical. Schoppe's intention was to take possession of Moribeca, and from thence cooperate with the fleet which was to make for Nazareth. His first movement was fortunate. He attacked the Estancia da Barreta, where Bertholameu Soares Canha was stationed with a garrison of eighty men. Not aware of the numbers by which he was attacked, this officer sallied against them ; more than half his men were killed, he himself was wounded and made prisoner, and the fort was taken.



Meantime the Portugueze held a council of war; some were of opinion that it would be hopeless to resist so superior a force in the field; that they ought to retire to Cape St. Augustines, and then by favour of the woods weary out the enemy in protracted warfare; but the Camp-Masters protested that their cause would be ruined if they were thus to give up all the advantages they had gained; and they resolved to take post at the foot of the Guararapes, a range of hills under which the enemy must pass.

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1648.

The Guararapes, hitherto the most memorable scene in the military history of Brazil, are between three and four leagues south of Recife, about three leagues west of the Camp, and two leagues north west from the fort which the Dutch had just won. The skirts of this range extend to within three miles of the sea, the intervening space being flat and swampy; from thence they rise gradually to a great height, and derive their name from the roaring of their torrents. Where the range comes nearest to the sea, the only road is by a slip of firm land about a hundred paces wide, between the foot of the hills and a long swamp; a situation strikingly resembling the pass of Thermopylæ; and the entrance to this pass is between a lake which forms the swamp, and a thicket extending from the mountains. Moribeca, to which the Dutch were marching, was a league beyond, . . . a small place, but of considerable importance, because of its populous neighbourhood. The Portugueze took possession of this pass, and the nature of the ground was such that the enemy could not see them as they approached. The next morning at day-break a slave arrived, who having been made prisoner at the Barreta, had escaped during the night from the Dutch camp; the centinels, hearing him in his flight, beat the alarm; in the confusion which ensued Bartholameu Soares also found means to fly: and the Camp-Masters thus obtained full information of the movements and strength of the enemy. A party

Battle of  
Guararapes.

April 18.



CHAP. was sent out to skirmish with and decoy them on; and the  
 XXII. Dutch, entering upon the pass, found the Pernambucan army  
 1648. ready to receive them upon ground where their numbers could  
 be of no advantage. The Portugueze had no artillery, and little  
 ammunition; their orders were, not to fire till every shot could  
 take effect, and after one discharge, immediately to close, sword  
 in hand. The battle was well contested; Vidal had two horses  
 killed under him; and that on which Joam Fernandes rode bore  
 away a singular mark of this memorable day, one of his ears  
 being perforated by a musquet-ball. A Dutch soldier seized  
 this horse by the reins, and aimed a blow at the rider, thinking,  
 perhaps, that by that single blow the war might be concluded:  
 Fernandes saved himself by cutting off the arm which was raised  
 against him. The enemy were defeated, but not routed; the  
 wreck of the army covered their retreat, and they retreated in  
 the night, carrying off their wounded, while a tempest of rain  
 and wind and thunder concealed their movements. The wound-  
 ed were conveyed by water from the Barreta to Recife. They  
 left twelve hundred dead upon the field, of whom an hundred  
 and eighty were officers; Haus, who had returned to serve in  
 Brazil, was one. Schoppe received a ball through the heel,  
 which made him a cripple during the remainder of his life. Two  
 pieces of artillery were taken, and the whole of the baggage,  
 among which, it is said, there were chains for the inhabitants of  
 the Varzea, whom the Dutch intended to carry away prisoners.  
 The conquerors buried their dead where they fell, with such  
 honours and ceremonies as the time and place permitted: eighty  
 four Portugueze had fallen; somewhat more than four hundred  
 were wounded. The loss of the Negroes and Indians is not stat-  
 ed. The war continued some years longer, but this victory decided  
 the fate of Brazil. So little had it been expected by the timid  
 government at Bahia, that the Count de Villa Pouca, believing



it impossible for the Pernambucans to resist the enemy's superior force, had ordered a detachment of five companies to the River S. Francisco to protect the fugitives. When the news arrived, and the Dutch standards, which the Camp-Masters sent as trophies, they were received with the utmost rejoicings, though these rejoicings ought to have awakened shame in the Chamber and in the Governor General, thinking how little they had contributed to the cause. In Pernambuco and all the provinces to which the war extended, the sacrament was exposed on the Sunday after the battle.

Schoppe never appeared so vigorous and enterprizing at any time as now. No sooner had he reached Recife, after the severest defeat which the Dutch had yet sustained in Brazil, than he prepared to take advantage of the distance of the enemy. In the morning he entered the city, and in the evening he sent a party to occupy Olinda, where he meant to send the sick and wounded, that they might have the benefit of better air and good water. A far more important advantage was given him by the misconduct of the officer at the Asseca, that battery which had so long annoyed, and at one time so greatly endangered, Recife. A garrison had been left there, sufficient, not merely to resist a sudden assault, but to stand a siege; yet it was given up without resistance; and when the Camp-Masters, on their return to the Bom Jesus, went round to visit the stations and relieve the garrisons, they were thunderstruck at finding this, the most important of all, in the hands of the enemy. The officer's conduct was subjected to an enquiry; and the result was, that he was acquitted by his judges, but not by public opinion: indeed during the whole war not a single Portugueze was punished for misconduct, though so many and such gross instances had occurred.

Olinda was immediately reoccupied; but the Asseca was too

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1648.

*Cast. Lus.*  
9, § 5-40.

*The Dutch  
after their  
defeat win  
the Asseca  
battery.*

*Cast. Lus.*  
9, § 41-2.  
*Vieyra Ser-  
moens, T. 8,  
p. 395.*

*Death of  
Camaram.*



CHAP. well fortified to be taken without better means than the Portu-  
 XXII. gueze at that time possessed; and the joy of the Dutch at being  
 1648. thus relieved from the worst horror of a siege diverted in some  
 degree their thoughts from the defeat which they had just sustain-  
 ed. They had also another cause for joy, in the death of their in-  
 defatigable enemy Camaram, who died soon after the battle, . . . a  
 man of singular ability, and distinguished military talents. His  
 Indian name was Poty, the Prawn, which the Portugueze, ac-  
 cording to their custom, translated: Philip IV. had given him the  
 order of Christ, the title of Dom, and the rank of Governor and  
 Captain-General of all the Indians. He was affable to his followers,  
 courteous with strangers, and dignified toward his superiors, so  
 tempering his manners as to obtain equally the love and respect  
 of all. Though he spoke Portugueze well, he always conversed  
 with strangers and persons of rank through an interpreter, lest  
 any defective pronunciation or impropriety of speech might  
 seem to derogate from that dignity which it was his pride to  
 preserve. He read and wrote well, and had some knowledge of  
 Latin. "Well were the pains bestowed," says Fr. Manoel do  
 Salvador, "which the Fathers of the Company and the other  
 Religioners employed upon this Indian! every day he heard  
 mass, and repeated the service of Our Lady; and he carried  
 always upon his breast two images, one a Crucifix, the other of  
 the Virgin." It is remarkable, that often as he was in action,  
 he scarcely ever received a wound. They buried him in the  
 Church of the Camp, with the highest funeral honours. He was  
 succeeded in his post by his cousin D. Diogo Pinheiro Cama-  
 ram, a brave man, who had obtained the Order of Santiago for  
 his services.

*Val. Luc.*  
*p. 165.*

*Cast. Lus.*  
*9, § 52-3.*

*Schoppe lays*  
*waste the*  
*Reconcave.*

The Dutch were still masters of the sea, and as soon as the  
 fleet from Bahia had sailed for Portugal, Schoppe made a se-  
 cond expedition to the Bay, laid waste the Reconcave as far as



he durst venture from the shore, totally destroyed two and twenty sugar-works, and returned laden with booty. During his absence Barreto permitted the native troops to go to their own homes, where they might recover strength, and maintain themselves; . . . a thing of material importance, now when the scarcity was in the Camp instead of the City: for the enemy's cruisers amply supplied Recife from the prizes which they brought in. For though the two countries were still nominally at peace, Dutch squadrons were continually cruising off the coast of Portugal, and in the latitude of the Azores, and captured all Portuguese ships. When this was complained of to the Dutch Government, it was replied that the cruisers were piratical adventurers, whom the United States did not acknowledge, and could not suppress; . . . the same answer which Portugal always made respecting the Pernambucans, and with the same degree of sincerity. But south of the line there needed no dissimulation; all there was fair prize, and Recife offered a ready market, and safe means of sending either produce or remittance to Europe. Great as the evil was to Portugal, it was increased by the villany of many captains in the merchant service, who, taking up goods upon credit, and then secretly disposing of them, threw themselves in the way of the Dutch cruisers, that the loss of ship and cargo might serve as a discharge from all demands. Thus by the cruising system the Dutch were enabled to carry on the war, and the prizes which were gained in this sort of lottery made it popular.

*Injury sustained by the Portuguese commerce.*

*Cast. Lus. 9, § 54—6.*

Meantime they experienced both loss and disgrace in a quarter where they had little reason to apprehend either. Salvador Correa de Sa, a fidalgo of that family by whom the French had been expelled from Rio de Janeiro, and the city founded, projected an expedition for the recovery of Angola, and obtained the secret assent of his court. He returned, therefore, from

*Expedition for the recovery of Angola.*

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1648.



CHAP. Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro, with the appointment of Governor  
XXII. there; five ships were awaiting him, in conformity to the in-  
1648. structions which the Conde de Villa Pouca had taken out. As  
soon as he landed, he convoked the magistrates and chief per-  
sons of the city, and told them he was authorized by the King  
to erect a fort in the Bay of Quicombo, on the Angolan coast,  
in order to secure a supply of Negroes for Brazil: from respect  
to the truce he was forbidden to make war against the Dutch:  
but certain it was that the King ought not to condemn him, if  
he could, notwithstanding the truce, recover by force those  
places which the Dutch, during the same truce, had by force  
deprived them of; and this he hoped to accomplish, if the peo-  
ple of Rio de Janeiro, whom it most concerned, would enable  
him. The proposal was well received; a donative of 55,000  
*cruzados* was immediately raised, and nine hundred men enlist-  
ed: he freighted six additional ships, purchased four others at  
his own cost, and departed with fifteen sail, stored for six  
months. They reached Quicombo Bay, and anchored there.  
The next day there was so great a swell, without any apparent  
cause, that it was deemed preternatural; for boats which were  
fishing at the time without the bay, felt neither wind nor any  
unusual agitation: and during the night, it being clear moon-  
light, and no wind stirring, the Admiral's ship made a signal of  
distress, and in a moment went down; only two of her crew  
escaped, and thus strangely were three hundred and sixty men  
lost. Much as his force was weakened by this inauspicious be-  
ginning, Salvador Correa was not discouraged; he called a coun-  
cil, and told his officers that when the King instructed him to  
preserve peace with the Dutch, those instructions must have  
been given in the persuasion that the Dutch were contented  
with what they had gained, and were not attempting farther  
encroachments; but since his arrival he had learnt that they were



making war upon the Portugueze in the interior, and he felt it his duty to stand by his countrymen, against a people whom no treaties could bind. He was answered by a general exclamation, that they would either win Angola, or the Kingdom of Heaven in attempting it; . . . they would root out the heresy which for seven years past the Dutch had been sowing in that land of true christianity.

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Immediately he set sail for Loanda, carrying no admiral's flag, that the enemy, seeing none, might suppose other forces were on the way to join him, which he also carefully reported. The first person whom they took informed them that a detachment of three hundred Dutch, with three thousand natives, were acting against the Portugueze at Massangano, whom they straitened so closely, that it was not possible for him to have any communication with them. This state of things, according to any interpretation of the truce, justified him in taking hostile measures; but persisting in that system of professing peace while making war, to which Portugal was induced by a sense of her weakness and of her wrongs, he sent a flag to the Governor, saying, the expedition which he commanded had been sent to erect a fort in a part of the country separated from what the Dutch possessed, for the purpose of opening and maintaining a communication with the Portugueze of the interior: but finding in what manner those Portugueze were oppressed and persecuted by the Dutch, he felt it his duty to act in their defence, though he risked his head by thus disobeying his orders. There could be no better opportunity; he knew the garrison were so weakened that they could not defend themselves, and therefore required them to spare all needless bloodshed by surrendering upon favourable terms. The Dutch were startled by this bold language, and demanded eight days to consider how they should act: he allowed them two, and instructed his messengers on

*Salvador  
Correa lands  
and com-  
pletely suc-  
ceeds.*



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1648.

their return, at the expiration of that term, to keep the white flag flying if the enemy should have agreed to surrender, otherwise to hoist a red one, that not a moment might be lost. Meantime he got his force ready, consisting of six hundred and fifty troops, and two hundred and fifty seamen, giving them all new clothes, as an encouragement to the service. The Dutch also collected all the force they could muster in the fort of the Morro de S. Miguel, which commanded the town, and that of N. Senhora da Guia on the beach; and having gathered courage during the delay, they determined upon resistance. No sooner was the red flag seen, than the signal-gun was fired, and Salvador Correa, who was already in his boat, led the way, the others following. Only an hundred and eighty men were left on board the fleet, but many figures were dressed up with hats, and placed in conspicuous situations, that the Dutch might believe the ships to be well manned. They landed about two miles from the city, without opposition: their first business was to hear mass; that done, Salvador Correa mounted on horseback, and advanced to take possession of a Franciscan convent, which commanded the beach, and also the watering-place of Mayanga. The Dutch made a show of resistance, but fled at the first attack; encouraged by this success, he pursued, though it was in the burning heat of noon, entered the city, and occupied the Jesuit College and the Governor's house. He now learnt that Fort S. Antonio was evacuated; upon which he immediately occupied that also, and found there eight pieces of cannon, only two of which had been spiked. With the six, and four others which he had landed, he erected two batteries upon the church, which stood opposite the Morro de S. Miguel, upon equally high ground, the two heights being separated by a ravine. The guns did little hurt to the fort, but they contributed to dishearten the Dutch, who from the rapidity of Correa's opera-



tions judged him to be strong in numbers. He, however, was playing an anxious and a desperate game; intelligence had now reached him that the Portugueze of Masangano had been defeated, and being hopeless of relief, were resolved to surrender the place: he knew also his own weakness, but he knew that audacity alone could save him, and that by a bold stroke every thing might be gained: better, too, to die honourably, than after exceeding his orders, to retire with defeat, and bear back tidings that Angola was totally lost. At day-break, therefore, he led his nine hundred men against the Morro, which was garrisoned by twelve hundred Europeans, and as many Negroes, and bravely assaulted the place; he was repulsed, with the loss of one hundred and sixty three killed and one hundred and sixty wounded; more than a third of his force was thus lost. He ordered the drums to beat a retreat, that he might prepare for a second attempt; the Dutch imagined that this was the signal for assault, and being panic-stricken by the desperate valour which had already been manifested, they hung out the white flag. Salvador Correa, who dreaded lest the real state of his army should be discovered, would allow them only four hours to conclude the capitulation: terms were soon adjusted, not for themselves alone, but for all the Dutch in Angola, and above two thousand men laid down their arms to less than six hundred. It was too late to remedy their folly when they discovered it, and Salvador Correa, with the right spirit of a soldier, and the characteristic feelings of a Portugueze, made them embark at Cassandama, where they had landed, that heresy might be turned out of the country at the very spot where it had entered. Angola was thus recovered; and as the Dutch in passing by St. Thomas made their misfortune known to their countrymen, the city there also was evacuated in such trepidation, that all the artillery, and most of the stores, were abandoned.

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XXII.  

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1648.

*Ericcyra,*  
1, 675-88.



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1648.

*Negocia-  
tions in  
Holland.*

*Demands of  
the Dutch.*

The tidings of this success, and of the battle of Guararapes, reached Portugal in good time, when the Government, prest to some immediate decision, was more than ever perplexed how to decide. The ambassador in Holland had exhausted all the arts of diplomatic chicanery; and the Court, dreading an open war, yet clinging with all the strength of honourable and religious feelings to the hope of recovering Pernambuco, as a sort of compromise between it's pride and its weakness, instructed him to turn the negociation into a bargain, and offer the Company a price for their claims upon Brazil, and their remaining possessions there. The Dutch knew the value of this long-contested territory; they presumed upon the strength of their arms, which nowhere but in Brazil had as yet suffered any humiliation; and presuming also upon the debility and helplessness of Portugal, they thought themselves entitled to dictate any terms to such an opponent. Instead, therefore, of listening to the proposal, they insisted that Portugal should cede the whole of the provinces which they had occupied when the truce was made, and the third part of Seregipe also: that the isle and fort of the Morro de S. Paulo, (which would have given them the command of Bahia,) should be put into their hands as a cautionary possession for twenty years, till the whole of the terms should be fulfilled; that, as an indemnity for the losses which they had sustained, the King of Portugal should pay 100,000 florins yearly, for twenty years, as a subsidy for the maintenance of Dutch troops in Brazil; that one thousand draft oxen, one thousand cows, four hundred horses, and one thousand sheep should be delivered yearly to the Company in Brazil for ten years, and one thousand chests of sugar, averaging twenty *arrobas* each, yearly for twenty years. All the slaves also whom the insurgents had carried off were to be replaced, according to a fair estimate of their numbers, and every thing belonging to the works which



had been destroyed, to be restored, the Dutch having full power to reclaim and seize their property of every kind for a year after the publication of the treaty, wherever they could find it. They should also retain their conquests in Africa; and if the Portuguese broke this agreement in any part beyond the line, it should become null and void in all parts beyond the line. These extravagant demands were so far modified in the course of their conferences with Francisco de Sousa, that they ceased to require the Morro de S. Paulo, and lowered the compensation to 600,000 cruzadoes, or 10,000 chests of sugar, half white, and half of inferior quality, in annual payments, which should complete the whole sum in ten years.

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XXII.  
1648.

*Pinheiro  
Collection:  
MSS. Vol.  
6, No. 3.*

Cruelly as the Portuguese had suffered under a foreign government and a domestic superstition, the nation had lost neither its courage nor its pride; and the public voice was for supporting their brethren in Pernambuco at all hazards. The Government felt its poverty, its weakness, and its danger; what course to pursue in these difficulties perplexed the cabinet of Joam IV, whose crown was indeed a crown of thorns; and this business, which had so often been discussed among his ministers, was again brought into debate. He laid before his council the ultimatum of the States, and also their first extravagant project: he desired them to bear in mind that France was on the point of concluding a separate peace with Spain, and enjoined them to keep the business perfectly secret, and make no minute in the council either of the decree which thus summoned it, or of the discussions consequent thereon. But though the council were thus ordered to leave no memorial of what past, their various opinions were given in writing; these have been preserved, and they are equally curious and characteristic.

*Deliberation  
in the Por-  
tuguese Ca-  
binet.*

The Conde de Odemira prefaced his observations upon the proposed terms by assuming it as a thing certain, that if peace

*Opinion of  
the Conde de  
Odemira.*



CHAP. were made, the Dutch would take the first pretext for breaking  
 XXII it, their only object being to get all they could into their hands :  
 1648. and there were no hostages, no security of princes on their part,  
 nothing but an oath, and that the oath of heretics! Upon the  
 article which stipulated for the reciprocal payment of debts, he  
 observed with some reason, that as by another article the Dutch  
 were to purchase the property of all persons who chose to re-  
 move from the ceded provinces, the consequence would be, that  
 they would claim a set-off in every instance, and thus the emi-  
 grant would get nothing: therefore, as he said, as there were  
 confessedly debts on both sides, the simplest method was to let  
 the one balance the other; . . a summary mode for the individuals  
 concerned, even if the sums owing by the Portugueze had not  
 been in the proportion of fifty to one, which the Count seems to  
 have overlooked. Upon the stipulation for releasing all pris-  
 oners, of whatever country or religion, Jews included, without  
 reserve, and granting a full and general amnesty, he observed,  
 that whatever regarded religion must be decided by theologians,  
 and the King would accede to this article in whatever might  
 not be a sin. His general opinion however was, that the peace  
 must be made, and he recommended as indispensable a stipula-  
 tion for excluding Spanish ships from the Dutch ports in Brazil.

Pinheiro  
 Collection :  
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 6, No. 6.

Opinion of  
 the Chief  
 Treasurer.

A longer and more extraordinary memorial was delivered by  
 Dr. Pedro Fernandes Monteyro, the *Procurador da Fazenda  
 Real*. Considering, he said, the great ability of the ministers  
 employed in this negociation, it was certain that no better terms  
 could have been obtained; but there were heavy objections on  
 the score of religion, of honour, and of feeling. Self-preserva-  
 tion would make the Dutch seek all means of distressing Bahia;  
 being masters of Serecipe they would withhold food, and pos-  
 sessing Angola they would withhold Negroes; and consequently  
 push their sugars every where, to the exclusion of the Portu-



gueze. The payment of debts was impossible: these debts were perhaps the cause of the revolt; if the Pernambucans could not pay them then, much less could they now; and according to this treaty, they could neither live in Pernambuco nor out of it, if they might be followed with law-suits every where. Whither, too, were they to go? Having no capital, wherever they went they would require support, which neither Bahia, nor Rio de Janeiro, nor the other parts of Brazil could afford, so that they would only distress the resident population. The first thing to be done was to act as if these negotiations would not terminate in peace, and therefore to send out instant supplies. They must remember, also, how great a difference was made by the late victory. It was apparent that the Pernambucans thought themselves forsaken by Portugal, and looked to themselves for deliverance: so much the worse for the Dutch. They would perhaps apply to Castille, and Castille would gladly espouse their cause. That country had repeatedly sent emissaries to Angola, to corrupt the Portuguese there, because the possession of Angola would give her Negroes for her own mines, and make her eventually mistress of Brazil, which could not subsist without Negroes. The Spaniards were now by treaty admitted into the Dutch ports of Angola and of Brazil: thus the means were easy, and zeal for religion alone would induce the Pernambucans to that measure: if they were refused here they would apply to England, or to any other power. This should be represented to the States, and also the unfitness of the King's promising what he might not be able to perform: for it was in vain to promise obedience for the Pernambucans. They were not like subjects who depended upon him for protection; and were he to attempt to reduce them by force, the people of Portugal, rather than suffer it, would abandon him, and put themselves again under the dominion of Castille. If, however, it



CHAP. should prove that the terms must be either accepted as they  
 XXII. stood, or refused altogether, war was indeed the more perilous  
 1648. alternative, the United States, with their two Companies, being  
 the strongest power in Europe; whereas the strength of Portugal lay in her foreign possessions: without these she would be reduced to the greatest distress, and a war with Holland would expose her commerce, which was her chief support, to ruin. The Dutch might at once attack Bahia and the Rio, and blockade the Tagus. The fleet which had been fitted out with such exertions for Bahia, lay there at this time, imploring reinforcements, to enable it to meet the enemy. Except Bahia and the Rio, all the other places in Brazil were open to an attack; so was Maranham, so was India. Succours could not be sent out at a time when Castille, at peace with the States and with France, was ready to attack not the frontiers alone, but the Bar also, as knowing that he who was not master of Lisbon could not be master of Portugal. The last year's fleet for Brazil was not raised without taking troops from the frontiers, obtaining contributions from the merchants, and granting great bounties to the men; these exertions could not be repeated, and therefore, in case of war, humanly speaking, all must be lost. All minor inconveniencies merged in this consideration, and religion, honour, and the love which he bore his people, required the King to accept the terms of peace. The people of the ceded provinces might then slacken their cultivation, so as to disappoint the Dutch of their expected profits from sugar for some years, till Portugal should have made her peace with Castille; and then the States might be induced by this method to restore the provinces: or at all events Portugal would stand upon firm ground when she came to treat again upon this quarrel.

This, the Procurador pursued, was the dark side of the argument; it was on the other that the just weight of reason prepon-



derated. Look at the situation of the Company! they who embarked in it were glad to sell for twenty-eight thousand *crúzados*, the shares which had cost a hundred thousand. They could not raise the last armament without assistance from the East India Company and from the States; and that armament was at this time subsisting upon what prizes it could take, . . . a resource which would fail, when Portugal should cease to employ its miserable *caravelas* in this navigation, and adopt wiser measures. The enemy would then, cut off as they were from supplies by land, be compelled to draw their very food from Europe, the aggravated expence of its first cost, freight, delay, and risk falling upon an impoverished concern. They could not send out another expedition, for since the battle of Guararapes, the next armament must need be greater than the last, success having given confidence and vigour to the Pernambucans. Men could not be raised in Holland for a service which had become unpopular, because it was known to be unfortunate. Even for the last effort, two thousand five hundred of the men were pressed; and some of the States already violently opposed these measures. With this opposition at home, and such conduct on the part of Portugal as would prevent the Company from supplying itself by naval captures, the Company going to ruin as it needs must, would gladly listen to terms, and rid itself of a burthen which it could not support. But would the States take up the cause? Here it must be remembered that the Dutch were above all things addicted to mercantile pursuits; gain was their prime object, reputation the last thing which they took into the account. They warred upon us in India, in Angola, in Brazil, because it was their interest: at the same time they traded with us at home because they wanted our salt, and other commodities, which if they had not taken the English and

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CHAP. other nations would. Say then that the Company in despair  
XXII. should transfer its pretensions to the States; Portugal offers mo-  
1648. ney for those pretensions; and could it be doubted whether  
such a government would not prefer a good sum, which was so  
much sure gain, to the risk of contending for distant possessions,  
held against the will of the inhabitants, and bringing neither  
profit nor popularity at home? Be it however admitted that  
they take upon themselves the quarrel, still such terms of peace  
as are proffered were the worse alternative. Holland cannot  
and will not observe them: she must for her own security ex-  
tend her conquests. A single slave sent from Bahia, is able by  
firing the canes to destroy a whole year's harvest; would the  
Dutch then suffer an enemy so near? and if they expected that  
through their war with us Castille would effect the conquest of  
Portugal, an event of all others the most dangerous to Holland,  
to strengthen themselves against that contingency they must en-  
deavour to spread their conquests, and thus the remainder of  
Brazil would be doubly endangered. The Company was now  
poor, and on the verge of ruin. These terms gave them all they  
could wish for without risk, expence, or exertion on their part.  
The sugars which they were to receive, and the recovery of their  
debts, would make them at once rich and flourishing: their  
plantations would be in full activity, their numerous ships  
would convey their produce to all markets, while they would be  
enabled so to undersell us that none would go to fetch our sugar.  
Yet sugar was at this time the main sinew of the kingdom, the  
main spring of that trade on which Portugal depended, and by  
which she subsisted; that failing, the revenue fails; the army  
can no longer be paid, and all must go to ruin. Besides, the  
soldiers would be disgusted at seeing all that they had won re-  
stored by a stroke of the pen; their spirits and hearts would be



broken, and poverty, ruin, and dejection would prepare an easy conquest for the Dutch in the remaining provinces of Brazil and in Maranham.

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But what, he continued, could Holland do against us? Send one expedition against Brazil, and another against our own coasts. Should they attack Bahia or the Rio, they could not take those places, being timely provided, as they might be, . . . or they could not hold them. They cannot prey upon our commerce if our ships sail in convoy; and if that resource fail them but for one year, they cannot support an expedition for the second. Upon the home coast they cannot make themselves masters of any strong place, from whence to infest the seas; our ships would come in secure strength; and if in their disappointment they pirate upon English, French, or other vessels, the injury to themselves would only be greater. Maranham indeed was defenceless, but the recovery of Angola left them without Negroes to cultivate it, and the hostility of the inhabitants would prevent them from making any profit by the conquest. In India hurt might certainly be done: could it be supposed that peace would prevent it? The Dutch regarded no laws but those of their own interest. . . . how had they regarded the truce in India? and peace would only enable them to pursue the same system with more facility. The Procurador then proceeded to consider the means by which Portugal might carry on war. The establishment of a Brazil Company was the first and most obvious; the merchants who traded with Brazil were rich, and would embark in it; and his Majesty might engage in it, not as a King, but as a sharer, to the amount of 200,000 *cruzados*. English ships, of which enough would offer, might be taken up to protect the convoy: there would be an especial fitness in this, for in case of being attacked by the Dutch, they would for their own sakes fight with their usual courage, and this might bring



CHAP. upon Holland disquieting causes of dispute with England. Scattered pirates could do nothing against a convoyed fleet: if the  
 XXII. Dutch attempted any thing, it must be by fitting out a squadron; if it should not fall in with the fleet, the expence is lost; if it should, there is the risk of battle: the expence of delay also would be ruinous, and the experiment once failing, would never be repeated. This single measure would suffice: a naval force and a flourishing commerce would render all secure; but if Pernambuco were yielded, the shipping and the trade would fall to decay, and every thing be endangered. Your Majesty, he continued, thus having means which in all human probability will suffice to defend your conquests, with security of your crown, extension of the faith, and the applause of your vassals, it seems as if you would offend Divine Providence by not availing yourself of them. For if your royal forefathers, in defending the faith against infidels, alway experienced the favor of heaven, and conquered mighty armies with forces so unequal that victory appeared impossible to human foresight; now that God hath not shown himself less propitious, but rather with fuller spring-tides of his mercy flowing towards your Majesty and your vassals, giving as well in Pernambuco as on the frontiers admirable victories, helping you in the greatest need, and by means the most unimagined, bringing from beginnings which appeared most untoward, results the most desirable, a heavy offence would it be against that Divine Providence if you did not feel a lively faith and an assured hope of greater and more signal favours in this war, the object of which is to defend the patrimony of Christ. After this religious strain, a worldly and weighty argument was adduced. Your Majesty's ministers may reject this reasoning, and determine upon peace; but the people have pronounced their opinion. The whole kingdom has broken out in rejoicings for the victories in Pernambuco; and if they see that the Per-



nambucans, after obeying the commands of your government, risking their lives and properties, and making such progress in effecting their own deliverance, should not only be deserted, but against their own consent given over to their enemies, they may consider this as a wretched example, when they look at the King of Castille, with his power and his armies.

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*Pinheiro  
Coll. MSS.  
Vol. 6, No.  
7.*

The Council laid this Memorial before the King, saying, that although nothing was of so much importance as a stable peace with the United States, yet religion and honour must be saved; and by God's help, with time and opportunity, things might mend. With regard to offering money or produce, they reminded him that this was incurring a certain loss, whereas it was by no means certain that the Dutch could reconquer Pernambuco; and indeed the Portuguese ought to confide in God that he would not permit such a reconquest, for they were defending his cause as well as their own. There were men who said that it was not compatible with the dignity and reputation of the United States to submit to lose what they had once possessed: but they had no just claim to those possessions; and how much more strongly did that argument apply to the King of Portugal! The Council therefore agreed with the Procurador in opinion, that war was better than restitution. The King was bound to support a cause so just, and God himself bound to defend it with his infinite power; human means, therefore, could not be wanting.

*The Council  
approve his  
opinion, and  
prefer war  
to restitu-  
tion.*

*Do. No. 5.*

The opinion of the Board of Conscience was to the same effect. They assumed as the ground of their reasoning, that the Dutch having neither faith nor law to bind them, would not be bound by their word, and therefore they thought it very desirable that some cautionary towns should be given to Portugal. The number of Christians in the disputed provinces was to be well considered, and the danger of salvation to which they would be exposed, and the offences which would result from ceding so

*The Board  
of Con-  
science agree  
in this de-  
termination.*



CHAP. many churches to be profaned by heretics. These were weighty  
 XXII. points for consideration, lest they should offend Divine Justice,  
 1648. or seem in the slightest degree to distrust Divine Mercy. But  
 upon all these points the Board advised that the King should  
 consult the Inquisition. On the whole they thought the pro-  
 posed terms insecure, unstable, and injurious; and advised that  
 more money and more sugar should be offered, so as to buy the  
 enemy's claims, for by this means the King would more easily  
 become Lord of the World. But it was at all events convenient  
 to dissemble, and send an experienced minister to Holland for  
 that purpose; as much delay as possible there, and as little in  
 secretly sending out the greatest possible succours to Brazil.

Pinheiro  
 Coll. MSS.  
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 10.

Vieyra op-  
 poses it,

The strange hope which the Board of Conscience expressed, of seeing the King become Lord of the World, came from men who, having been Sebastianists, were now persuaded that the prophecies of that sect referred to the reigning sovereign, under whom the fifth monarchy was to be established. The pride, the contempt of their enemy, the political ignorance, the bigotry, and the blind presumption which characterized these councils, would be almost inconceivable, if the authentic documents had not been preserved. Yet Portugal was not without consummate statesmen at this time, and to Vieyra, the most able among them, the King referred these papers. The answer which he drew up was deemed so convincing, that it obtained the name of *O Papel Forte*, the Strong Memorial. Vieyra was a man of too comprehensive a mind to look exclusively at Brazil; intimately conversant with the whole concerns of Portugal, he contemplated all her possessions and political relations in one wide view, and saw the imminent danger to which all were exposed. The religious objections to the proposed terms he set aside by the conclusive answer, that all persons might remove from Pernambuco who thought proper, and that they who



should not would enjoy a full toleration: the point of conscience lay on the other side, and the King might well scruple whether he could conscientiously delay the cession, the very existence of Portugal itself being at stake. As little difficulty did he find on the score of what was due from the Government to the people of Pernambuco, who had taken up arms. A part only of the people had risen in arms, against the wish of the majority; nor was it for the sake of the Catholic faith that they had done this, but because they either could not or would not pay their debts. As for the argument that it would be impious and cruel toward them if the cession were made, he affirmed that it would be unreasonable to carry on war for their sake. Pernambuco was but a member of Portugal, and the impiety and cruelty would be if the King should endanger the whole body rather than cut off so small a part, and that part so corrupt, and so difficult to preserve. To judge rightly of the terms, they should be compared with those which Castille had made with Holland, and the Empire with Sweden; and then it would appear how infinitely more advantageous they were, though made by Portugal, which lay almost surrounded by such an enemy as Castille, with a republic the most flourishing, the most powerful, and the most haughty in the world. The situation of Brazil also was to be considered: it was easy to say that the Dutch were now cooped up in Recife, and that the terms would give them Brazil. The Captaincies which they required were in extent about a tenth part of that country; but in point of value and cultivation they might, before the war, have been computed at a third: half was now laid waste. The Dutch possessed many and strong posts, that at the Potengi being indeed the best which the Portugueze had in Brazil; and if they seized and fortified any of the posts between Cape S. Augustines and the River S. Francisco, the insurgents would be cut off from Bahia,

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*and exposes  
the weakness  
and the  
danger of  
Portugal.*



CHAP. and placed between two fires, . . . the evil of which they were  
 XXII. most in fear. In reality the contest could not be and ought not  
 1648. to be continued. By removing the inhabitants they would re-  
 move Pernambuco, for it was men of which Portugal was in  
 want, not extent of territory. The whole rental of these Captain-  
 cies would not amount to a tenth part of what it would cost to  
 defend them ; and who would affirm that they were worth such a  
 price at such a time? There is security enough for the good  
 faith of the Dutch ; now that Angola was recovered they must  
 look to Portugal for their supply of slaves ; their canes might  
 easily be destroyed by a few slaves from Bahia ; and the States  
 were now treating for a salt-contract, which of itself would effec-  
 tually bind them. They offered to pay the duties beforehand  
 in military stores, at the Government price ; they would employ  
 four or five hundred ships in the trade, and all the persons en-  
 gaged in it would be so many hostages, and all their families so  
 many securities.

The advice to purchase Pernambuco would be good if the  
 Dutch would sell it ; but they choose rather to believe our ex-  
 ample, said Vieyra, than our language. They have the same  
 reason for wishing to keep their acquisitions that we have for  
 desiring to recover them ; their reputation also is concerned, as  
 much, or more, than ours ; and when we talk of offering a price  
 to be paid by instalments in six years, it should be remembered  
 they perhaps may think Portugal will be in such a state at the  
 end of the first, that no farther payment can be expected from  
 her. It is we who sell Pernambuco ; we sell it for interests of  
 greater magnitude, and shall reclaim it whenever fortune favours  
 us ; all that is now said against the conduct of the Dutch will  
 be good in its proper season, and it is well that we should write  
 in brass the wrongs which we have received at their hands, till  
 that season arrive. But now Brazil is at their mercy. We



could perhaps be able to fit out one armament; Holland can afford to lose many. The West India Company may be poor; the East India one is rich, and will deprive us of all we have in India. All persons doubted our success at the Acclamation; but upon the insurrection in Pernambuco no one doubted of our ruin, and for this reason no power in Europe will form an alliance with us. Castille makes a dishonourable peace with Holland, rather than be involved in war at once with Holland and France. France suffers injuries from Holland rather than expose herself to war at once with Holland and Castille; and we, who never measure our own strength, we would make war with them! France, the richest, the most powerful, the most compact, the least exposed state in Europe... Portugal, the poorest, the weakest, the most divided, the most exposed! Beyond all doubt Spain and Holland, had they remained united, would have subdued the world, ... and we think to resist them both! Where are our men? upon every alarm in Alentejo it is necessary to take students from the university, tradesmen from their shops, labourers from the plough! Where is our money? the expences and losses which already have been incurred amount to five millions! Sixty ships have been captured during the present year. The last armament might have undeceived us; to raise seamen we were obliged to wait for the Rio de Janeiro fleet; to raise troops we took them from the frontiers; to provide artillery we stript the fortresses; to make up thirteen ships we left Portugal without one! Eight years have elapsed since our emancipation, and the frontiers are not yet fortified, nor is Lisbon yet put in that state of defence which we all agree is necessary; and why? ... because the means are wanting. Compare our resources with those of the enemy! In Holland they have fourteen thousand vessels; in Portugal we have not an hundred and fifty. In India they have more than an hundred

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CHAP. ships of war, of from twenty-four to fifty guns; we have not one.  
 XXII. In Brazil they have more than sixty ships, some of great force;  
 1648. we have seven, if indeed we have them still. They are free from  
 the power of Spain; we have the whole power of Spain to contend with. They have no enemy in Europe; we have no friend. They have more than two hundred thousand seamen; we have only four thousand. They have abundant stores; we none but what we buy from them, or what must pass by their doors. They have excellent engineers, excellent officers, excellent soldiers; we have, it is true, some good soldiers in Brazil, but no commanders. Finally, the Dutch have their industry, their diligence, their desire of gain, their unanimity, and their love of the common weal; we have our disunion, our envy, our presumption, our negligence, and our perpetual attention to individual interests. The more miraculous the late success appeared, the more should it make us feel the inequality of our strength. Yet persons who advised peace a few days ago have changed their opinion in consequence of this news! Ought we to trust in such things? It is better to deserve miracles than to expect them; but to rely upon them, even when we deserve them, is tempting God.

But Vieyra rested his main argument upon the state of India, and the certain loss of all their possessions there if the contest with Holland were persisted in. As a proof of the impossibility of succouring those distant conquests, he reminded the King, that at this time, when they were not at open war with the Dutch, the recovery of Angola had been known two months, and no troops had been sent to secure so important a place. For the love of God, said he, and for the love of your Majesty, and for the love of our country, I beseech all those who read this paper to consider how impossible it is to guard all our possessions with only one fleet; I beseech them to weigh the diffi-



culties, the consequences, the impossibilities! Only two blows are required to deprive us of India and of Brazil; one which should take Goa, one which should take Bahia; . . . both so practicable, so easy, so certain! The bulwark of peace would secure both. Your Majesty's predecessors knew this, and by keeping peace with all the world they were masters of three parts of it. Let us keep all our resources for the struggle with Castille, in which alone we have sufficient need of the favour of God, and even of the miracles which we expect from his mercy. Finally summing up the whole, he recommended that if the terms could not be modified they should be accepted as they were. The clause which concerned the Jews might be made a secret article, and the business managed easily; for if there were no subjects of Holland in the Inquisition, the matter was at an end; and if there were, their cases might be dispatched forthwith, before any discussion. He advised that plenty of money should be sent to their ambassador at the Hague; for money was the most effectual and cheapest means of overcoming all difficulties, and in Holland every thing was venal: and to indemnify themselves for the loss of Pernambuco, they might easily take the Plata, and to their great advantage. Thus doing, they might leave the war with Holland till a fitter opportunity, when they could recover from her all that should now be ceded, and all that she had taken in all their conquests; but it was in another war, and not in this, that God had reserved for the King the Empire of the World.

The more the subject was discussed the greater was the King's perplexity: he could neither resolve to sacrifice his feelings by submitting to the cessions which were required, nor on the other hand dared he provoke a danger which he saw clearly in its whole extent. Unable to make up his mind to either determination, he still continued to deliberate and procrastinate; every

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MS. A. 9. 2. 7. 111  
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O Papel  
Forte, MSS.

A Brazil  
Company  
established  
at Vieira's  
suggestion.



CHAP. thing was left to the course of events, and time and chance at  
 XXII. length justified almost equally the foresight of his cautious ad-  
 1648. visers and the confidence of his presumptuous ones. India, as  
 Vieyra had foreseen, was lost ; but, through circumstances which  
 could not be foreseen, Brazil was saved, and Portugal in conse-  
 quence was enabled to carry on the arduous struggle for its in-  
 dependance to a successful termination. But though Vieyra  
 thus strenuously argued for the cession, no man contributed  
 more effectually to the prosecution of the war. He had long  
 represented to the King, that the only means for preserving  
 Brazil and India, and recovering what had been lost in both  
 countries, was to follow the example of the Dutch, and establish  
 two Companies for the East and West : capital, he said, would  
 readily be forthcoming ; that spirit of exertion and enterprize  
 would appear which individual interest, when well understood,  
 never fails to produce ; and foreigners as well as natives would  
 engage in so promising and certain an adventure : one thing only  
 was indispensable, that the property thus embarked must be ex-  
 empt from confiscation. Here was the stumbling-block. Never  
 had any country suffered so dreadfully in its vital interests from  
 the spirit of intolerance as Portugal at this time. Vieyra, who had  
 most ably and most eloquently exposed the atrocious practices of  
 the Inquisition, perceived the whole political evil, as well as the  
 whole moral iniquity of this accursed tribunal. The exemption  
 which he required, and without which it was impossible that  
 these Companies could be formed, was for the sake of the New  
 Christians, a denomination under which probably the greater part  
 of the Portugueze merchants were liable to be included, . . . for  
 in fact no man was secure. The Holy Office took the alarm ;  
 the mixture, not of suspected persons, but, as he says, of sus-  
 pected money, was denounced as an abomination ; and it was  
 not till the losses of eight successive years had nearly ruined the

*Vieyra Car-  
tas, T. 2, C.  
118.*

*Vieyra Ser-  
moens, T.  
12, Serm. de  
S. Roque,  
§ 54.*



trade of Portugal, and laid the Government almost at the mercy of its enemies, that this obstacle was overcome. Even then only half his project was adopted ; that, however, was for the nearest and most important object : a Brazil Company was established. This country had been so long and obstinately contended for, that the mere contest had made the Portuguese feel its value, and take a pride in its possession : and the King, with this feeling, gave his eldest son Theodosio the title of Prince of Brazil.

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*Rocha Pitta,*  
5, § 97—9.  
*Do.* § 84.

While the new Company was forming, the Dutch made a second attempt to recover their ascendancy in the field, contrary to Schoppe's judgement, whose opinion was overruled by a majority in the council of war : they were perhaps misled by the report of two Italian deserters, who exaggerated the want of men and of ammunition in the Camp, and represented that the army was mutinous for want of pay. Brink, who commanded, because Schoppe was still disabled by his wound, increased his numbers by drafting men from the ships, and armed some of his strongest soldiers with partisans and halberts, having trained them with these weapons, which it was thought would counterbalance the advantage that the Portuguese derived from their superior use of the sword. These preparations were known in the Camp ; the Portuguese leaders therefore recalled their troops to quarters, and did not neglect those religious practices themselves which they stigmatized in the Dutch as superstitious and diabolical. The wafer was exposed in their churches, and the men were exhorted to confess and communicate before the expected battle. Brink sallied with the greatest force he could collect, stated by the Portuguese at five thousand men, and took possession of the ground at the Guararapes, which was still covered with the bones of his countrymen. Here the Portuguese attacked him, and though the order of the battle upon this spot was reversed, the result was the same. The action soon became

*Second battle of Guararapes.*

*Nieuhoff,*  
p. 119.  
Feb. 18.



CHAP. so close that the enemy could not use with effect the halberts  
 XXII. and partisans in which they trusted ; for when the first stroke  
 1649. was spent, the Portugueze allowed them neither room nor lei-  
 sure for a second. After a struggle which lasted from two in  
 the afternoon till eight at night, the Dutch fled, leaving above  
 eleven hundred men upon the field, nineteen stand of colours,  
 with all their artillery and ammunition. Brink and the com-  
 mander of the marine forces both fell, and Poty, the Chief of the  
 Indians, was taken : he was kept a close prisoner in irons nearly  
 three years, and then embarked for Portugal ; but he died upon  
 the voyage. Joam Fernandes twice in this action narrowly es-  
 caped death ; a spent ball left its mark upon his body, and his  
 horse plunged with him into a quagmire, from which the animal  
 could not be extricated. Of the conquerors forty-seven only are  
 said to have fallen ; among them were Paulo da Cunha, Manoel  
 de Araujo, and Cosme do Rego, men whose names often occur  
 in the annals of this war. Henrique Diaz and more than two  
 hundred were wounded. The disparity of loss may be exagge-  
 rated, but was doubtless very great, for the Portugueze pursued  
 their advantage with an insatiable appetite for vengeance, and  
 the Dutchmen who feigned to be slain were more fortunate than  
 those who cried for mercy. During many subsequent days the  
 Indians and Negroes hunted the woods, and put to the word  
 all the stragglers whom they could find. The victory <sup>2</sup> was cele-  
 brated as its importance deserved ; the Vicar General, who was

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<sup>2</sup> Nieuhoff's account of the battles at Guararapes is quite inexplicable : he relates only one action, which by the date should be the first, and yet refers to a former, of which he has given no intimation elsewhere. Perhaps something has been omitted by the translator, whom I am compelled to trust, for want of the original.



with the army, ordered a public thanksgiving for the ensuing Sunday in all the churches under his jurisdiction, with the wafer exposed: and the religious orders vied with each other in sermons and processions. The Dutch solicited permission to bury their dead; they found the bodies mutilated as well as stript, and this sight was not wanted to exasperate the inveterate feelings of hatred with which the war was carried on.

A few days before this battle, the Brazil Company sent out its first fleet, with all the success which had been anticipated from such a measure. The Dutch could make no attempt upon it, and their cruisers kept within harbour as long as it remained in those seas. The Conde de Castello Melhor went out in it as governor, and Pedro Jaques de Magalhaens was admiral. Fourscore merchant ships sailed for Portugal under the protection of the returning fleet. The two preceding Governors embarked in this convoy, Antonio Telles da Silva having waited thus long, partly<sup>3</sup> perhaps to avoid that outward manifestation of displeasure, which while any negociations were continued with Holland, the King must be constrained to show; and partly

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Ericeyra,  
712.  
Cast. Lus.  
9, § 58—  
84.

The Compa-  
ny sends out  
its first fleet.

<sup>3</sup> A manuscript memoir, (*Pinheiro Collection, Vol. 2, No. 18,*) which gives a summary view of the disputes between Holland and Portugal, says, that although Antonio Telles had taken every precaution not to break the truce, he could not avoid the displeasure of the King, who, after having been fully informed of his conduct, ordered him home as a prisoner: but he perished by shipwreck on the way. I can discover no hint of this displeasure in any of the printed accounts. Ericeyra draws from the shipwreck an argument, which in his age was not unnecessary, against the astrologers. Such, he says, was the fate of these ships, *com discredito dos matematicos, porque parece que huma só constelaçam nam pode conduzir tantas criaturas a hum mesmo naufragio, e vem a ser só infalliveys os juizos divinoz.*



CHAP. Our Lady of the Conception, which he thought the best in the  
 XXII. fleet. The voyage proved unfortunate; one galleon was lost  
 1649. with all on board; two others were wrecked upon St. Michaels;  
 the vessel which Antonio Telles had chosen, reached Portugal,  
 only to suffer shipwreck on the coast of Buarcos, and to be lost  
 with all her crew.

*Ericcyra.*  
 p. 125.

*Feeble state  
 of both par-  
 ties in Bra-  
 zil.*

The great measure of establishing a Company having thus  
 been taken, the Portugueze Government relapsed into its cha-  
 racteristic inactivity; the Pernambucans were left to themselves,  
 and they carried on the war with that unweariable perseverance  
 which nothing could subdue, and which therefore could not fail  
 at length to overcome all obstacles. Schoppe was too weak to  
 attempt much; his boldest effort was an expedition at the end of  
 1650. the ensuing year to the River S. Francisco; the Portugueze troops  
 derived from thence the greater part of their subsistence, and  
 Cardozo being immediately sent there with five hundred men,  
 the Dutch as soon as they were apprized of his approach retired  
 without effecting their object. Two following years were spent  
 1652. in the same slow but vigilant warfare. The Portugueze once more  
 laid waste the plantations upon the Potengi, and burnt large  
 quantities of Brazil wood which had been collected there.  
 Schoppe, who found himself now equally crippled by land and  
 by sea, reconnoitred the entrenched posts of the camp, but ex-  
 perienceed loss enough to deter him from any serious attempt.  
 A second expedition to the S. Francisco was not more fortunate  
 than the first: the supplies which his cruisers used to bring in had  
 now failed him, and his only hope was, that some effort would  
 be made from home to reestablish that naval superiority, without  
 which it would be impossible to maintain Recife.

*State of the  
 negocia-  
 tions.*

These hopes were frustrated by the address of the Portugueze  
 diplomatists, and the course of political events in Europe. Fran-  
 cisco de Sousa Coutinho continued as Ambassador to the States,



although the government, clearly understanding his duplicity, manifested towards him the most marked dislike; and though the popular resentment against him was so strong, that the Zeelanders publicly declared their intention of throwing him overboard, if they could intercept him on his voyage home. At length after the full discussion in the Portugueze cabinet which ended in leaving the business as they found it, the States desired him to take his departure, saying, They had endeavoured by all means to have the treaty of 1641 observed, but having been so repeatedly deceived, they were now determined to right themselves by force of arms. A man of his stamp was not so easily to be dismissed: he would set out, he replied, as soon as he received instructions from his Court; but with regard to breach of treaty, the States, he contended, were not so much sinned against as sinning, and their complaints were only designed as a pretext for farther acts of wrong. He then made out a strong case of the various infractions on their part, and concluded by saying, that the sum of their alleged grievances amounted only to this, that the King had not subdued for them the insurgents in Pernambuco, . . . a thing which they might know was not lightly to be effected, since they with all their efforts had failed in it. But shortly afterwards when he informed the States that another minister had been appointed to succeed him, they desired him to obtain fresh credentials, saying, that circumstances had occurred which rendered it necessary to confer with him upon matters of great importance. Upon learning this, the Portugueze government ordered the new minister to hasten his departure, expecting that one who was not personally obnoxious to the States might treat with them to more advantage. He was prevented by death, and Francisco de Sousa thus remained upon his mission. The delay proved singularly fortunate. The Dutch ministers employed a Frenchman to bribe one of his countrymen,

CHAP.  
XXII.  
1649.

*Ericcyra.*  
p. 700.



CHAP. who was the Ambassador's Secretary, and this probably was the  
 XXII. reason why they wished for no immediate change; the secretary  
 1649. listened to the offer, and undertook by means of false keys to  
 get possession of the King's dispatches, that the Dutch Government might satisfy themselves concerning the real contents; having made this promise, he communicated what had past to his master, who, being provided with the King's blank signatures, immediately filled them up with such instructions as would best deceive the States. At this time the States had resolved to assist the West India Company with two hundred thousand florins for the relief of Recife, and orders had been given to prepare twelve ships and two thousand eight hundred men for the same destination, and a fleet of twenty-five sail to act against Portugal; but so well did the wily Portugueze turn the arts of the Dutch against themselves, that the preparations were stopt, and the relief so essential for the preservation of their conquests in Brazil was delayed, till events occurred, which rendered it no longer disposable for that service.

*Ericcyra,*  
700—35.

*Holland engaged in war  
with England.*

Ere long, Antonio de Sousa de Macedo arrived to succeed the Ambassador. The States thought proper to show their displeasure by letting him wait some months before he obtained an audience; and he, who desired nothing more than procrastination, waited patiently. When it was at length granted, he represented, that the violent measures which they had pursued in Brazil, rendered restitution, which had before been difficult, impossible now. He dwelt upon the inconvenience and expence of merely maintaining the few posts which were still in their power, and proposed a pecuniary indemnification as the best and only means of final settlement. They replied only by threats; to which he answered, that, if nothing would content them but what was impossible, arms of course must be the resort. Procrastination had now been carried to its utmost length,



for the whole ten years of the treaty were expired: the Ambassador left Holland, and the parties without any necessity of declaring hostilities on either side were at war by the mere expiration of the truce. It did not however suit either party to avow this: the Dutch merchants proposed to the Ambassador, to purchase licences for trading with Portugal, as had been done even under the Philips by those in the salt trade: and the Portuguese Government, even without these forms, suffered the commerce to continue in its usual course, so that the two nations were at peace with each other in Europe, where peace was for their mutual convenience, and at war wherever either power found itself strong enough for offensive operations. Possibly the Dutch might have indulged a more vindictive spirit, if, at a time when Portugal by an act of the highest honour had exposed itself to a war with the English Commonwealth, for refusing to deliver up Prince Rupert, Cromwell had not regarded that conduct with his usual magnanimity, and listening easily to a proffered accommodation, engaged in war with Holland. This event delivered Portugal from a danger under which the throne of the Braganzas might otherwise have fallen. The Dutch being attacked by so formidable an enemy in their own seas, left the West India Company to provide for Brazil as it could; but the means of the Company were exhausted, and the naval force which they had in Recife, fell to decay for want of stores and supplies from Europe. Schoppe made an effort to intercept the homeward bound fleet of 1652, off Cape St. Augustines; he was beaten off with considerable loss, and the safe entrance of the convoy into Lisbon afforded a triumphant proof of the wisdom of Vieyra's counsels.

In this state of weakness and embarrassment on both sides, the struggle might have continued for an indefinite time, if means had not been devised for bringing it to a close without compro-

CHAP.  
XXII.  
1649.

*Pinhoiro  
Collection,  
MSS. Vol. 2,  
No. 10.  
Ericcyra,  
778.*

*The Camp-  
Masters re-  
solve to soli-  
cit the aid  
of the Brazil  
Company's  
fleet.*



CHAP.  
XXII.  
1653.

mising the Portuguese Government farther than it was already compromised. The experience of many years had convinced Joam Fernandes, that while the sea was open, Recife could not be conquered by any land forces which would ever be brought against it. He knew that there was no hope of obtaining any direct succour from Portugal; but the Company's fleet might perhaps be induced to suspend their own business for a short time, and assist in completing this great and long protracted work. Barreto entered into these views, and under pretence of a *Romeria*, or religious visit, assembled the Camp Masters (to whom Francisco de Figueiroa had been added) at S. Gonzalo's chapel, a place chosen for its solitariness, seven leagues from Recife, and some distance from Nazareth. They dismissed their attendants, and held their council in the chapel, Barreto declaring he had appointed that place in full confidence that the Portuguese Saint, in whose house they were consulting, would befriend them with his miraculous assistance. Figueiroa, to whom the scheme had not been previously imparted, saw only the obvious difficulties, and represented them as insuperable. The enemy, he said, were well disciplined and well provided: their fortifications strong, and their numbers perfectly adequate to the defence: but on their part, artillery, engineers, magazines, men, and money, were wanting. Vidal, as was to be expected, agreed with Fernandes, and Barreto confined his objections to the want of stores. Joam Fernandes asked him if this was the only inconvenience which he apprehended, and upon his reply that this was all, immediately replied that he took that charge upon himself.

*Cast. Lus.*  
10, § 6, 10.

*Operations  
concerted  
with the  
Brazil fleet.*

The annual fleet sailed from Lisbon early in October, with Pedro Jaques de Magalhaens for general, and Brito Freire for admiral, a man then known as a brave soldier and skilful seaman, and now remembered as a faithful historian. A dispatch



was forwarded to Barreto, desiring that the ships in the ports of Pernambuco might be ready to join the fleet as it past by on the way to Bahia, at which time that part of the convoy which was bound for these parts would run in; and the commander was desired to take proper measures for protecting them. On the seventh of December this advice was received, and on the twentieth the convoy came in sight of Recife. Some Dutch frigates, which attempted to harass them, were beaten off, and Barreto sent a boat off, as if with a message of congratulation; in reply to which both Pedro Jaques and Brito Freire landed at the Rio Docê. It may be suspected that the business had been preconcerted. The Camp-Masters requested that the fleet would block up the harbour to exclude succours, while they completed their long and arduous enterprize of the deliverance of Pernambuco: but if this were refused, they besought their countrymen at least to be spectators of a last and desperate attempt, that if it failed, and the patriots were seen to perish in assaulting the enemy's walls, they might not perish without witnesses, who should proclaim to the world their heroism and their undeserved fate. Pedro Jaques represented that his hands were tied; that his instructions from the King did not authorize him to commit the slightest act of hostility, nor those from the Company to divert the fleet from its destination; that he was sworn to take all means for preserving that fleet, and carrying it with all speed to its port; and that if he were to involve his country in war with Holland, his head might pay the penalty of his disobedience. Joam Fernandes replied, that if his Excellency should fail to accede to their just intreaties, God would not fail to exact account of the number of souls whom he left exposed to prevarication of faith; in such a cause the fear of losing his head would not be admitted as a sufficient reason for withholding his assistance, one soul being of more value than many thousand

CHAP.  
XXII.  
1653.



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*Cast. Lus.*  
10. § 11—  
13.

*D. Francis-*  
*co Manoel*  
*Epanapho-*  
*ras, p. 601.*

*Recife*  
*blockaded*  
*by sea.*

lives. It is said that Pedro Jaques yielded to this argument, and that he and Brito Freire intimated their sense of an inward and overruling influence which determined them. A Council was held at Olinda on Christmas Day, when the plan of operations was finally settled.

The Dutch fleet, too weak to engage the enemy, had intended to hover about the skirts of the convoy; but perceiving the intent of the Portugueze, they stood out to sea while they could. Their disappearance set at liberty the merchant ships in the ports of Serinhaem, Rio Fermoze, Tamandare, and Camaragibe, which were laden for Portugal, and they entered the harbour of Nazareth, where Barreto employed them in conveying the stores which had been collected in those parts for the siege, and transporting also a number of troops, whom he wished to arrive fresh for the fatigue which they were to undergo. Proclamations in different languages were addressed to the men in the Dutch service, inviting them to desert, and threatening them with the vengeance of a victorious and exasperated enemy if they adhered to a ruined cause. To make a display of their own force, the boats of the fleet were employed all day in landing men, who were carried back by night, that the same artifice might be repeated the following day: all who could be spared from the ships were finally landed under Brito Freire's orders. The smaller merchantmen were sent on with a sufficient convoy to the southern ports for which they were bound; the larger ones, being of some strength, were detained to join in the blockade, and a line was drawn across the harbour. The small craft rowed guard day and night, and the shores on both sides were lined by companies of infantry, so that no relief could reach the besieged either by sea or land. On the night of the twenty-sixth, Joam Fernandes, with two engineers and a few chosen men, reconnoitred the whole works, approaching so near, that they were

*D. Fr. Ma-*  
*noel Epana-*  
*phoras, p.*  
*607.*  
*Cast. Lus.*  
10. § 14—  
17.



sometimes fain to lie upon the ground, while the balls whistled over them.

The besieging force consisted of three thousand five hundred men, of whom one thousand were employed in garrisoning the Camp, Olinda, and some of the adjoining forts. Their first attempt was against the fort of the Salinas, which commanded the passage of the river, and from whence the city and the bar were within reach of artillery. Fernandes, who led this enterprize, encouraged his followers by promising a separate mass for the soul of every man who should fall, exclusive of those which he had founded for all who fell in the war collectively; and he made the men repeat with him the Pater Noster and Ave Maria on their knees, before they set out in the darkness. The undertaking was conducted with consummate skill, and at day-break the garrison, to their utter astonishment, received the good-morrow from a battery of four twenty-four pounders, within pistol-shot. It was on the fifteenth of January, a day consecrated in the Romish kalendar to St. Maurus, the disciple of Benedict, known in Portugal by the name of S. Amaro; he is believed to have a special virtue in healing broken bones, and the Portuguese pleased themselves in thinking that the saint would be neither less able nor less willing to break the bones of the heretics than to mend those of his believers. The fort surrendered in the course of the ensuing night; the conquerors continued to fire, hoping to entrap some reinforcements which were coming from Recife, but the artifice was discovered. Schoppe was now well aware of his danger, and gave orders to abandon the Barreta and the Buraco de Santiago, that the garrisons might aid in the defence of the city: they were instructed to destroy the works, but the younger Camaram was speedy enough in his movements to win the first before it could be injured. Fort Altena was stronger, and could receive supplies from the river. A

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XXII.

1653.

*Siege and  
capture of  
Recife.*



CHAP. French engineer, who had deserted to the conquering side with  
XXII. many of his men, was of great service in the operations against  
1654. this place : Henrique Diaz also distinguished himself here, and  
the fear which his remorseless Negroes inspired was such, that  
the garrison mutinied, and compelled their officers to surrender ;  
two hundred and forty men were taken here, among whom was  
the chief officer of the engineers. From hence a battery was  
opened upon the Cinco-Pontas. Fort dos Affogados was aban-  
doned to the besiegers, and they carried by storm a new re-  
doubt, an achievement in which Joam Barboza Pinto, who had  
often distinguished himself in this long contest, lost his life.  
This was a post of so much importance that Schoppe marched  
out of the city to recover it : but he re-entered without daring to  
make the attempt. By this time the inhabitants were clamor-  
ous for a capitulation, more especially the Jews, who knew that  
unless a capitulation were made no mercy would be shown unto  
them. The people feared also that the garrison would mutiny,  
as they had done at Altena, sack the town, and then surrender  
it. Against the general despondency and general outcry the  
efforts of the commander could avail nothing ; he saw that the  
troops were equally disheartened, and perceived that men who  
evidently dreaded an assault were little likely to resist it with  
success. Yielding therefore to necessity, he opened a conference  
on the twenty-third. The Dutch would fain have referred every  
thing to the pending discussions in Europe ; the Portugueze,  
who had the sword in their hands, insisted upon treating only  
for the immediate objects of the Pernambucan war, and terms  
were soon settled, where the one party had no alternative but to  
submit. The first article stipulated in curious phrase, that all  
acts of hostility committed by the subjects of the United Pro-  
vinces and by the West India Company against the Portugueze,  
should be regarded as if they had never been committed : it



promised also an amnesty to the Portugueze who had followed the Dutch cause, and to the Jews, in all wherein they could promise it: . . . words which left an ominous latitude for Catholic intolerance. Moveable property was secured to the owners, and of the ships which were in the harbour as many were to be given to the Dutch as would suffice for the transport of all who chose to remove; ships arriving from Holland within four months should be permitted to return, and those which were now off the coast were allowed to come into port, persons and property being secured. The Dutch who had married Portugueze or Pernambucan women might take their wives to Holland, if their wives chose to accompany them; or they might remain in Brazil upon the same footing with regard to religion as foreigners were at that time in Portugal. The Dutch, having surrendered their arms, might remain three months in Recife to settle their affairs, and when they departed they might assign their property, whether moveable or fixed, to persons who should act for them; all the provisions in the magazines were at their use during their stay and for the voyage. They were to surrender Recife and Mauritiás, with the adjacent forts, the Potengi, Paraíba, Itamaraca, Seara, and the Isle of Fernam de Noronha, all which they possessed in Brazil or on the coast thereof, with all their artillery and stores, excepting such iron guns as were necessary for the protection of the transports, and twenty pieces of brass artillery, from four to eighteen-pounders, for the ship in which the General should embark. The amnesty was extended to all the Indians in the Dutch service; one Antonio Mendes, who must have been particularly obnoxious, was included by name: the Mulattos, Negroes, and Mamalucos were included also, but they were not, like the Dutch, to march out with the honours of war. These terms having been concluded, Fernandes entered the city and received the keys of the magazines,

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forts, &c. seventy-three in number, which he delivered to Barreto: and well, says his historian, may it be said, that from the hands of Joam Fernandes Vieira, Francisco Barreto received that city, and the Crown of Portugal its empire of Brazil.

*Vidal goes to Portugal with the tidings.*

There were twelve hundred regular troops in Recife, one hundred and three brass guns, one hundred and seventy iron; eight hundred and fifty Indians had retired toward Seara. A Dutch colonel, by name Nicolaas, saved some of the distant garrisons; he got out of Recife upon a raft, and carried the news to Itamaraca, Paraiba, and the Potengi: at the first of these places four hundred men surrendered; but when the Portuguese arrived at Paraiba, they found that the enemy had embarked, with all their artillery and stores. Pedro Jaques and Brito Freire now proceeded with the convoy to Bahia, bearing with them the tidings of the complete expulsion of the enemy from Brazil, and giving to that city, says Raphael de Jesus, the happiest day which it had known since its foundation; . . . a happiness however, it ought to be added, which the inhabitants had but ill deserved. Vidal went to Portugal with the tidings, and to plead in defence of the Pernambucans, who, in disobedience of the King's commands, had reconquered their country for him. F. Joam de Resurreiçam, a Benedictine, who had served through the whole war, embarked in a smaller vessel, and sailed out of Recife in his wake. They steered different courses, but reached the Bar of Lisbon on the same evening. Vidal anchored in the river, meaning not to land till he could proceed immediately to the palace; the monk knew his ship, and passed it, thinking he was gone on shore, and that they should meet at court; but finding that he was not there, he thought it did not become him to delay the communication of so important an event. It was on the eve of St. Joseph's Day, when the King's birth-day was to be celebrated; and the King is said to have received the news as an act of St. Joseph's favour.

*Ericcyra, 824-40.  
D. Fr. Manoel Epanaphoras, 616.  
Cast. Lus. 10, § 19-48.*



The recovery of Pernambuco had thus been happily effected, but the litigated points between the two cabinets were yet undecided, and Portugal did not obtain this advantage without a heavy counterbalance of loss and humiliation. Irritated as the Dutch were, they were not in a condition to take immediate revenge in Europe, for it was about this time that they received that signal defeat from the English in which Tromp was killed, and which reduced them to the necessity of submitting to such terms as Cromwell thought proper to impose. But they prosecuted their successes in the East, and, as Vieyra had foreseen, succeeded in expelling the Portuguese from Ceylon, the most lucrative and the most tenable of all their Indian possessions. In the scale of profit this acquisition far outweighed the loss of the Brazilian provinces, and the Government, consoling itself with this knowledge, and embarrassed by its nearer disputes with England, forebore awhile from pressing its demand of restitution. A Portuguese agent still remained at the Hague, and the two nations continued their contest in India and their intercourse in Europe. Things were in this state, when Joam IV. died, at the close of the year 1656. He died at an age when he might have hoped for many years of life, and at a time when Portugal could ill bear his loss; and he had been unhappy enough to survive his eldest son Theodosio, a youth who for his hopeful spirit, and for his patronage of all that deserves to be patronized by princes, as well as for his early death, may be compared to our own Prince Henry. The Queen, a woman of manly mind and courage, was left regent during the minority of her son Affonso VI. The Spaniards were now more than ever in hope of crushing what they termed the rebellion of the Portuguese; and the Dutch, being delivered by peace from the formidable enmity of Cromwell, renewed their demands upon a helpless country, and prepared to enforce them. It was at this

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1654.

Death of  
Joam IV.

Ericsson  
p. 885.



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1657.

time the policy of France to prevent the ruin of Portugal; Louis XIV. offered to act as mediator, and was accepted on both sides: accordingly a Portugueze ambassador was named to treat under these auspices; but the Dutch, who during a late dispute with France had made some naval preparations, having that force disposable, thought the best mode of accelerating the business would be to send it to the Tagus. The fleet accordingly sailed under Admiral Wassenaar, with Tenhoven and De Wit as commissioners; and Ruyter was recalled from the Mediterranean to rejoin them on the coast of Portugal, and take the command. They were instructed to intercept, if possible, the Brazil fleet, to take as many good prizes as they could, by way of quickening the negotiations, and to declare war, if the terms which they proposed were not admitted.

*The Dutch  
send a fleet  
to the Tagus  
to dictate  
terms.*

The fleet, consisting of fourteen sail, anchored off the bar as friends, and as friends the Court sent them the customary refreshments. While they were waiting for Ruyter the commissioners landed, and were received by the Queen in council, to whom they presented a Latin memorial. It began with condoling upon the loss of the King her husband, proceeded to wish all prosperity to the King her son, and then passed to the subject in dispute: an answer was insisted upon within fourteen days, and this, it is said, was required in language which might have provoked some unpleasant acts of resentment, if the presence and the prudence of the Queen had not restrained her counsellors. She received the memorial courteously with her own hand, and another paper also, which contained these demands: that all the country between the River S. Francisco and Seara, inclusively, should be restored; all the artillery and stores which had been taken in the different forts; and all the private property of which the Dutch had been dispossessed in those provinces; that the Brazilian Portugueze should give



the Company one thousand draft oxen, one thousand cows, three hundred horses, and six hundred sheep, annually, for six years; that six hundred thousand florins should be paid the Company in six months, and thirteen thousand chests of sugar in thirteen years. Debts should be mutually paid; the Portuguese who chose to quit the ceded Captaincies might sell their property, but not remove it. The island of S. Thomas should be restored to the Dutch, with Angola, and all that had been taken from them upon that coast. The commissioners were asked if they came with powers to modify these terms, . . . otherwise it would be useless to discuss them: they replied, they had power to do whatever was just. Persons were then appointed to confer with them. The Portuguese observed, that it was very strange the States should negotiate in this manner, after they had accepted the mediation of France, whose ambassador the Portuguese minister was gone to meet at the Hague. It was replied, that the mediation of France was not superseded by this step, for that the French ambassador at Lisbon might act. The restitution of Pernambuco was then said to be contrary to the religion of the Portuguese; to be impossible, considering the temper both of the Pernambucans and the people of Portugal; and to be against the laws of Portugal, which prohibited any such alienation during the minority of the sovereign. The Dutch instanced cases wherein catholic princes had made cessions of territory to protestant powers. It was replied, that in these cases the countries so ceded had been bordering states, liable to war, and accustomed to liberty of religion; therefore the precedent was not applicable to countries in which liberty of conscience had never been admitted. The King, it was added, had no means of controlling subjects so remote; and were he to recal his garrisons, as the Company required, the only effect would be that the Brazilians would deliver themselves to some other



CHAP.  
XXII.  
1657.

Conferences  
at Lisbon.

crown; for they were a resolute people, and never would submit to the dominion of the States, from whom they had received such injuries in their properties, lives, and honours.

The commissioners then extended their term another week, and proposed a modified project, in which they receded from the demand of S. Thomas and Angola, requiring only a free trade with both places, and the right of erecting a fortress either in the Enseada de Soto, or on the rivers Coanza or Lucala. They still required the restitution of the provinces in Brazil, but lowered the amount of indemnification to three millions of florins, in money and sugar, payable in the course of eight years. To this the Portugueze made answer, that if the impossible demand of restitution were laid aside, her Majesty would instruct them to treat upon the rest, at whatever cost. The French ambassador now proposed, that if the commissioners had power so to do, they should offer a project, not including the restitution: that if they had no such power, an ambassador should be sent to Holland, who might there conclude a solid peace, under the mediation of the King of France and the Protector of England; or that if this were inconvenient, the place of meeting should be in France. The Queen declared herself willing to accede to either of these methods: the commissioners protested they could do nothing unless Pernambuco were restored; the Frenchman argued, that this was renouncing the mediation of his sovereign, for the use of a mediator was to moderate rigorous terms; but the Dutch persisted that the restitution of Pernambuco must be the *sine quâ non*. The Queen then laid the state of affairs before all her different councils and tribunals, thus appealing, as far as is possible in such a government, to the people. They unanimously replied, that there was no instance in their history wherein the patrimony of the crown had been diminished under a minority, and that the Portugueze were ready to die in de-



fending the territory which their ancestors had won. Persons who were conversant with Brazil were consulted, and they protested that the restitution was impossible. The Dutch negociators then declared that force must be the alternative; and the Portugueze called upon their countrymen to say, like the Maccabees, "We have not taken the land of another, neither do we keep that which is not our own." When the negociation was approaching this point, the Queen laid an embargo upon the Dutch ships at Lisbon and Setubal; and the commissioners, who came out with instructions to intercept the Brazil fleet, and seize all Portugueze ships which might be worth taking, made the most earnest representations through their Consul against this measure, and requested that the commerce between the two countries might have its course! Before they departed they wished to take leave of the Queen; but being informed that she was indisposed, they expressed their sorrow at being deprived of that honour, and at the occasion which deprived them; and left with the secretary of state a sealed letter, which they required him to deliver into her hand. The letter which was accompanied with this complimentary language contained a declaration of war.

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1657.

*Pinheiro  
Collection:  
MSS. Vol.  
2, No. 10.*

Oct. 22.

*Operations  
of Ruyter on  
the coast of  
Portugal.*

Ruyter now joined the squadron, and had it not been for a seasonable fog he would have inflicted a heavy blow upon the reviving commerce of Portugal. The homeward-bound Brazil fleet of eighty-four sail, then daily expected, was separated by a storm in latitude thirty-one, and part of it fell in with the enemy; but such was the thickness of the weather, that though the Dutch squadron were for two days actually in the midst of forty sail of richly-laden merchantmen, only five were captured. After this disappointment Ruyter returned to winter in Holland, suffering much upon the way from want of water, and from tempests. In the ensuing year he was sent out with twenty-two sail, having three thousand three hundred troops on board, with

1658.



CHAP. orders to attack the Portugueze by land and by sea, and com-  
 XXII. mit every kind of hostility against them. He was to be follow-  
 1658. ed by reinforcements, under Wassenaar, but these were never  
 sent: his own fleet suffered from storms upon the way, and  
 when he arrived off the Tagus it was discovered that the ships  
 were so ill supplied with water-casks that they could only con-  
 tain enough for ten days' consumption. The enemy were too  
 wise to come out for the purpose of giving him battle, and in a  
 few days he found it necessary to put into Cadiz for water, and  
 to anchor under Cape St. Vincents, for the purpose of cleaning  
 his ships. He continued after this to cruise off the coast, with  
 little injury to the Portugueze, till the commencement of winter,  
 and then again returned to Holland. His appearance had  
 seemed to accelerate the negotiations; but meantime Holland  
 became involved in the dispute between Denmark and Sweden,  
 and the Portugueze, having experienced how little had been  
 done by the Dutch when they had no other object in view,  
 made no haste to conclude the pending treaty when they saw  
 them engaged in the Baltic. Both parties, however, were weary  
 of the contest, for there now remained little in the East of which  
 Holland could hope to despoil the Portugueze, and nothing in  
 the West for Portugal to recover from the Dutch. At this time  
 D. Fernando Telles de Faro was sent ambassador to the Hague,  
 and he, either thinking that the affairs of his country were going  
 to ruin, or that his own private fortunes might be improved by  
 an act of treason, absconded from his mission, deserted to the  
 Spaniards, and revealed the secrets of his government to the  
 Spanish court. The Spaniards assured the States, upon this  
 traitor's authority, that the Queen of Portugal would restore  
 Pernambuco if the demand were persisted in, and the States  
 accordingly raised their demands; being encouraged in this also  
 by the conduct of Charles II. then on his way to receive the

*Brandt.*  
*Life of Ruy-*  
*ter, French*  
*translation,*  
*p. 97—108.*

1659.



crown of England; for that prince, while he showed every mark of favour to the Spanish ambassador at the Hague, refused to admit the visits of the Portugueze minister, the Conde de Miranda, as if it was not his intention to recognize the Braganzan dynasty. But Charles soon altered his views; and while treating for his marriage with a Portugueze princess, he intimated to the Dutch, that if they persevered in their resentment against Portugal, he should become a party in the dispute. France also now interfered more earnestly, for the purpose of delivering Portugal from one enemy, that it might be better able to resist the Spaniards. The long-protracted negotiations were therefore at length concluded, Portugal consenting to pay to the amount of four millions of *cruzados*, in money, sugar, tobacco, and salt, as might be most convenient to her, in sixteen annual payments; and to restore all the artillery taken in Brazil which was marked either with the arms of the United Provinces or of the West India Company. This was the preliminary article to a long commercial treaty, at the close of which it was stipulated that all matters of litigation between the subjects of the two powers respecting property in Brazil should be amicably settled within two months; if this could not be done, three commissioners were to be mutually appointed, who should go over for the term of eighteen months, to inform themselves upon the spot of all the points in dispute, and then meet at Lisbon, there to pass sentence finally and without appeal.

Thus after so many years of mutual insincerity and mutual suffering, the struggle between the Portugueze and Dutch was ended. The dishonourable aggressions of the Dutch at the commencement of the ten years truce gave the Portugueze a fair pretext for their subsequent infractions of the same agreement: though if no such pretext had been given, it cannot be doubted that the Pernambucans would have risen against a heavy and a

CHAP.  
XXII.  
1661.

*Ericeyra.*  
T. 2, 269,  
310.

*Interference  
of England,*

Aug. 6.

*and final  
settlement of  
peace.*

*Du Mont.*



CHAP. galling yoke, and it is more than probable that Portugal, from  
 XXII. its religious principles and its national spirit, would have aided  
 1661. and abetted the insurgents. The motives of that insurrection were  
 both as evil and as good as they have been represented by the  
 writers of the different countries. Joam Fernandes Vieira would  
 not perhaps have found encouragement in his designs, if many of  
 the leading conspirators had not been men of desperate fortunes;  
 but on the other hand, nothing short of the high principle of  
 patriotism could have enabled him and his countrymen to persevere  
 through so many difficulties, and such continual disappointments.  
 As in the commencement of the struggle, there is much that is disgraceful  
 on both parts, so also the termination cannot be considered as honourable  
 to either: the Dutch were beaten out of the country in dispute, and  
 the Portuguese consented to pay for the victory which they had obtained.  
 But Portugal must not be reproached for this submission, at a time  
 of the utmost internal weakness, and the greatest pressure of danger  
 from Spain. At that time the loss of Ceylon may perhaps have been  
 thought to outweigh the recovery of the Brazilian provinces: but  
 Ceylon must always have fallen to a stronger maritime power, and  
 the Portuguese, though the most amalgamating in their policy of all  
 the European conquerors, and in that respect the wisest, would still  
 have formed but a small part of its population. On the other hand,  
 the recovery of Pernambuco has left Portugal in undisputed possession  
 of one of the most extensive and highly-favoured regions of the globe;  
 . . . an empire which under every imaginable circumstance of  
 misgovernment has continued to advance in population and in industry,  
 which is now rapidly progressive, and which, whatever revolutions it  
 may be destined to undergo, will remain the patrimony of a Portuguese  
 people, speaking the language of Fernam Lopes, of Barros, of Camoens, and Vieira.